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Abstract
This dissertation addresses the two questions of how economic activity is distributed 
across space, and what are the factors that determine this distribution. The introductory 
chapter sets the scene. This is followed by three substantive chapters which cover three 
different aspects of economic location: the size distribution of cities, factor endowments, 
and political economy. A final chapter concludes.
Chapter 2 assesses the empirical validity of Zipf’s Law for cities, which states that 
the size distribution of cities follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter equal to
1. New data on 73 countries is used. We reject Zipf’s Law far more often than we would 
expect based on random chance. Variations in the value of the Pareto exponent are better 
explained by political economy variables than by economic geography variables.
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between factor endowments, technology, and the 
location of industrial production, using a panel dataset on Indian industries across states 
and over time. Factor endowments and technology play important roles in explaining the 
share of an industry in GDP. This finding is robust to the inclusion of controls for the policy 
environment and market access. The liberalisation of the economy beginning in 1985 and 
1991 represents a clear structural break in the relationship between industry share, factor 
endowments, and technology.
Chapter 4 develops and tests a political economy model of campaign contributions 
and electoral competition, extended to consider the implications for factor mobility and 
hence the structure of production. There are two main predictions. First, countries with 
more capital stock tend to implement more pro-capital policies. Second, the more different 
are countries’ policies, the more different will be the set of goods which they produce. 
These predictions are confirmed using panel data on cross-state differences in policies and 
economic outcomes in India.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
The revival of interest in economic geography has been largely credited to Paul 
Krugman’s 1991 book Geography and Trade. In that book, Krugman develops the idea 
that, in the presence of increasing returns to scale and transport costs of goods, work­
ers and entrepreneurs have an incentive to locate together, or to use the economists’ 
buzzword, to "agglomerate". This then has implications for the unequal distribution of 
economic activity across locations.
Yet Krugman was not the first to think about the issue of where economic activ­
ity is located. Indeed, the neoclassical trade model developed by Heckscher and Ohlin is 
essentially a model of the distribution of economic activity, in this case based on factor 
endowment differences across locations. And finally, in a world where government in­
tervention is part of economic life, the role of politics cannot be discounted as a force for 
the determination of the location of economic activity.
This dissertation addresses the question of where economic activity is located, and 
why. The uneven distribution across space of economic activity is a fact of life and 
one can think of many reasons why this is the case. I focus on three basic ideas: that 
the location of economic activity can in large part be explained by differences in factor 
endowments, market access, and policies across locations. These ideas are illustrated in 
three specific applications: the size distribution of cities, the relationship between factor 
endowments and the location of industry, and the role of absolute size in influencing 
policy and hence the structure of production.
In the rest of this introduction, I discuss the three basic ideas underlying the analy­
sis, and give an overview of the rest of the dissertation. Chapter 2 begins the analysis 
on the size distribution of cities, while Chapter 3 focusses on the relationship between 
factor endowments, technology, and industrial structure. Chapter 4 shifts the focus to
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emphasise the role of politics and government policy. Finally, Chapter 5 offers some 
brief conclusions. In view of the diverse issues addressed here, I do not dedicate a sepa­
rate chapter to an overall literature review; instead, a literature review is incorporated into 
the introductory sections of each chapter, to highlight the contributions of that chapter 
relative to the existing literature.
1.1 Three basic ideas
There are clearly many possible factors that may influence the distribution of economic 
activity across space. In this dissertation I limit my analysis to three factors which to­
gether appear to have the greatest impact: factor endowments, market access, and poli­
tics. This section will highlight how these factors are interwoven into the analysis of the 
following chapters.
Factor endowments refer to the distribution of factors of production. This may in­
clude natural resources such as minerals, or man-made resources such as capital stock 
and skilled labour. Factor endowments have played many important roles in economics. 
For my purposes, two roles are the most important. First, the neoclassical theory of inter­
national trade as developed by Heckscher and Ohlin has emphasised the importance of 
differences in factor endowments across countries in the determination of industrial struc­
ture and hence the pattern of trade (see Flam and Flanders (1991) for a translation of the 
original contributions by Heckscher and Ohlin). The key result of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
trade theory is that countries will tend to specialise in the goods which use intensively the 
factors with which they are (relatively) abundantly endowed. This result emerges most 
cleanly in the model with two goods and two factors, but holds with appropriate qualifica­
tions and modifications when there are larger numbers of goods and factors. As Chapter 
3 documents, recent empirical studies which relax some of the stricter assumptions of 
the standard model, have found a good fit between theory and evidence.
Another way in which factor endowments may impact on the subsequent analysis 
comes from neoclassical growth theory. Here the seminal article is Solow (1956), who 
shows that factor accumulation leads to higher levels of per capita income. This theoret­
ical result on factor accumulation and income levels has found empirical support in the
12
results of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). In chapters 2 and 4, the level of per capita 
income is included in the empirical analysis to capture this effect.
The original idea of market access appears to have come from regional science, 
in what Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) refer to as market potential analysis. The 
basic idea is intuitively appealing: in the presence of any type of cost of connecting 
producers to consumers, producers will prefer to locate in areas with many consumers. 
This idea has formed the basis of formal theoretical modelling by Krugman and others 
(see especially Krugman (1991), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999)), which they refer 
to as new economic geography.
Theory-consistent empirical validation of this idea can be found in Hanson (1998), 
Redding and Venables (2004), and Amiti and Cameron (2004), who find that access to 
markets and suppliers play important roles in determining differences in income levels 
across locations. Overman, Redding and Venables (2003) survey this and older evidence 
on the role of proximity to markets, while Harrigan (2003) has a section discussing the 
persistent success of the gravity equation as a predictor of trade flows between countries. 
In my analysis, direct measures of the variables used in models of new economic geogra­
phy are included in the analysis in Chapter 2, while measures of market access are used 
in Chapter 3.
Finally, there is the role of politics. In the absence of market failures and with a 
benevolent social planner, the planner’s outcome simply replicates the competitive out­
come. However, since in reality there are market failures, diverse special interest groups 
and social planners who are not always benevolent, state intervention in the economy 
has the potential to yield outcomes that are very different from market outcomes. This 
line of research is most closely associated with the work of Persson and Tabellini (2000) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001), who characterise the equilibria that emerge 
when political agents are self-interested agents. The alternative theories relating politics 
to trade policy are surveyed in Helpman (1997), while empirical evidence as surveyed by 
Gawande and Krishna (2003) tends to be supportive of the impact of politics on economic 
outcomes, although the details of the evidence do not always agree with the theories.
Politics plays an important part in all o f the following chapters. In Chapters 2 and 
3, political histories and government policies are used as part of the empirical exercise,
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while Chapter 4 develops a political economy theory of capital mobility and industrial 
structure, and proceeds to empirically test the predictions o f the model.
1.2 Three levels of analysis
As with the basic ideas underlying the location of economic activity, so too are there 
many levels at which we can approach the subject. A strategic narrowing of the analysis 
allows me to focus more sharply on the key messages. I focus on three levels of analysis, 
which may be delineated as description, theoretical explanation, and empirical expla­
nation. In each of the three following chapters, the emphasis is on a different level of 
analysis, as well as a different area of application. The choice of area and level of analy­
sis are complementary, and reflect the issue at hand. Nevertheless, each chapter contains 
elements of all three levels of analysis - the difference across chapters is mainly one of 
which level is most strongly emphasised.
Chapter 2 focusses on the size distribution of cities and includes both description 
and empirical estimation motivated by theory. Here, the crucial idea is Zipf’s Law: the 
idea that city sizes follow a Pareto distribution with shape parameter equal to one. From 
this is derived the main estimated equation. In this chapter, the question is: do city 
size distributions follow Zipf’s Law? In the last decade or so, as detailed in Chapter 
2, many new theories have emerged purporting to explain the "empirical fact" that city 
size distributions follow a Pareto distribution. But what of this "empirical fact" which 
they claim to explain? The last detailed cross-country study on this issue was Rosen and 
Resnick (1980), which was performed on data from 1970, which found only equivocal 
evidence in favour of this hypothesis. While city systems do not as a rule experience 
massive changes overnight, it is conceivable that in the 30 years since the data used by 
Rosen and Resnick, new patterns may have emerged that justify a new study describing 
the size distribution of cities. Further, instead of simply replicating Rosen and Resnick’s 
approach, advances in econometric methods and more careful analysis of the results 
may yield further insights not captured by Rosen and Resnick’s classic paper. Such a 
study would enhance our understanding of city size distributions and better inform future 
theoretical work. These are the main motivations for the analysis in Chapter 2.
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The key result of Chapter 2 is that Zipf’s Law is statistically rejected far more of­
ten than we would expect based on random chance, calling into question the "empirical 
fact" underlying much of the recent theoretical literature. Using OLS as the estimation 
method, Zipf’s Law is rejected for 53 of the 73 countries in my sample, while using the 
alternative Hill (1975) estimator for extreme values, Zipf’s Law is rejected for 30 coun­
tries. There is also some evidence that city size distributions do not precisely follow 
a Pareto distribution. Closer inspection of the results suggests that European countries 
tend to have a more equal distribution of city sizes than Asian, African or Latin Amer­
ican countries. Extending the analysis, I find that this difference across continents is 
largely explained by differences in political history and stability, as well as differences in 
industrial structure and transportation infrastructure.
Theory-consistent empirical explanation is the key analytical device in Chapter 3. 
This chapter is a detailed study of the industrial structure in India in the period 1980 to 
1997. It starts out with a brief description of the unequal distribution of industrial activity 
across Indian states, where some states are considerably more industrialised than others. 
It then goes on to ask whether a standard model of factor endowments and technology can 
explain this unequal distribution. Here, the basic framework is based on that popularised 
by Harrigan (1997) for his study of the industrial structure of OECD countries. The 
framework is that of the neoclassical trade model, from which an estimating equation is 
derived linking the share of an industry in a state to factor endowments and technology. 
The data used is a state-industry-year panel covering 16 major states for the period noted 
above, for 18 2-digit industries. In addition to simply applying the framework to data 
on India, I also extend the framework in two ways. First, I include additional variables 
as robustness checks, and second, in view of the economic liberalisation initiated by 
the Indian government in 1985 and 1991, I consider the implications of these natural 
experiments for the relationship between factor endowments and industrial structure.
The main finding of Chapter 3 is that factor endowments and technology are 
strongly associated with industrial structure in India. This finding is robust to the in­
clusion of additional controls for government policy and political history, and to market 
access. While technological superiority is associated with a larger share of that indus­
try, there is only mixed evidence of continuous technological progress across all indus­
tries. Further, there is evidence of structural breaks in the relationship between factor
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endowments, technology and industrial structure in both 1985 and 1991, coinciding with 
the liberalisation of the Indian economy in these two years; the shift from a primarily 
state-controlled economy to a market-orientated one has changed the relationship be­
tween technology, factor endowments and industrial structure. These findings show that 
a neoclassical economic model can explain features of the economies of less developed 
countries, and that one need not always recourse to special models when analysing these 
countries.
Finally, Chapter 4 switches the main analytical approach to that of theoretical ex­
planation, together with empirical explanation and testing of theoretical predictions. In 
this chapter, the question is: how can initial conditions in the form of absolute factor en­
dowments impact on economic policy and what are the implications for industrial struc­
ture? While the role of initial conditions has been emphasised especially in the literature 
on economic geography, the channel of influence through public policy has only been re­
cently developed, especially in the work of Baldwin et al (2003). Here, differently from 
Baldwin et al (2003) whose starting point is a model of economic geography, I develop a 
theoretical model of political economy that predicts a relationship between absolute fac­
tor endowments and government policy. The underlying model is one of electoral com­
petition and special interest politics, based on the framework of Grossman and Helpman 
(1996). There are two main contributions of the theoretical analysis. First, I extend the 
framework to allow for multiple industries in order to consider the implications of politi­
cal economy for industrial structure. Second, I extend the framework further to introduce 
factor mobility across locations, which introduces interesting interactions between initial 
factor endowments, government policies, and industrial structure.
The two main theoretical predictions are the following. First, the larger is the 
absolute capital stock in a country, the more favourable to capital will be the policies 
adopted by that country. Second, in a two country world, the country which starts out 
with more capital stock, will implement more favourable policies toward capital, and 
hence will be able to attract capital flows from the other country. An intial absolute 
advantage in capital stock may then be associated with a long run comparative advantage 
in the capital-intensive good.
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I take the two predictions of the model to empirical data across Indian states be­
tween 1959 and 1997. I run two regressions: First, I regress a measure of labour regula­
tion on absolute capital stocks, to test the first prediction above, and find that states with 
more capital stock do indeed have more favourable labour regulations toward capital. 
Since labour regulation may also influence the capital stock in a state, I run the regres­
sion using both OLS and Instrumental Variables (IV) methods to address the problem 
of reverse causality. In the IV case, I instrument capital stock using electricity generat­
ing capacity and bank credit, and I show that these instruments have highly significant 
effects on capital stock, and pass the standard tests for overidentification. The second 
regression which I run is a regression of the difference in industrial structure across In­
dian states on differences in labour regulation, and once again the empirical finding is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction: the greater is the difference between states in 
their labour regulation, the greater will be the difference between them in their industrial 
structure.
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Chapter 2 
Zipf’s Law for Cities: A Cross Country 
Investigation2
2.1 Introduction
One of the most striking regularities in the location of economic activity is how much 
of it is concentrated in cities. Since cities come in different sizes, one enduring line of 
research has been in describing the size distribution of cities within an urban system.
The idea that the size distribution of cities in a country can be approximated by a 
Pareto distribution has fascinated social scientists ever since Auerbach (1913) first pro­
posed it. Over the years, Auerbach’s basic proposition has been refined by many others, 
most notably Zipf (1949), hence the term “Zipf’s Law” is frequently used to refer to the 
idea that city sizes follow a Pareto distribution. Zipf’s Law states that not only does the 
size distribution of cities follow a Pareto distribution, but that the distribution has a shape 
parameter (henceforth the Pareto exponent) equal to l 3.
The issue addressed by this chapter is the extent to which Zipf’s Law holds across 
a broad cross-section of countries. This is important for at least two main reasons. First, 
the most recent cross-country study of Zipf’s Law was Rosen and Resnick (1980), which 
uses data from 1970. If  we are interested in discovering the size distribution of cities 
today, we need to perform the analysis with a new, updated dataset. Such an analysis can 
take advantage not only of newer data, but also new econometric methods. Second, new 
empirical evidence would help drive theoretical work in this area. Several recent papers4 
have sought to provide theoretical explanations for the "empirical fact" that Zipf’s Law 
holds in general across countries. It is therefore crucial to discover whether or not Zipf’s
2 This chapter is based on a paper accepted for publication in Regional Science and Urban Economics.
3 Although to be clear, it is not a "Law", but simply a proposition on the size distribution o f cities.
4 A partial list includes Krugman (1996), Gabaix (1999), Axtell and Florida (2000), Reed (2001), Cordoba 
(2004), Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2003), Eeckhout (2004). In addition, Brakman, Garretsen, Van Mar- 
rewijk and van den Berg (1999) and Duranton (2004,2005) seek to model the empirical city size distribution, 
even if it doesn’t follow Zipf’s Law.
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Law actually does hold - whether it does or not, it is the actual size distribution of cities 
which should be the objective of theoretical modelling.
The present chapter sets out to do four things: the first is to test Zipf’s Law, using 
a new dataset. This dataset includes 73 countries, and is for the latest available census 
period (almost always after 1990). The second is to perform the analysis using the Hill 
estimator suggested by Gabaix and Ioannides (2004), who show that the OLS estimator 
is downward biased when estimating the Zipf regression, and that the Hill estimator 
is the maximum likelihood estimator if the size distribution of cities follows a Pareto 
distribution. Third, it non-parametrically analyses the distribution of the Pareto exponent 
to give an indication of its shape and to yield additional insights. Finally, this chapter 
sets out to explore the relationship between variation in the Pareto exponent, and some 
variables motivated by economic theory.
Our main findings are as follows. First, when we use OLS, for cities, Zipf’s Law 
fails for the majority of countries. The size distribution often does not follow a Pareto dis­
tribution, and even when it does, the Pareto exponent is frequently statistically different 
from 1, with over half the countries exhibiting values of the Pareto exponent significantly 
greater than 1. This is consistent with Rosen and Resnick’s earlier result. Second, we 
find that, for agglomerations, the Pareto exponent tends to be significantly less than 1 us­
ing OLS; this finding differs from Rosen and Resnick, who find that, for agglomerations, 
the Pareto exponent is equal to 1. We argue that this is largely due to a different sam­
ple of countries used in the analysis. The third main finding is that the OLS estimates 
of the Pareto exponent are unimodally distributed, while the Hill estimates are bimodal; 
this may indicate that at least one of the estimators is not appropriate. Fourth, we show 
that both political and economic geography variables are significant determinants of the 
size distribution of cities, although political variables tend to be more jointly significant 
than economic geography variables.
The next section outlines Zipf’s Law and briefly reviews the empirical literature 
in the area. Section 2.3 describes the data and the methods, and section 2.4 presents the 
results, along with non-parametric analysis of the Pareto exponent. Section 2.5 takes the 
analysis further by seeking to uncover the relationship between these measures of the
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urban system and some economic variables, based oh models of the size distribution of 
cities. The last section concludes.
2.2 Zipf’s Law and Related Literature
The form of the size distribution of cities as first suggested by Auerbach in 1913 takes 
the following Pareto distribution:
y = A x~ a (2.1)
or
log y =  log A  — a log x  (2.2)
where x  is a particular population size, y  is the number of cities with populations greater 
than x, and A  and a are constants (A , a > 0). Zipf’s (1949) contribution was to propose 
that the distribution of city sizes could not only be described as a Pareto distribution but 
that it took a special form of that distribution with a = 1 (with the corollary that A  is the 
size of the largest city). This is Zipf’s Law.
Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) and Cheshire (1999) are excellent surveys of this 
literature. The key empirical article in this field is Rosen and Resnick (1980). Their 
study investigates the value of the Pareto exponent for a sample of 44 countries, in 1970. 
Their estimates ranged from 0.81 (Morocco) to 1.96 (Australia), with a sample mean
of 1.14. The exponent in 32 out of 44 countries exceeded unity. This indicates that
populations in most countries are more evenly distributed than would be predicted by 
Zipf’s Law. Rosen and Resnick also find that, where data was available, the value of the 
Pareto exponent is lower for urban agglomerations as compared to cities.
More detailed studies of Zipf’s Law (e.g. Guerin-Pace’s (1995) study of the ur­
ban system of France between 1831 and 1990 for cities with more than 2000 inhabitants) 
show that estimates of a are sensitive to the sample selection criteria. This implies that 
the Pareto distribution is not precisely appropriate as a description of the city size distri­
bution. This issue was also raised by Rosen and Resnick, who explored adding quadratic 
and cubic terms to the basic form, giving
log y  =  (log A)' +  a' log x  +  b’ (log x )2 (2.3)
l°g V = (log A)" +  a" log x  -I- b" (log x )2 +  c" (log x )3 (2.4)
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They found indications of both concavity (a' <  0) and convexity (a' >  0) with respect to 
the pure Pareto distribution, with more than two thirds (30 of 44) of countries exhibiting 
convexity. As Guerin-Pace (1995) demonstrates, this result is also sensitive to sample 
selection5.
Nitsch (2003) is an important recent contribution to this literature. In this paper, he 
provides a meta-analysis of Zipf’s Law; that is, he looks at the results of 515 regressions 
from 29 previous studies, and performs a statistical analysis on these results. His paper 
therefore summarises the results of a century of empirical research on this topic. He finds 
that the average value of the Pareto exponent from all these studies is 1.09, and that the 
coefficient is larger for cities than for urban agglomerations (1.11 for cities versus 1.02 
for urban agglomerations).
There have also been papers which seek to test directly some of the theoretical 
models of Zipf’s Law; in particular, the idea, associated with Gabaix (1999) and Cor­
doba (2004), that Zipf’s Law follows from Gibrat’s Law. Black and Henderson (2003), 
for example, test whether the growth rate of cities in the US follows Gibrat’s Law. They 
conclude that neither Zipf’s Law nor Gibrat’s Law apply in their sample of cities. On the 
other hand, Ioannides and Overman (2003), using similar data but a different method, 
find that Gibrat’s Law holds in the US. This is an interesting development; however data 
limitations prevent us from being able to test for Gibrat’s Law, as our dataset lacks suf­
ficient time periods to track the growth path of cities over time (Ioannides and Overman 
use US data with ten time periods; in our dataset, the maximum number of time periods 
is four).
While obtaining the value for the Pareto exponent for different countries is inter­
esting in itself, there is also great interest in investigating the factors that may influence 
the value of the exponent, for such a relationship may point to more interesting economic 
and policy-related issues. Rosen and Resnick (1980), for example, find that the Pareto 
exponent is positively related to per capita GNP, total population and railroad density, but 
negatively related to land area. Mills and Becker (1986), in their study of the urban sys­
tem in India, find that the Pareto exponent is positively related to total population and the
5 The addition o f such terms can be viewed as a weak form o f the Ramsey (1969) RESET test for functional 
form misspecification. In our sample, we find that the full RESET test rejects the null o f  no omitted variables 
almost every time.
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percentage of workers in manufacturing. Alperovich’s (1993) cross-country study using 
values of the Pareto exponent from Rosen and Resnick (1980) finds that it is positively 
related to per capita GNP, population density, and land area, and negatively related to the 
government share of GDP, and the share of manufacturing value added in GDP.
2.3 Data and Methods
2.3.1 Data
This chapter uses a new data set, obtained from the following website: Thomas Brinkhoff 
(2004): City Population, http://www.citypopulation.de. This site has data on city popu­
lations for over 100 countries. However, we have only made use of data on 75 countries, 
because for smaller countries the number of cities was very small (less than 20 in most 
cases). For each country, data is available for one to four census periods, the earliest 
record being 1972 and the latest 2001. This gives a total number of country-year pairs of 
observations of 197. For every country (except Peru and New Zealand), data is available 
for administratively defined cities. But for a subset of 26 countries (including Peru and 
New Zealand), there is also data for urban agglomerations, defined as a central city and 
neighbouring communities linked to it by continuous built-up areas or many commuters.
The precise definition of cities is an issue that often arises in the literature. Offi­
cial statistics, even if reliable, are still based on the statistical authorities’ definition of 
city boundaries. These definitions may or may not coincide with the economically mean­
ingful definition of “city” (see Rosen and Resnick (1980) or Cheshire (1999)). Data for 
agglomerations might more closely approximate a functional definition, as they typically 
include surrounding suburbs where the workers of a city reside.
To alleviate fears as to the reliability of online data, we have cross-checked the 
data with official statistics published by the various countries’ statistical agencies, the 
UN Demographic Yearbook and the Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year (2001). 
The data in every case matched with one or more of these sources6.
6 For example, the figures for South Africa, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, India, Malaysia, Pak-
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The lower population threshold for a city to be included in the sample, is obtained 
from the definition given by Brinkhoff (2004), who in turn obtains his definition from the 
national statistical agencies. This seems a reasonable way to proceed, as what is defined 
as a city in a small country, may not satisfy the definition of a city in a larger country. As a 
result, this lower threshold for inclusion varies from one country to another. On average, 
larger countries have higher thresholds, but also a larger number of cities in the sample. 
The countries chosen all have minimum thresholds of at least 10,000. Our sample of 75 
countries includes all the countries in the Rosen and Resnick sample, except for Ghana, 
Sri Lanka and Zaire.
Some discussion of the sample selection criteria used here is in order. Cheshire 
(1999) raises this issue. He argues that there are three possible criteria: a fixed number of 
cities, a fixed size threshold, or a size above which the sample accounts for some given 
proportion of a country’s population. He objects to the third criterion as it is influenced 
by the degree of urbanisation in the country. However, it is simple to see that the other 
two criteria he prefers are also problematic: the first because for small countries a city 
of rank n might be a mere village indistinguishable from the surrounding countryside, 
whereas for a large country the nth city might be a large metropolis. While the limita­
tion of the second criterion is that when countries are of different sizes, a fixed threshold 
would imply that a different fraction of the urban system is represented in the sample. We 
therefore use a different threshold for each country; this threshold is determined mainly 
by data considerations, however as noted above, there exists a positive relationship be­
tween the size of a country and the threshold for inclusion. This seems in our opinion to 
represent the best way of describing the reality that large countries do have more cities 
than small countries on average, however, what is defined as a city in a small country 
might not be considered as such in a larger country.
As a check on the sensitivity of our results to different sample selection criteria, 
we performed two experiments. First, for all countries for which at least 50 cities are
istan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Vietnam, Austria and Greece are the same as those from the United Na­
tions Demographic Yearbook. The figures for Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Kenya, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, 
Venezuela, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kuwait, Azerbaijan, Philippines, Russia, Turkey, Jordan, Bulgaria, Den­
mark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzer­
land, Spain, Ukraine and Yugoslavia are the same as those from the Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the 
Year. It should be noted that the Encyclopaedia Britannica Book o f the Year 2001 lists BrinkhofFs website 
as one o f its data sources, thus adding credibility to the data obtained from this website.
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available, we restrict the sample in each country to the 50 largest cities, and run the 
Zipf regression for these 50 cities. Second, we restrict the sample of cities to all cities 
with a population of over 100000, thus maintaining a constant lower threshold across 
countries; these correspond to Cheshire’s first two selection criteria above. In light of 
the discussion of Guerin-Pace (1995) above, it is unsurprising that the estimated value of 
the Pareto exponent changes as the sample size is changed, as there is some evidence of 
nonlinearity in the log-rank log-population plot in many countries.
Nevertheless, the overall picture is not very different when we use different selec­
tion criteria. In unreported results, we find that, first, for the 50 countries for which we 
have at least 50 cities, the mean value of the Pareto exponent is 1.20 when only 50 cities 
are included, against 1.16 when all available cities are included. This difference is not 
statistically significant (p-value of 0.13). Second, for the sample which fixes the lower 
threshold for inclusion, when all countries are included, the mean value of the Pareto ex­
ponent is 1.07, compared to 1.11 when the full sample is used. This difference is again 
not statistically significant (p-value of 0.17). Since the number of cities with more than 
100000 people is very small in some countries, removing those countries with less than 
10 cities using this criterion, leaves us with 49 countries, for which the mean value of the 
Pareto exponent is 1.14, compared to the full sample estimate for these 49 countries of 
1.09; the p-value for the test of similarity of the two samples’ means is 0.15.
As an additional test, data was kindly provided by Paul Cheshire on carefully 
defined Functional Urban Regions (FURs), for twelve countries in the EC and the EFTA. 
This dataset, by more carefully defining the urban system, might be viewed as a more 
valid test of Zipf’s Law. However, because the minimum threshold in the dataset is 
300,000, meaningful regressions were run for only the seven largest countries in the 
sample (France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom). This serves as an additional check on the validity of the results obtained using 
the main dataset. The results using Cheshire’s dataset are similar to those obtained using 
Brinkhoff’s dataset and are not reported for brevity.
Data for the second stage regression which seeks to uncover the factors which in­
fluence the Pareto exponent a is obtained from the World Bank World Development In­
dicators CD-ROM, the International Road Federation World Road Statistics, the UNIDO
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Industrial Statistics Database, and the Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) geographical 
dataset. The GASTIL index (named after Raymond Gastil, who developed the method­
ology used in computing the index) is from Freedom House.
2.3.2 Methods
Two estimation methods are used in this chapter: OLS and the Hill (1975) method. Using 
OLS, two regressions are run:
Equation (2.2) seeks to test whether a = 1 and A  =size of largest city, while equation
(2.3) seeks to uncover any non-linearities that could indicate deviations from the Pareto 
distribution. Both these regressions are run for each country and each time period sep­
arately, using OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. This is done for all 
countries although a Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity has mixed results.
Measurement error in city populations may induce a correlation between the rank 
of a city and its population. As an additional check, the regressions were also run using 
Instrumental Variables (IV). We instrument current city population with city population 
from the previous observed period; since our data are from each country’s population 
census, the lag can be between 5 and 15 years. When we have data for at least three 
time periods, both previous observations are used as instruments for present city popu­
lation. The instruments have highly significant effects on the instrumented variable in 
the first stage regression, and when two instruments are used, IV passes the Sargan test 
for overidentification7. Results using IV are very similar to the OLS results, and are not 
reported.
One potentially serious problem with the Zipf regression is that it is biased in 
small samples. Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) show using Monte Carlo simulations that 
the coefficient of the OLS regression of equation (2.2) is biased downward for sample
7 Using lagged values as instruments is appropriate only if  shocks to city populations are not correlated 
across time. Otherwise the instruments would be correlated with the errors. If  shocks are persistent, the 
Sargan test has low power, since it assumes that at least one of the instruments satisfies the exclusion restric­
tions.
log y  =  log A  — a log x
log y = (log A )' -1- a’ log x  +  b' (log x )2
(2.2)
(2.3)
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sizes in the range that is usually considered for city size distributions. The reason for 
this is that, although the rank-size rule predicts that the second largest city will be half 
the size of the largest city, the 95 percent confidence interval for the ratio of the sizes of 
the two largest cities is [1,20]. Therefore, the largest city will appear "too large", and in 
compensation, the OLS line will be less steep, so that the OLS estimate of a will be less 
than the true value.
Further, because the ranking procedure creates a positive correlation between the 
residuals, the OLS standard errors are incorrect. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) argue 
that with positive correlation in the residuals, OLS underestimates the true standard error, 
and this is confirmed by Gabaix and Ioannides (2004). They show that OLS standard 
errors are grossly underestimated (by a factor of at least 5 for typical sample sizes), thus 
leading to too many rejections of Zipf’s Law. They also show that, even if the actual data 
exhibit no nonlinear behaviour, OLS regression of equation (2.3) will yield a statistically 
significant coefficient for the quadratic term an incredible 78% of the time in a sample 
of 50 observations. This is again caused by the correlation in the residuals, which causes 
OLS to underestimate the true standard error.
To take into account these concerns, we use the Hill (1975) estimator as an alter­
native procedure for calculating the value of the Pareto exponent, as suggested by Gabaix 
and Ioannides (2004) in their survey of the literature. Under the null hypothesis of the 
power law, it is the maximum likelihood estimator. Thus, for a sample of n cities with 
sizes x \  > ... > xn, this estimator is:
The best known paper that has used the Hill estimator for estimating Zipf’s Law is 
Dobkins and Ioannides (2000), who find that the Pareto exponent is declining in the 
US over time, using either OLS or the Hill method. However, they also find that the Hill 
estimate o f the Pareto exponent is always smaller than the OLS estimate. Since the OLS
Black and Henderson (2003), who use a very similar dataset, suggests the interpretation
n  — 1
(2.5)DLi1 (Ins:* -  Inx n )
while the standard error is given by:
r2 ( Y!i=i { l n x j - l n x i+1)2 1 (2.6)
estimate is meant to be downward biased, this is puzzling. Additional evidence from
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that the reliability of the Hill estimate is dependent on the curvature of the log rank -  log 
population plot, something which we return to in subsection 2.4.3 below.
There are two issues in comparing the two alternative estimators, both of which 
revolve around the fact that the Hill estimator is a maximum likelihood (ML) estimator. 
First, as a ML estimator, the Hill estimator makes stronger assumptions about the size 
distribution of cities (i.e. that it follows a Pareto distribution), and hence may be sensitive 
to violations of these assumptions. On the other hand, OLS is not the best linear unbiased 
estimator under the null hypothesis of the Pareto distribution, as the OLS assumptions of 
independently and normally distributed errors are violated. However, OLS may perform 
better than the Hill estimator if the null hypothesis does not hold.
The second issue is that, as a ML estimator, the desirable properties of the Hill 
estimator, such as consistency and efficiency, hold only asymptotically. Given the rela­
tively small sample sizes for many of the countries in our sample, it is difficult to claim 
that these asymptotic properties hold. For example, Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) show 
that the Hill estimator is biased in small samples.
We plot the kernel density functions for the estimates of the Pareto exponent us­
ing the OLS and Hill estimators to give a better description and further insights of the 
distribution of the values of the exponent across countries. From these plots, we find 
that the Hill estimates exhibit a bias when the size distribution of cities does not follow a 
Pareto distribution. The Pareto exponent is then used as the dependent variable in a sec­
ond stage regression where the objective is to explain variations in this measure using 
variables obtained from models of political economy and economic geography.
2.4 Results
In this section, we discuss only the results for the latest available year for each country, 
for the regressions (2.2) and (2.3) for Zipf’s Law and the Hill estimator (2.5). This is to 
reduce the size of the tables. In the text, brief comparisons will be made to results from 
earlier periods where relevant. Full details are available from the author upon request.
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2.4.1 Zipf’s Law for Cities
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the detailed results of the OLS regressions of (2.2) and (2.3) 
and the Hill estimator (2.5) for cities. Note that because the Hill estimator is based on 
the assumption that the size distribution of cities follows a Pareto distribution, it is only 
possible to calculate the value of the Pareto exponent (but not the quadratic term) using 
the Hill method.
For OLS, the largest value of the Pareto exponent (1.719) is obtained for Kuwait, 
followed by Belgium, whereas the lowest value is obtained for Guatemala at 0.7287, 
followed by Syria and Saudi Arabia. Unsurprisingly, the former two countries are as­
sociated with a large number of small cities and no primate city, whereas in the latter 
three countries one or two large cities dominate the urban system. The left side of Ta­
ble 2.3 summarises the statistical significance of the Pareto exponent, using both OLS 
and the Hill estimator for cities. Using OLS, a is significantly greater than 1 for 39 of 
our 73 countries, while a further 14 observations are significantly less than one. This 
is consistent with Rosen and Resnick’s result, as they find that 32 of their 44 countries 
had a Pareto exponent significantly greater than 1, while 4 countries had the exponent 
significantly less than 1.
For the Hill estimator, the country with the largest value of the Pareto exponent is 
Belgium with a value of 1.742, followed by Switzerland and Portugal. The lowest values 
were obtained for South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Belarus. It is clear that the identity of 
the countries with the highest and lowest values for the Pareto exponent differ between 
the OLS and the Hill estimators. In fact, the correlation between the OLS estimator and 
the Hill estimator is not exceptionally high, at 0.7064 for the latest available period (the 
Spearman rank correlation is 0.6823). This can be interpreted as saying that, because 
we use a different number of cities for each country, and since the OLS bias is larger 
for small samples, we should not expect the results of the OLS and Hill estimators to be 
perfectly correlated. Indeed we find a weak negative correlation between the difference 
in estimates using the two methods, and the number of cities in the sample (corr=-0.2575, 
significant at the 5 percent level using the latest available period).
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OLS Hill
Country Year Cities a a’ b’ Log A a
Algeria 1998 62 1.351** -2.338 0.041 18.80** 1.359*
Egypt 1996 127 0.996 -2.912** 0.078** 15.06 1.094
Ethiopia 1994 63 1.065 -4.313** 0.143** 14.23 1.334*
Kenya 1989 27 0.817** -1.949** 0.049** 11.30** 1.006
Morocco 1994 59 0.874** -1.019 0.006 13.07** 0.930
Mozambique 1997 33 0.859** 1.015**
**00oo 12.13** 0.811
Nigeria 1991 139 1.041** -0.949 -0.004 15.98** 1.046
South Africa 1991 94 1.359** -1.103 0.011 19.12** 1.268*
Sudan 1993 26 0.909 -0.214 -0.028 13.07* 1.007
Tanzania 1988 32 1.010 -1.817 0.035 13.69 0.909
Australia 1998 131 1.228** 7.894** -0.406** 17.60** 0.801**
Argentina 1999 111 1.044 2.994** -0.165** 16.13** 0.967
Brazil 2000 411 1.134** -0.096** -0.042** 18.37** 1.061
Canada 1996 93 1.245** 0.427 -0.069 18.09** 1.253
Chile 1999 67 0.867** -0.652 -0.009 13.02** 0.791*
Colombia 1999 111 0.902** -0.804 -0.004 14.03** 0.935
Cuba 1991 55 1.090 -3.686** 0.109** 15.13 1.318
Dominican 1993 23 0.847 -2.638* 0.075* 11.69** 0.803
Republic
Ecuador 1995 42 0.808** -1.409 0.026 11.69** 0.902
Guatemala 1994 13 0.729** -3.658** 0.125** 9.71** 1.207
Mexico 2000 162 0.973 1.951** -0.117* 15.83 0.813**
Paraguay 1992 19 1.014 -1.958 0.042 13.15 1.257
USA 2000 667 1.378** -1.951** 0.024** 21.38** 0.934
Venezuela 2000 91 1.063* -0.725 -0.014 15.82** 1.428**
Azerbaijan 1997 39 1.035 -5.213** 0.181** 13.66 1.361
Bangladesh 1991 79 1.091 -4.188** 0.127** 15.63 1.355*
China 1990 349 1.181** 1.434** -0.101** 19.57** 0.962
India 1991 309 1.188** -0.745 -0.017** 19.39** 1.218**
Indonesia 1990 235 1.135** -2.633** 0.061** 17.42** 1.233**
Iran 1996 119 1.058** -1.554 0.020 16.25** 1.053
Israel 1997 55 1.089* 1.498** -0.115** 14.89** 1.041
Japan 1995 221 1.317** -0.633 -0.027 20.65** 1.225**
Jordan 1994 34 0.898** -2.483** 0.069** 12.08** 1.063
Kazakhstan 1999 33 0.962 4.862** -0.244** 13.88 0.865
Kuwait 1995 28 1.719** 5.898** -0.355** 20.55** 1.686*
Malaysia 1991 52 0.872* 2.819** -0.162** 12.66** 0.842
Nepal 2000 46 1.187** -2.096 0.041 15.58** 1.259
Pakistan 1998 136 0.962 -2.484** 0.061** 15.04** 1.063
Notes: Under the OLS estimator, a is the value of the Pareto exponent from the linear regression 
equation (2.2), while Log A is the intercept term, a' and b' are the coefficients on the linear and 
quadratic terms, respectively, of the quadratic regression (2.3). Under the Hill estimator, a is the 
value of the Pareto exponent calculated using equation (2.5). Cities: Number of cities.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; for a, significantly different from 1; for a’, significantly 
different from (-1), for b ’, significantly different from 0; for log A, significantly different from 
the log o f the population of the largest city, a is defined as a positive value; to compare the 
coefficients of log x  in equation (2) and (log x )’ in equation (3), we compare (-a) with a’.
Table 2.1: Results of OLS regression of equations (2.2) and (2.3) and the Hill estimator
(2.5), for cities, for latest year of each country.
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OLS Hill
Country Year Cities a a ’ b’ Log A a
Philippines 2000 87 1.080 3.439** -0.184** 16.50** 0.863
Saudi Arabia 1992 48 0.782** 0.024** -0.033* 11.91** 0.730**
South Korea 1995 71 0.907** -0.318 -0.023 14.58** 0.685**
Syria 1994 10 0.744* -1.471 0.028 10.90** 1.086
Taiwan 1998 62 1.059** 0.148** -0.049** 15.75** 0.929
Thailand 2000 97 1.186** -4.944** 0.155** 16.68 1.418**
Turkey 1997 126 1.054 -2.666** 0.064** 16.17 1.185
Uzbekistan 1997 17 1.049 -8.954** 0.305** 14.79 1.511*
Vietnam 1989 54 0.976** -1.420 0.018** 14.13* 0.803
Austria 1998 70 0.988 -3.986** 0.136** 13.08 1.423**
Belarus 1998 41 0.844** 0.649** -0.064** 12.24** 0.750*
Belgium 2000 68 1.589** -2.186 0.026 20.50** 1.835*
Bulgaria 1997 23 1.114 -4.842** 0.153** 15.14 1.286
Croatia 2001 24 0.921 -1.769 0.038 12.09** 0.955
Czech Republic 2001 64 1.168** -3.519** 0.103** 15.70** 1.267
Denmark 1999 58 1.361** -2.760** 0.0627* 17.56** 1.375*
Finland 1999 49 1.192** -2.468** 0.057** 15.64** 1.346
France 1999 104 1.451** -4.189** 0.114** 20.25** 1.639**
Germany 1998 190 1.238** -0.302** -0.038** 18.65** 1.255**
Greece 1991 43 1.413** -6.202** 0.204** 18.60** 1.480*
Hungary 1999 60 1.124** -4.019** 0.125** 15.16 1.279
Italy 1999 228 1.381** -3.907** 0.106** 19.81** 1.497**
Netherlands 1999 97 1.473** -0.433 -0.045 20.03** 1.444**
Norway 1999 41 1.270** -4.595** 0.148** 16.26** 1.403
Poland 1998 180 1.183** 0.393** -0.068** 17.29** 1.091
Portugal 2001 70 1.382** -4.136** 0.124** 17.79** 1.670**
Romania 1997 70 1.109* -0.056 -0.045 15.94** 1.060
Russia 1999 165 1.186** 1.246* -0.094* 18.94** 1.034
Slovakia 1998 42 1.303** -4.486** 0.143** 16.56** 1.481*
Spain 1998 157 1.186** -0.066 -0.047 17.57** 1.097
Sweden 1998 120 1.439** -1.218 -0.010 19.18** 1.287**
Switzerland 1998 117 1.437** -6.126** 0.223** 17.85** 1.739**
Ukraine 1998 103 1.025 1.579 -0.106** 15.76** 1.020
Yugoslavia 1999 60 1.183* -2.282 0.048 15.88** 1.167
United Kingdom 1991 232 1.401** -3.550** 0.089** 20.31** 1.398**
Notes: Under the OLS estimator, a is the value of the Pareto exponent from the linear regression 
equation (2.2), while Log A is the intercept term, a' and b' are the coefficients on the linear and 
quadratic terms, respectively, of the quadratic regression (2.3). Under the Hill estimator, a is the 
value of the Pareto exponent calculated using equation (2.S). Cities: Number of cities.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; for a, significantly different from 1; for a’, significantly 
different from (-1), for b ’, significantly different from 0; for log A, significantly different from 
the log of the population of the largest city, a is defined as a positive value; to compare the 
coefficients of log x in equation (2) and (log x )’ in equation (3), we compare (-a) with a’.
Table 2.2: (continued from Table 2.1) Results of OLS regression of equations (2.2) and
(2.3) and the Hill estimator (2.5), for cities, for latest year of each country.
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For statistical significance of the Hill estimator, one key result of Gabaix and Ioan­
nides (2004) is that the standard errors of the OLS estimator are grossly underestimated. 
Thus, Table 2.3 shows that using the Hill estimator, 43 of the 73 countries (or 59 per­
cent) in our sample for cities have values of the Pareto exponent that are not significantly 
different from the ZipFs Law prediction of 1, with 24 countries having values signifi­
cantly higher than 1, while only 6 countries have values significantly less than 1. Hence 
the overall pattern of statistical significance of the Pareto exponent for the Hill estimator 
follows that of the OLS estimator, except that there are fewer significant values for the 
Hill estimator because the (correct) standard errors are larger than those estimated using 
OLS.
The top half of Table 2.4 summarises the results of both OLS and Hill estimators 
for cities. The first set of observations labelled Full Sample shows the summary statis­
tics for a for the latest available observation in all countries. We see that the mean of the 
Pareto exponent for cities using OLS is approximately 1.11. This lends support to Rosen 
and Resnick’s result (they obtain a mean value for the Pareto exponent of 1.13). For the 
Hill estimator, the mean of the Pareto exponent is 1.167, which is statistically different 
from the mean for the OLS estimator at the 5% level. This is consistent with the argu­
ment in Gabaix and Ioannides (2004), that OLS is biased downward in small samples. 
However, we also find that for 34 of the 73 countries, the Hill estimate of the Pareto ex­
ponent is smaller than the OLS estimate, which may indicate a bias in the Hill estimator 
(recall that the Hill estimator is supposed to overcome the downward bias of the OLS 
estimator; subsection 2.4.3 discusses this further). Such a bias may arise from a viola­
tion of the key assumption underlying the Hill estimator, that city sizes follow a Pareto 
distribution.
Breaking down the results by continents, we find that, for both OLS and Hill esti­
mators, there seems to be a clear distinction between Europe, which has a high average 
value of the Pareto exponent (the average being above 1.2 using OLS) and Asia, Africa, 
and South America, which have low average values of the exponent (below 1.1 using 
OLS)8. This indicates that populations in Europe are more evenly spread over the sys­
tem of cities than in the latter three continents. Indeed, 21 of the 26 European countries
8 A two-sample t-test shows that the average Pareto exponent for Europe is significantly different from 
that for the rest o f the world as a whole.
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Cities 1 Agglomerations
Summary results: OLS estimates of a
Continent a<  1 a = 1 a>  1 Continent a < 1 a = 1 a>  1
Africa 3 4 3 Africa 1 1
N America 1 2 N America 2 1
S America 4 4 2 S America 3 2
Asia 5 8 10 Asia 3 2
Europe 2 3 21 Europe 5 2 2
Oceania 1 Oceania 2
Total 14 20 39 Total 16 8 2
Summary results: OLS estimates of b’
Continent b’ < 0 b’ = 0 b’ > 0 Continent b’ < 0
oIIJO b’ > 0
Africa 1 6 3 Africa 1 1
N America 1 2 N America 2 1
S America 3 4 3 S America 5
Asia 11 5 8 Asia 2 2 1
Europe 4 7 14 Europe 3 4 2
Oceania 1 Oceania 1 1
Total 20 23 30 Total 9 13 4
Summary results: OLS estimates of A (compared to largest city)
Continent Less than Equal to Greater than Continent Less than Equal to Greater than
Africa 3 4 3 Africa 1 1
N America 1 2 N America 1 2
S America 5 2 3 S America 5
Asia 6 7 10 Asia 2 3
Europe 2 3 21 Europe 5 3 1
Oceania 1 Oceania 2
Total 16 17 40 Total 16 9 1
Summary results: Hill estimator for a
Continent a < 1 a = 1 a>  1 Continent a<  1 a = 1 a > 1
Africa 7 3 Africa 1 1
N America 1 1 1 N America 1 2
S America 1 9 S America 1 4 .
Asia 2 14 7 Asia 5
Europe 1 12 13 Europe 1 8
Oceania 1 Oceania 1 1
Total 6 43 24 Total 5 21
Table 2.3: Breaking down the results of OLS regressions (2.2) and (2.3) and the Hill es­
timator (2.5): Statistical significance (5 percent level) in the latest available observation, 
for cities and urban agglomerations.
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OLS for cities Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full sample 73 1.1114 0.2042 0.7287 1.719
Africa 10 1.028 0.191 0.8169 1.3595
North America 3 1.2008 0.1705 1.0127 1.3451
South America 10 0.9531 0.1363 0.7287 1.1391
Asia 23 1.0633 0.2027 0.7442 1.719
Europe 26 1.2306 0.1735 0.8435 1.54
Oceania 1 1.2685 1.2685 1.2685
Hill for cities Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full sample 73 1.1667 0.2583 0.685 1.7422
Africa 10 1.0762 0.1868 0.8107 1.3586
North America 3 1.1772 0.2724 0.8751 1.4039
South America 10 1.0255 0.1819 0.8028 1.3177
Asia 23 1.1226 0.2602 0.685 1.6859
Europe 26 1.3063 0.2542 0.7503 1.7422
Oceania 1 0.8398 0.8398 0.8398
OLS for agglomerations Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full sample 26 0.8703 0.1526 0.5856 1.2301
Africa 2 0.8661 0.3374 0.6275 1.1047
North America 3 0.8941 0.0648 0.8345 0.9631
South America 5 0.851 0.1065 0.7025 0.9904
Asia 5 0.8778 0.1316 0.6813 1.0001
Europe 9 0.9111 0.1725 0.6349 1.2301
Oceania 2 0.6844 0.1399 0.5856 0.7833
Hill for agglomerations Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full sample 26 0.8782 0.2276 0.5058 1.5897
Africa 2 1.0477 0.7665 0.5058 1.5897
North America 3 0.7202 0.1714 0.5225 0.8273
South America 5 0.8812 0.2084 0.5229 1.0567
Asia 5 0.8837 0.1133 0.7286 1.0384
Europe 9 0.9402 0.1178 0.6778 1.0903
Oceania 2 0.6458 0.1939 0.5087 0.7829
Table 2.4: Summaiy statistics: by continent: Values of a using OLS and Hill estimators, 
for cities and agglomerations.
in our sample had a significantly greater than 1 using OLS. These findings raise the in­
teresting question of why these differences exist between different continents. Could it 
be the different levels of development, or institutional factors? Section 2.5 will seek to 
identify the reasons for these apparently systematic variations.
We can also compare the results of the latest period with those of earlier periods. 
For 69 countries, there is data for at least two periods. In this earlier period, the mean 
of the Pareto exponent using OLS across all countries is 1.086, and this is significantly 
different from 1 at the 5 percent level for 49 countries. Out of these 49 countries, 33 of 
them have a value of the Pareto exponent significantly greater than 1. Europe once again 
has the largest average value of the Pareto exponent, 1.227, which is again significantly
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different from the average for all other countries (this average is 1.001) at the 5 percent 
level. For the Hill estimator, the mean across all countries is 1.146 (again, significantly 
different from 1 at the 5 percent level). The null hypothesis that the Pareto exponent 
is equal to 1, is rejected for 25 of the 69 countries in this earlier sample. Of these, 20 
countries have a value of the Pareto exponent significantly greater than 1. As before, the 
Hill estimates for this earlier period follow the same patterns as with the latest period, 
with Europe exhibiting a much higher value than the other continents.
For a subsample of 44 countries, data is available for at least three periods. The 
OLS-obtained mean of the Pareto exponent for this sample of earlier observations is 
1.124, and this is significantly greater than 1 for 23 countries, and significantly less than 
1 for 5 countries. The comparative results are broadly similar to those of the later periods. 
This suggests that the size distribution of cities exhibits persistence, in that the results do 
not change very much over time. One clear message that comes through is that we reject 
the null hypothesis that the Pareto exponent is equal to 1, much more often than we 
would expect based on random chance, irrespective of the estimation method or time 
period used.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 also provide the results of the value of the intercept term of 
the linear regression (2.2). As Alperovich (1984, 1988) notes, a proper test of Zipf’s 
Law should not only consider the value of the Pareto exponent, but also whether the 
intercept term A is equal to the size of the largest city. We find, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
that whenever the Pareto exponent is significantly greater than 1, the intercept term is 
also greater than the size of the largest city (this is almost by construction: in a log-rank 
-  log-population plot, the largest city enters on the horizontal axis, so that, provided the 
largest city is not too far from the best-fit line, if the line has slope equal to 1, it must be 
that the vertical intercept is equal to the horizontal intercept). A comparison of the first 
and third panels of Table 2.3 confirms this result, as the estimates of the Pareto exponent 
and the intercept follow almost identical patterns.
For values of the quadratic term, the patterns are less strong. Recalling that a sig­
nificant value for the quadratic term represents a deviation from the Pareto distribution, 
we find the following results. For the cities sample, 30 observations or 41% display 
a value for the quadratic term significantly greater than zero, indicating convexity of
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Figure 2.1: Values of the OLS estimate of the Pareto exponent with the 95% confidence 
interval, for the full sample of 73 countries for the latest available period, sorted accord­
ing to the Pareto exponent.
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the log-rank -  log-population plot, while 20 observations (26%) have a value for the 
quadratic term significantly less than zero, indicating concavity of the log-rank -  log- 
population plot. These results are again in the same direction as those obtained by Rosen 
and Resnick (1980), but less strong (they find that the quadratic term is significantly 
greater than zero for 30 out of 44 countries).
One additional result that arises out of the quadratic regression (2.3) is that in­
cluding the quadratic term often dramatically changes the value or even the sign of the 
coefficient of the linear term. This is actually a fairly common result in the literature; 
Rosen and Resnick (1980) find that, in the quadratic regression (2.3), the linear term is 
positive for six of their 44 countries; this compares with 17 o f our 73 countries (in Ta­
bles 2.1 and 2.2, a is a positive value, but the coefficient on the term (logx) in the linear 
specification (2.2) is ( -a ) ) . This sign change in the linear term can be explained by the 
different interpretations of the linear term in equations (2.2) and (2.3). In a linear regres­
sion, the linear term gives the slope of the best-fit line. But in a quadratic regression, the 
linear term gives the location of the maximum or minimum point of the best-fit line9.
9 If the function is y  =  a +  bx +  c x 2, then y  is maximised when x  =  — ( ^ )  and c is negative. Then
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Figure 2.2: Values of the Hill estimate of the Pareto exponent with the 95% confidence 
interval, for the full sample of 73 countries for the latest available period, sorted accord­
ing to the Pareto exponent.
V alues of Hill estim ate of a with 95% confidence interval
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For the baseline linear model, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 graph the estimates for the Pareto 
exponent for all countries using the latest available observation, using the OLS and Hill 
estimators respectively, including the 95% confidence interval and sorting the sample 
according to values of the Pareto exponent (the confidence intervals do not form a smooth 
series since each country has a different standard error). The figures show graphically 
what the tables summarise. We find that the confidence intervals for the Hill estimator 
are larger than for the OLS estimator, and hence that we reject the null hypothesis that 
the Pareto exponent is equal to 1 more frequently using the OLS estimator (in the figures, 
a rejection occurs when no portion of the vertical line indicating the confidence interval 
intersects the horizontal line at 1.00).
b may be positive if  the maximum of y  occurs at positive values o f  x . This is possible in our dataset since, 
while in the dataset x  and y  must by construction be negatively related, observed values o f x  (the log o f city 
size) lie between 9 and 17, so that there may be an (out o f sample) maximum o f y at positive values o f  x.
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2.4.2 Zipf’s Law for Urban Agglomerations
It is frequently claimed (see e.g. Rosen and Resnick (1980) or Cheshire (1999)) that 
Z ip f s Law holds if we define cities more carefully, by using data on urban agglomera­
tions rather than cities. To see if this is in fact the case, we also run the OLS regressions 
(2.2) and (2.3), and the Hill estimator, for our sample of 26 countries for which data on 
urban agglomerations is available.
The results for the latest available period for urban agglomerations are presented 
in Table 2.5, and are summarised in the lower half of Table 2.4. Using either OLS or 
the Hill estimator, the mean value of the Pareto exponent is lower for agglomerations 
than for cities (the value is 0.870 for OLS and 0.8782 for the Hill estimator). This is 
to be expected, since the Pareto exponent is a measure of how evenly distributed is the 
population (the higher the value of the exponent, the more even in size are the cities). 
Large cities tend to have a larger fraction of their populations in suburbs, which are part 
of the urban agglomeration but not the core city, and so urban agglomerations may be 
expected to be more uneven in size than core cities. Once again a slight pattern can 
be observed across continents; the small sample size however does not make this result 
particularly strong.
The right side of Table 2.3 summarises the statistical significance of both OLS and 
the Hill estimator for agglomerations. Using OLS, the Pareto exponent for agglomer­
ations is significantly greater than one for only two countries (the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom), while fully 16 of the 26 observations for agglomerations were signif­
icantly less than one (a similar result albeit with weaker significance is obtained using 
the Hill estimator). Results for the intercept term of the linear regression (2.2) track the 
results for the Pareto exponent very closely. For the quadratic regression (2.3), we find 
that half of the observations (13 out of 26) have a value for the quadratic term not signif­
icantly different from zero, with 9 or 35% having a quadratic term significantly less than 
zero.
This result is broadly confirmed using data from earlier time periods. For a sub­
sample of 18 countries, we have data for at least two time periods. In the earlier period, 
the average value of the Pareto exponent using OLS is 0.8312, whereas using the Hill es-
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OLS Hill
Country Year Agg a a’ b’ Log A a
Morocco 1982 10 1.105 -14.207** 0.485** 15.85 1.590
South Africa 1991 23 0.628** 3.819** -0.175** 10.16** 0.506**
Australia 1998 21 0.586** 0.911 -0.058* 9.44** 0.509**
New Zealand 1999 26 0.783** -0.809 0.001 10.86** 0.783
Argentina 1991 19 0.703** -1.118 0.015 11.13** 0.523**
Brazil 2000 18 0.990 -1.125 0.004 16.56 0.974
Canada 1996 56 0.835** -0.264 -0.023 13.10** 0.827
Colombia 1993 16 0.828** -0.238 -0.021 12.94** 1.057
Ecuador 1990 43 0.905 -2.017 0.047 12.76** 0.957
Mexico 2000 38 0.963 -1.386 0.015 15.67 0.811
Peru 1993 65 0.829** -1.584 0.032 12.35** 0.896
USA 2000 336 0.885** 3.499** -0.167** 16.10 0.523**
Bangladesh 1991 43 0.807** -2.932** 0.084** 12.16** 0.914
India 1991 178 0.958** 0.156** -0.042** 16.29 0.900
Indonesia 1990 193 1.000 -1.132 0.005 15.84 1.038
Jordan 1994 10 0.681** 0.238 -0.037 9.71** 0.729
Malaysia 1991 71 0.943 3.336** -0.187** 13.79 0.837
Austria 1998 34 0.750** -0.634 -0.005 10.66** 0.678**
Denmark 1999 27 0.817** -3.722** 0.124** 11.22** 1.090
France 1999 114 1.023 -1.526 0.020 15.79 1.064
Germany 1996 144 0.890** 0.570** -0.058** 14.64** 0.889
Greece 1991 15 0.635** -3.987** 0.132** 9.22** 0.950
Netherlands 1999 21 1.230* 0.830 -0.080 17.54** 0.970
Norway 1999 19 0.883* -1.772 0.039 11.77** 0.921
Switzerland 1998 48 0.985 -0.167 -0.036** 13.72 0.956
United Kingdom 1991 151 1.030* -0.919 -0.005 16.05 0.944
Notes: Under the OLS estimator, a is the value of the Pareto exponent from the linear regression equation 
(2.2), while Log A is the intercept term, a1 and b' are the coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms, 
respectively, of the quadratic regression (2.3). Under the Hill estimator, a is the value of the Pareto 
exponent calculated using equation (2.5). Agg: Number of urban agglomerations.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; for a, significantly different from 1; for a’, significantly 
different from (-1), for b ’, significantly different from 0; for log A, significantly different from 
the log of the population of the largest city, a is defined as a positive value; to compare the coefficients 
of log x in equation (2) and (log x )’ in equation (3), we compare (-a) with a’.
Table 2.5: Results of OLS regression of equations (2.2) and (2.3), and the Hill estimator
(2.5), for urban agglomerations, for latest year of each country
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timator it is 0.8381. Using OLS, the null hypothesis that the Pareto exponent is equal to 
1, is rejected for 11 countries (all significantly less than 1), while using the Hill estimator, 
the null is rejected for 5 countries, again all significantly less than 1.
Therefore, the claim that Zipf’s Law holds for urban agglomerations (see Rosen 
and Resnick (1980), Cheshire (1999)), is strongly rejected for our sample of countries 
in favour of the alternative that agglomerations are more uneven in size than would be 
predicted by Zipf’s Law. Our result differs from that of Rosen and Resnick, primarily be­
cause the sample of countries is different. Using the same sample as Rosen and Resnick10 
(less Italy for which data is unavailable), we get an average value for the Pareto exponent 
o f0.9639 using OLS, and 0.8543 using the Hill estimator11. This compares with an aver­
age of 1.002 for Rosen and Resnick when Italy is excluded. This highlights the danger of 
drawing conclusions from too small a sample; our larger sample is more representative 
of the population of countries than Rosen and Resnick’s more limited sample.
2.4.3 Non-parametric analysis of the distribution of the Pareto 
exponent
An additional way of describing the distribution of the Pareto exponent across countries 
is to construct the kernel density functions. The advantage of doing so is that it gives 
us a more complete description of how the values of the Pareto exponent are distributed 
-  whether it is unimodal or bimodal, or whether it is normally distributed or not. In 
implementing this method, we use the latest available observation for each country. We 
construct the efficient Epanechnikov kernel function for the Pareto exponent for both the 
OLS and Hill estimators, using the “optimal” window width (the width that minimises 
the mean integrated square error if the data were Gaussian and a Gaussian kernel were 
used), and including an overlay of the normal distribution for comparative purposes.
Figure 2.3 shows the kernel function for the OLS estimator. It is slightly right 
skewed relative to the normal distribution, but is clearly unimodal (with the mode ap-
10 Their sample is Brazil, France, India, Italy, Mexico and the US.
11 This is yet another instance in which the Hill estimate is less than the OLS estimate, which goes against 
our priors. The large discrepancy between the two averages is largely driven by the US, but for Brazil, 
Mexico and India, the Hill estimate is also less than the OLS estimate.
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Figure 2.3: Kernel density function for Pareto exponent using the OLS estimator (optimal 
window width=0.076).
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Figure 2.4: Kernel density function for the Pareto exponent using the Hill estimator 
(optimal window width=0.098).
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Figure 2.5: Kernel density function for the Pareto exponent using the Hill estimator 
(window width=0.006, vertical lines at x=1.00 and x=1.32).
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proximately equal to 1.09) and its distribution is quite close to the normal distribution. 
Figure 2.4 shows the kernel function for the Hill estimator. What is interesting (and a pri­
ori unexpected) is that the distribution is not unimodal. Instead, we find that there is no 
clearly defined mode, rather that observations are spread roughly evenly across ranges 
o f the Pareto exponent between 0.95 and 1.35. Experimenting with narrower window 
widths (Figure 2.5, where the window width is 0.06)12 shows that the distribution is in 
fact bimodal, with the two modes at approximately 1.0 and 1.32.
Closer inspection of the relationship between the OLS estimator and Hill estimator 
of the Pareto exponent, and the value of the coefficient for the quadratic term in the OLS 
regression equation (2.3), reveals further insights as to what is actually happening. We 
find that, while the correlation between the OLS estimator of the Pareto exponent and the 
quadratic term is very low (corr=-0.0329 for the latest available period), the correlation 
between the Hill estimator and the quadratic term is high (corr=0.5063). Further, the 
correlation between the difference between the Hill estimator and the OLS estimator,
12 While the “optimal” window width exists, in practice choosing window widths is a subjective exercise. 
Silverman (1986) shows that the “optimal” window width oversmooths the density function when the data 
are highly skewed or multimodal.
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Figure 2.6: Relationship between difference between Hill and OLS estimators, and the 
value of the quadratic term in equation (2.3).
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and the quadratic term, is even higher (corr=0.7476) (see figure 2.6). What we find is 
that, in general, the Hill estimator is larger than the OLS estimator if the quadratic term 
is positive (i.e. the log rank -  log population plot is convex), while the reverse is true if 
the quadratic term is negative. In other words, when the size distribution o f cities does 
not follow a Pareto distribution, the Hill estimator may be biased. This interpretation 
is also consistent with the difference between the Hill and OLS estimates o f the Pareto 
exponent for US cities in Dobkins and Ioannides (2000), and the concavity of the US 
log rank - log population plot in Black and Henderson (2003) (see the brief discussion 
in subsection 2.3.2 above). Therefore, we should tread carefully in drawing conclusions 
from the results o f the Hill estimator.
2.5 Explaining Variation in the Pareto Exponent
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2.5.1 Theory and methods
The Pareto exponent a can be viewed as a measure of inequality: the larger the value of 
the Pareto exponent, the more even is the population of cities in the urban system (in the 
limit, if a = oo, all cities have the same size). There are many potential explanations for 
variations in its value. One possibility is a model of economic geography, as exemplified 
by Krugman (1991) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). These models can be 
viewed as models of unevenness in the distribution of economic activity. For certain 
parameter values, economic activity is agglomerated, while for other parameter values, 
economic activity is dispersed.
The key parameters of the model are: the degree of increasing returns to scale, 
transport costs and other barriers to trade within a country, the share of mobile or foot­
loose industries in the economy. Equation (9.25) in Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) 
summarises the impact of these factors on the market potential function, which deter­
mines the stability of a monocentric (highly concentrated) economy:
™ M  = < r [ ( l - fl) T A - ( l  + p )vT M] (2.7)
Here, fl (0) is the market potential at a city, r  is the location of a point, a  is the elas­
ticity of substitution between varieties in manufacturing (which proxies for the degree 
of scale economies), p  is the share of expenditure in manufacturing, r A is the transport 
cost of agricultural goods, t m  is manufacturing transport cost, and p  is the intensity of 
preference for a variety of the manufacturing good. For a city to exist at location 0, the 
market potential function at location 0 must be negative. Fujita, Krugman and Venables 
(1999) show that the steeper is the market potential function at location 0, the less stable 
will be the monocentric equilibrium (i.e. the more likely that new cities will form). This 
would imply a more even distribution of economic activity, and hence a larger value of 
the Pareto exponent.
Therefore, a larger value of the Pareto exponent is related to a larger value of 
a  (the smaller are scale economies), and a larger value of p  (the larger the share of 
manufacturing in the economy). Transport costs in agriculture and manufacturing, r A 
and t m , have conflicting effects on the Pareto exponent. In addition, Chapter 18 of 
Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) shows that a greater extent of international trade
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weakens the force for agglomeration and leads to a more even distribution of economic 
activity13.
But we can also think of political factors that could influence the size distribution 
of cities. One possibility is the model proposed by Ades and Glaeser (1995). They ar­
gue that political stability and the extent of dictatorship are key factors that influence the 
concentration of population in the capital city. Their model seeks to explain the size of 
the capital city, but may be reinterpreted in terms of the urban system as a whole. In this 
interpretation, political instability or a dictatorship should imply a more uneven distrib­
ution of city sizes (i.e. a smaller Pareto exponent). A dictatorship would be more likely 
to have a large capital city since rents are more easily obtainable in the national capi­
tal. However, regional capitals would also be a source of rents (albeit at a smaller scale 
than in the national capital). We should therefore see a hierarchy of cities where cities at 
each tier of the hierarchy are much larger in size than cities at a lower tier. Similarly, if 
the country is politically unstable, then if the government is unwilling or unable to pro­
tect the population outside large cities, we should find a more uneven distribution of city 
sizes since the population would flock to the larger cities.
However, it is possible that dictatorships may drive the population away from ma­
jor centres of activity, if the people fear persecution by the authorities. Also, political 
instability may lead to migration away from the larger cities, if these cities become cen­
tres of instability. Theory does not give us a clear prediction as to the expected sign of the 
geographical and political variables. Therefore, we do not seek to accept or reject either 
of these theories, but instead attempt to discover which variables play a more significant 
role in explaining variations in the Pareto exponent.
We also control for other variables that could influence the size distribution of 
cities, including the size of the country as measured by population, land area or GDP, 
and also for possible effects of being located in different continents.
13 Strictly speaking, to the best o f our knowledge, existing models o f economic geography are not able to 
generate a size distribution of cities that follows a Pareto distribution, without making additional assumptions 
(c.f. Brakman et al (1999)). They are however able to generate cities o f different sizes, and here we seek to 
explore whether the variables associated with models o f economic geography, impact on the size distribution 
o f cities, in the way that is predicted by the models.
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Thus our estimated equation is:
ait = 6o + 51GEOG + 62P O L I T I C  + 63C O N T R O L  + 6AD U M M I E S  + uit (2.8)
Where an is the Pareto exponent, GEOG  is the vector of economic geography variables: 
scale economies (the share of industrial output in high-scale industries as measured by 
Pratten (1988)), transport costs (the inverse of road density), non-agricultural economic 
activity as a share of total GDP, and trade as a share of GDP (a detailed definition of 
the variables is given in the Data Appendix to this chapter). P O L I T I C  is a group of 
political variables: the GASTIL index of political rights and civil liberties, total gov­
ernment expenditure as a share of GDP, an indicator variable for the time the country 
achieved independence, and an indicator variable for whether the country had an exter­
nal war between 1960 and 1985. The GASTIL index is our measure of dictatorship, 
while the timing of independence and external war are our measures of political stabil­
ity14. Government expenditure can be interpreted as an indicator capturing the extent of 
government involvement in the economy, through redistribution of tax revenues to re­
duce regional inequalities. C O N T R O L  is a set of variables controlling for the size of 
the country; here the control variables used are the log of per capita GDP in constant 
US dollars, the log of the land area of the country, and the log of population. Finally, 
D U M M I E S  is the set of continent and period dummies; period dummy i is an indi­
cator variable taking value equal to 1 if the observation is the ith observation for the 
country, zero otherwise.
For this second stage, we use the full sample, including multiple periods for each 
country if data is available. This gives an unbalanced panel with a total of 79 observa­
tions, drawn from 44 countries (data for some independent variables is unavailable for 
some countries). One potential problem with an unbalanced panel is that the panel may 
be endogenously unbalanced; this poses a potential sample selection problem. To address 
this possibility, we also run the regression using a balanced panel panel of countries. By 
using a balanced dataset, we have a total of 48 observations from 24 countries, distrib­
uted as 9 countries from Europe, 1 from North America, 4 from South America, 3 from 
Africa, and 7 from Asia.
14 Following Ades and Glaeser (1995), we would have liked to use as the measure o f political instability, 
the number o f attempted coups, assassinations or revolutions from the Barro-Lee (1994) dataset. However 
the years of their data do not match ours.
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One potential concern is the effect of using an estimated coefficient from a first 
stage regression as a dependent variable in a second stage regression. Lewis (2000) 
shows that the danger in doing so is that there could be measurement error in the first 
stage estimate, leading to inefficient estimates in the second stage. Heteroskedasticity 
might also arise if the sampling uncertainty in the (second stage) dependent variable 
is not constant across observations. He advocates the use of feasible GLS (FGLS) to 
overcome this problem. However, Baltagi (1995) points out that FGLS yields consistent 
estimates of the variances only if T  —> oo. This is clearly not the case for our sample; 
hence FGLS results are not reported. We instead report the results of OLS estimation 
with standard errors clustered by country. Clustering the standard errors by country 
allows for heteroskedasticity and non-independence of observations within each cluster, 
but observations are assumed to be independent across clusters15.
2.5.2 Results
Table 2.6 presents the results for the unbalanced panel, using the OLS estimate of the 
Pareto exponent as the dependent variable (running the regression with the Hill estimate 
as the dependent variable yields almost identical results). Columns (1) to (3) present the 
results using all available observations. Column (1) is the model without size and conti­
nent controls. Of the economic geography variables, only the degree of scale economies 
is highly significant. For the political variables, government expenditure share and the 
war dummy are significant. The signs of the coefficients suggest that more high-scale 
industry, higher government expenditure shares, and experiencing an external war, are 
associated with larger values of the Pareto exponent, or a more equal distribution of city 
sizes. The economic geography variables are jointly significant at the 10 percent level, 
while the political variables are jointly significant at the 1 percent level; both geography 
and politics play significant roles in determining the distribution of city sizes.
Columns (2) and (3) augment the basic specification by including size and re­
gional controls. Including these controls reduces the significance of the degree of scale 
economies as an explanatory variable for the value of the Pareto exponent. None of the
15 An alternative way o f calculating the standard errors using OLS estimation is to use the Beck and Katz 
(1995) panel-corrected standard errors, which makes the assumption that observations are heteroskedastic 
and contemporaneously correlated across panels.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep variable OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Transport cost -0.6137 -0.2494 -0.4167 -0:835 -0.4592 -0.6519
(1.63) (0.53) (0.98) (1.87)* (1.02) (1.53)
International trade (% of -0.0915 0.0315 -0.0229 -0.0477 0.0479 -0.0171
GDP) (1.21) (0.46) (0.23) (0.74) (0.68) (0.18)
Non-agricultural economic -0.1925 -0.9524 , -0.5346 -0.5545 -1.4064 -0.8332
activity (% of GDP) (0.42) (1.45) (0.97) (1.27) (2.24)** (1.44)
Scale economies 0.495 0.471 0.4251 0.5345 0.5112 0.4424
(2.37)** (1.83)* (1.52) (2.23)** (1.85)* (1.40)
GASTIL index o f dictatorship -0.0399 -0.016 -0.0382 -0.0324 -0.0024 -0.028
(1.68) (0.69) (2.06)** (1.32) (0.10) (1.29)
Total government expenditure 0.7512 0.7682 0.7482 0.9852 0.9127 0.9359
(% o f GDP) (2.85)*** (3.25)*** (1.73)* (4.04)*** (4.16)*** (2.11)**
Timing o f independence -0.0576 -0.066 -0.1401 -0.0947 -0.0958 -0.1672
(1.43) (1.82)* (2.98)*** (2.26)** (2.56)** (3.55)***
War dummy (external war, 0.2047 0.1217 0.1442 0.2231 0.114 0.1553
1960-1985) (3.60)*** (1.84)* (2.15)** (4.60)*** (1.83)* (2.45)**
Ln(land area) 0.0048 0.0286 0.0096 0.0252
(0.17) (0.80) (0.39) (0.80)
Ln(Population) 0.0549 0.011 0.0441 0.0029
(2.16)** (0.34) (1.74)* (0.10)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.0953 0.0573 0.1115 0.0537
(2.41)** (1.55) (2.69)** (113)
Africa Dummy 0.1287
(109)
0.1046
(0.82)
Asia Dummy 0.2049
(1.41)
0.1976
(132)
North America Dummy -0.0638
(0.42)
-0.0082
(0.05)
South America Dummy -0.1235
(1.06)
-0.1266
(0.87)
Oceania Dummy -0.0835
(0.54)
-0.033
(0.22)
Period 1 dummy 0.0723 0.0813 0.0348 0.0304 0.0481 -0.0029
(1.23) (1.39) (0.56) (0-42) (0.64) (0.05)
Period 2 dummy 0.0923 0.108 0.0392 0.0587 0.0785 0.008
(1.87)* (1.91)* (0.68) (0.93) (112) (0.15)
Period 3 dummy 0.0103 0.0511 0.0059 -0.0093 0.004 -0.0277
(0.16) (0.62) (0.08) (0.12) (0.04) (0.39)
R-squared 0.49 0.59 0.66 0.55 0.64 0.70
F-test geography 2.44* 1.19 0.68 2.24* 1.81 0.89
F-test politics 5.62*** 3.46** 3.95*** 12.86*** 6.36*** 5.88***
Observations 79 79 79 72 72 72
Countries 44 44 44 40 40 40
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimation 
method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable is the OLS estimate of the 
Pareto exponent. The sample is an unbalanced panel. In columns (1) to (3), all available observations are used. 
In columns (4) to (6), all former Eastern European communist countries are excluded. Period dummy 1 is an 
indicator variable taking value 1 if the observation is the first observation for the country, and so on. Period 4 
is the excluded period. Transport cost is the inverse o f road density. Scale economies is the fraction of 
industrial output in high-scale industries as defined by Pratten (1988). The GASTIL index ranges from 1 to 7, 
with lower values indicating more freedom. The F-test of geography and politics are the F-statistics of the test 
of joint significance of all economic geography and political variables, respectively.
See the Data Appendix for details on the sources and construction of the variables.
Table 2.6: Panel estimation of equation (2.8): The determinants of the Pareto exponent, 
full sample.
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other economic geography variables are close to statistical significance. For the politi­
cal variables, while the inclusion of additional control variables reduces the significance 
of government expenditure shares and the war dummy, the GASTIL index and the tim­
ing of independence now become statistically significant. The signs associated with the 
coefficients indicate that larger values of the GASTIL index (less political freedom) and 
the more recently a country achieved independence, are associated with smaller values 
of the Pareto exponent (more uneven distribution of city populations). These results are 
consistent with the predictions of Ades and Glaeser (1995). When these controls are 
included, the geography variables are no longer jointly significant, but the political vari­
ables remain jointly significant at at least the 5 percent level. This shows that the political 
variables have more significant effects on the size distribution of cities than the economic 
geography variables which we use.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 2.6 present results of the same regression, run for the 
sample excluding former communist countries, in the belief that in the rest of the world, 
free market forces play a more important role than political forces. Dropping the former 
communist countries improves the overall fit of the estimated equation, since R-squared 
increases. Apart from the GASTIL index which becomes statistically insignificant in all 
specifications, none of the other results are changed by dropping the former communist 
countries. The economic geography variables remain jointly insignificant in columns (5) 
and (6), while the political variables become even more jointly significant compared to 
columns (2) and (3).
Of the geographical control variables and the continent dummies, in the full spec­
ifications (3) and (6), they are mainly insignificant. In columns (2) and (5), when not 
controlling for continents, larger countries both in terms of population and per capita 
GDP, are positively related to the Pareto exponent, indicating that larger and wealthier 
countries have more even distributions of cities. This effect disappears when continent 
dummies are included. This indicates that the economic geography and the political vari­
ables account for most of the variation in the Pareto exponent across continents noted in 
Section 2.4.
The period dummies are mostly statistically insignificant (period 4 is the excluded 
period), apart from the dummy for the second observation being marginally significant in
48
the full sample when continent dummies are not included; none of the results are changed 
if the period dummies are excluded from the regression. There is no evidence that the 
Pareto exponent differs across time periods in a way that is not captured by the other 
variables in the regression.
Table 2.7 presents the results of the same regression, using a balanced panel of ob­
servations. Columns (1) to (3) report the results for all available countries, while columns 
(4) to (6) replicate this exercise excluding former communist countries; in practice, this 
means dropping 4 observations from 2 countries: Bulgaria and Hungary. The results are 
quite similar those with the full, unbalanced panel; the coefficients for statistically sig­
nificant variables have the same signs in both tables, but in general the t-statistics for the 
balanced panel are smaller, which reflects the smaller sample size and consequent im­
precision of the estimates. In Table 2.7 as in Table 2.6, excluding the former communist 
countries improves the fit of the model in terms of R-squared as well as in terms of the 
statistical significance of the explanatory variables.
With the balanced panel, transport cost is the only economic geography variable 
which is robustly significant across all specifications. The sign of the coefficient suggests 
that lower transport costs are associated with larger values of the Pareto exponent; that 
is, a more even size distribution of cities. Scale economies and the share of international 
trade are significant in some specifications especially when former communist countries 
are excluded from the sample. Greater international trade or lower scale economies are 
associated with a more uneven distribution of city sizes.
Of the political variables, the GASTIL index is never significant in any specifi­
cation, while government expenditure share is significant in most specifications; greater 
government involvement in the economy is associated with less inequality in city sizes. 
The timing of independence is statistically significant when former communist countries 
are excluded from the sample, with more recent independence being associated with a 
less even distribution of city sizes. Table 2.7 does not include the war dummy as none 
of the countries in the balanced panel experienced an external war between 1960 and 
1985. Comparing F-tests of the joint significance of economic geography and political 
variables, again the political variables show more joint significance than the economic 
geography variables. However, now, when we exclude former communist countries from
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep variable OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Transport cost -1.1654 -1.1374 -1.116 -1.4724 -1.4718 -1.536
(2.21)** (2.20)** (1.79)* (6.89)*** (4.03)*** (3.39)***
International trade (% of -0.1871 -0.0545 -0.0915 -0.1166 -0.0577 -0.1269
GDP) (1.74)* (0.58) (0.61) (3.22)*** (0.82) (0.83)
Non-agricultural economic 0.0802 -0.6807 -0.7575 -0.4512 -0.8328 -0.9261
activity (% of GDP) (0.13) (0.76) (0.78) (1.05) (1.03) (1.49)
Scale economies 0.4492 0.457 0.3593 0.4658 0.4597 0.3136
(1.47) (1.20) (0.88) (2.60)*** (2.59)*** (0.76)
GASTIL index of dictatorship -0.0186 0.0089 -0.0224 -0.0152 0.0032 -0.0221
(0.50) (0.26) (0.56) (1.36) (0.35) (0.86)
Total government expenditure 0.9509 0.9378 0.9007 1.1944 1.159 1.1583
(% of GDP) (3.35)*** (3.38)*** (1.44) (10.82)*** (5.53)*** (2.53)**
Timing of independence -0.0311 -0.0428 -0.1248 -0.076 -0.0627 -0.1652
(0.61) (0.89) (1.50) (2.19)** (2.02)** (4.08)***
Ln(land area) 0.0309 0.0296 0.0332 0.0156
(1.02) (0.55) (1.72)* (0.42)
Ln(Population) 0.0207 -0.0082 0.0057 -0.0248
(0.54) (0.18) (0.58) (1.47)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.0843 0.0785 0.0588 0.0377
(1.72)* (1.48) (1.45) (0.85)
Africa Dummy 0.1982
(1.14)
0.1785
(1.98)**
Asia Dummy 0.2334
(1.19)
0.242
(1.33)
North America Dummy 0.0359
(0.13)
0.1498
(0.76)
South America Dummy -0.0352
(0.19)
-0.0541
(0.44)
Period 1 dummy 0.018 0.01 0.0233 0.0135 0.0057 0.0234
(0.64) (0.29) (0.71) (2.06)** (0.46) (2.07)**
R-squared 0.56 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.67 0.71
F-test geography 2.32* 1.65 1.32 2.57* 2.45* 2.34*
F-test politics 4.12** 4.41** 1.72 18.11*** 9.27*** 3.24**
Observations 48 48 48 44 44 44
Countries 24 24 24 22 22 22
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimation 
method is OLS with standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable is the OLS estimate of the 
Pareto exponent. The sample is a balanced panel with 2 observations for each country. In columns (1) to (3), 
the full sample is used. The countries in the full sample are: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey and Venezuela. In columns (4) to (6), the 
former Eastern European communist countries Bulgaria and Hungary are excluded. Period dummy 1 is an 
indicator variable taking value 1 if  the observation is the first observation for the country; period 2 is the 
excluded period. Transport cost is the inverst of road density. Scale economies is the fraction of industrial 
output in high-scale industries as defined by Pratten (1988). The GASTIL index ranges from 1 to 7, with lower 
values indicating more freedom. The F-test of geography and politics are the F-statistics of the test of joint 
significance of all economic geography and political variables, respectively.
See the Data Appendix for details on the sources and construction of the variables.
Table 2.7: Panel estimation of equation (2.8): The determinants of the Pareto exponent, 
balanced panel.
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the sample, the economic geography variables are jointly significant at the 10 percent 
level. Therefore, both economic geography and politics have statistically significant ef­
fects on the size distribution of cities.
In columns (1) to (3), none of the country size, regional and time controls are 
significant. When former communist countries are excluded, African countries are found 
to have more equal distributions of city sizes than European countries (the excluded 
category). There is also some evidence that countries had a more even distribution of 
city sizes in the first period of the sample.
Comparing our results to previous findings, we find that our results for columns 
(3) and (6) of Table 2.6 (including all the variables and controls) are broadly in line 
with those of Alperovich (1993). However, we get somewhat different results from those 
o f Rosen and Resnick, as they find that the Pareto exponent is positively related to per 
capita GNP, total population and railroad density, and negatively related to land area. 
One likely explanation for this difference in results is that our specification is more com­
plete than the one used by Rosen and Resnick. In their specification, Rosen and Resnick 
include variables such as GNP per capita, population, land area, and railway density. Us­
ing their specifications, we are able to replicate the sign (but not always the significance) 
which they obtain in two out of three specifications, and achieve higher R 2 than they 
do. Our preferred specifications in columns (3) and (6) include all of these variables (al­
beit without the nonlinear functional forms which they adopt), and include others which 
are motivated by theoretical considerations. The fact that our specification is more com­
plete than that of Rosen and Resnick can also be seen from the larger R 2 that we obtain 
(0.66) compared to their largest R 2 of 0.23 (and a largest R 2 of 0.50 which we obtain by 
following Rosen and Resnick’s specification).
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter set out to test Zipf’s Law for cities, using a new dataset and two alternative 
methods -  OLS and the Hill estimator. Using either method, we reject Zipf’s Law much 
more often than we would expect based on random chance. Using OLS, we reject the 
Zipf’s Law prediction that the Pareto exponent is equal to 1, for 53 of the 73 countries in
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our sample. This result is consistent with the classic study by Rosen and Resnick (1980), 
who reject Zipf’s Law for 36 of the 44 countries in their sample. We get a slightly 
different result using the Hill estimator, where we reject Zipf’s Law for a minority of 
countries (30 out of 73).
Therefore, the results we obtain depend on the estimation method used, and in turn, 
the preferred estimation method would depend on our sample size and on our theoretical 
priors -  whether or not we believe that Zipf’s Law holds. If we believe that city sizes 
follow a Pareto distribution, then the Hill estimator is appropriate. OLS is biased in small 
samples and the ranking of cities creates a positive correlation between the residuals. 
The Hill estimator addresses these concerns, but if city sizes do not follow a Pareto 
distribution, then the Hill estimator may give biased results.
The average value of the Pareto exponent for urban agglomerations is less than 
1 (and significantly so for over half the sample using OLS); Zipf’s Law fails for urban 
agglomerations. This is a new result, as previous work (e.g. Rosen and Resnick (1980)) 
have tended to find that the Pareto exponent is equal to 1 if data on urban agglomerations 
are used. This is likely due to a sample selection effect, as we have a larger and more 
representative sample of countries than do Rosen and Resnick.
In attempting to explain the observed variations in the value of the Pareto exponent, 
we sought to relate the value of the Pareto exponent to several variables used in models 
of the size distribution of cities. We find that both economic geography and political 
variables have statistically significant effects on the size distribution of cities, although 
political variables tend to be more jointly significant than economic geography variables.
Finally, our empirical results point to two implications for theoretical work seeking 
to explain Zipf’s Law and the size distribution of cities more generally. First, theoretical 
models should address the fact that there are fairly large variations in the observed city 
size distribution. Zipf’s Law holds some of the time, but theories should be able to 
explain deviations from Zipf’s Law as well. Second, whilst existing models based on 
stochastic processes have been able to replicate Zipf’s Law, it is desirable to develop 
models which embed these processes in a more satisfactory micro-founded framework. 
In this light, recent work by Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2003), Eeckhout (2004) and 
Duranton (2004,2005) point the way forward in this literature.
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2.A Data Appendix to Chapter 2
This appendix describes the variables used in the regressions (the full list of data sources 
is given in the text). Unless otherwise mentioned, all data are from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators CD-ROM.
Scale economies is the degree of scale economies, constructed as the share of 
industrial output in high-scale industries where the definition of high-scale industries 
is obtained from Pratten (1988). The method used is to obtain the output of 3-digit 
industries from the UNIDO 2001 Industrial Statistics Database, then use Table 5.3 in 
Pratten (1988) to identify the industries that have the highest degree of scale economies, 
and divide the output of these industries by total output of all manufacturing industries16.
Transport cost is transport cost, measured using the inverse of road density (total 
road mileage divided by land area). Source: United Nations WDI CD-ROM and Interna­
tional Road Federation World Road Statistics.
Non-agricultural economic activity is the share of non-agricultural value-added in
GDP
GASTIL index is a combination of measures for political rights and civil liberties, 
and ranges from 1 to 7, with a lower score indicating more freedom. Source: Freedom 
House.
Total government expenditure is total government expenditure as a share of GDP.
War dummy is a dummy indicating whether the country had an external war be­
tween 1960 and 1985. Source: Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999).
Timing of independence is a categorical variable taking the value 0 if the country 
achieved independence before 1914,1 if between 1914 and 1945,2 if between 1946 and 
1989, and 3 if after 1989. Source: Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999).
16 Strictly speaking, this approach to calculating the degree o f scale economies is valid only if  technologies 
are similar across countries; it may be possible, for example, that some industries are high-scale in some 
countries, but low-scale in other countries.
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Trade (% of GDP) is the ratio of total international trade in goods and services to 
total GDP.
Ln(GDP per capita) is the log of per capita GDP, measured in constant US dollars. 
Ln(land area) is the log of land area, measured in square kilometres. 
Ln(population) is the log of population.
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Chapter 3 
Factor Endowments and The Location of 
Industry in India
3.1 Introduction
The factor endowments model is one of the key theories in the international economist’s 
toolkit. This is despite the fact that many empirical studies have found that the model 
does not seem to hold empirically (see, for example, Leontief (1953), Bowen, Learner 
and Sveikauskas (1987), Trefler (1993, 1995)). However, it is clear that many of the 
strict assumptions associated with the basic factor-endowments model - identical tech­
nologies and preferences across countries, identical qualities of inputs and outputs, no 
trade barriers or transport costs - do not hold in the real world. Consequently, estimates 
of the model that allow for differences in the above characteristics have been able to fit 
the data more closely than strict versions of the model (e.g. Trefler (1993, 1995), Harri- 
gan (1995, 1997), Harrigan and Zakrajsek (2000), Davis and Weinstein (2001), Redding 
and Vera-Martin (2004)).17
The main motivation of this chapter is to estimate the relationship between factor 
endowments, technology, and the location of production using state-level data on indus­
tries in India. Provided that the assumptions of the model hold, this relationship should 
hold both across and within countries. In this regard, there are clear benefits of using 
within-country rather than cross-country data, since within-country data are more likely 
to be comparable, any measurement error biases may be expected to work in a similar 
direction, and more generally the assumptions of the basic model listed above are more 
likely to hold across states within a country than across different countries. Also, it re­
lates to the original work of Ohlin, who notes in the preface to The Theory o f  Trade: “... 
international trade is only a special case of what could be called interlocal trade, that is,
17 For some excellent recent surveys of the empirical literature on factor endowments and trade-related 
issues, see e.g. Helpman (1999), Davis and Weinstein (2002), or Harrigan (2003).
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exchange between locations which are characterised by incomplete mobility of factors 
and commodities between them.” (Ohlin (1924)).
There are several reasons why India makes an interesting case study for the rela­
tionship between technology, factor endowments, and the location of production. First, 
as we document in section 3.2 below, there is great heterogeneity across Indian states in 
terms of factor endowments and industrial structure. Second, our data covers a period 
of rapid change in both economic performance and government policy. India was essen­
tially a centrally planned economy prior to 1985, when Rajiv Gandhi started liberalising 
the economy. These initial steps was followed by a much more comprehensive liber­
alisation starting in 1991. Finally, India is a developing country, which contrasts with 
previous studies which have mainly concentrated on developed countries (e.g. Davis, 
Weinstein, Bradford and Shimpo (1997) and Bernstein and Weinstein (2002) who look 
at the case of Japan).
The literature on the liberalisation of the Indian economy is immense and no at­
tempt is made here to list all possible sources. Some recent surveys of the progress and 
performance of the liberalisation programmes include Basu and Pattanaik (1997), Ba- 
jpai and Sachs (1999), Krueger and Chinoy (2002), Ahluwalia (2002), Bajpai (2002), 
Srinivasan (2003) and Panagariya (2004). The general consensus seems to be that, while 
the reform process has increased the real growth rate of the Indian economy (from an 
average of 3.5 percent between 1950 and 1980, to 5.7 percent in the 1980s, to an aver­
age of 6.2 percent in the 1990s), it is still unfinished, and much more needs to be done 
especially with regard to some sectors such as infrastructure, labour laws, health and edu­
cation which have so far not been the main focus of the reforms. Section 3.2 gives a more 
detailed description of the reform process especially as it relates to industrial activity.
The contributions of the present chapter are as follows. First, we use a new panel 
of cross-state industry data on India between 1980 and 1997 to estimate the relationship 
between factor endowments, technological differences, and the location of production. 
Second, we investigate the significance and impact of the policy reforms of 1985 and 
1991 on the relationship between factor endowments, technologies and industrial struc­
ture. Finally, we perform some robustness checks on the basic framework, by including
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additional variables as controls, to try to capture the many other factors that are likely to 
be influential in determining the location of industrial production in India.
To briefly preview our results: First, our estimate of Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) provides evidence of technological improvement in the sample period. However, 
this improvement is not uniform across industries, as some industries showed rapid TFP 
growth (industries 30: chemical products, and 37: transport equipment), while others 
showed no evidence of technological improvement (e.g. industry 34: metal products). 
Second, both factor endowments and technology are strongly associated with the share 
of an industry in the gross domestic product of a state. Endowments of capital stock, lit­
erates and illiterates are more significantly related to industry shares than endowment of 
agricultural crop area. Factor endowments are much more significantly related to indus­
try share in heavy industries than in textiles and agriculture. One possible explanation is 
that our measure of crop area does not capture how suitable the land is for food or textile 
production. We also do not include natural resource endowments, because it is not possi­
ble to obtain comparable empirical measures at the state level over time. The state fixed 
effect which we use in the regression will control for time invariant natural resource en­
dowments. Third, superior technology in an industry is associated with larger shares of 
that industry. These findings are robust to the inclusion of additional political and mar­
ket potential controls in the regression. Fourth, there is strong evidence that both rounds 
of liberalisation of the economy beginning in 1985 and 1991 are associated with struc­
tural breaks in the relationship between factor endowments, technology, and industrial 
structure.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section outlines the 
empirical environment, providing a description of the data and the industrial policy of 
India. This is followed in section 3.3 by the empirical model used. Section 3.4 details 
the results, and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical environment
This section first outlines the institutional environment in which the empirical exercise is 
carried out, then offers a description of the data used.
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3.2.1 Industrial policy and economic performance in India
The data which we use for our empirical study spans the period 1980-1997, covering 
both sides of the economic reform begun in India hesitantly in the mid-1980s and more 
broadly in 1991. Industrial licensing was a central part of industrial policy in India prior 
to reform. The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of 1951 imposed a licensing 
requirement on private industry in almost all industries. A licence was required to set up 
a new unit, expand capacity by more than 25 percent, or manufacture a new product.
Prior to the major reform of 1991, industrial policy was governed by the Industrial 
Policy Resolution of 1956. Under this resolution, "... the State will progressively as­
sume a predominant and direct responsibility for setting up new industrial undertakings 
and for developing transport facilities." (Government of India (1956)). This is clearly a 
statement on the role of state planning in industrial development in the pre-reform pe­
riod; its purpose was "to prevent private monopolies and the concentration of economic 
power in different fields in the hands of small numbers of individuals". All industries 
were divided into three categories: those which were to be the exclusive responsibility 
of the state, those which were to be progressively state-owned, and those left to private 
enterprise. Included in the first two categories was virtually every heavy industry. The 
resolution goes on to state, "In order that industrialisation may benefit the economy of 
the country as a whole, it is important that disparities in levels of development between 
different regions should be progressively reduced". However, the resolution recognises 
that existing concentrations of industrial activity are often determined by factor endow­
ments and infrastructure. Hence it also seeks to develop such facilities in underdeveloped 
regions. All in all, the tone of the 1956 Resolution is one of state dominance in industry, 
with the private sector relegated to secondary importance.
In 1985 and 1986, Rajiv Gandhi’s government initiated a set of policies to lib­
eralise the Indian economy. Industrial licensing was abolished for 25 broad industry 
groups. Licensing requirements for capacity expansion and product diversification were 
relaxed. Import tariffs were also reduced.
India’s economic performance from 1950 to 1980 was not impressive, with com­
mentators ranging from Das (2002) to Srinivasan (2003) referring to the "Hindu rate of
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growth" of 3.5 percent per year (in real terms) in that period. Economic growth improved 
in the 1980s, to a real average growth rate of 5.7 percent (and further improved to 6.2 
percent per year in the 1990s). Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) argue that this improve­
ment in growth rates in the 1980s was largely caused by the pro-business orientation of 
Indira Gandhi when she returned to power in 1980. At least some part of this improve­
ment may be attributed to the limited liberalisation begun in 1985 by Rajiv Gandhi, and 
also by fiscal expansion in the second half of the 1980s (see Panagariya (2004)).
In 1991, India began further liberalisation of its economy. This liberalisation was 
initiated by the incoming government as a result of a balance of payments crisis in 1991, 
which in turn was caused by fiscal imbalances throughout the 1980s. Because the reform 
was caused by a crisis, initial reforms were focussed on macroeconomic stabilisation. 
Simultaneously, reform was begun in industrial policy, trade and exchange rate policies, 
foreign investment policy, taxes, the financial sector, and the public sector. These mea­
sures were much more comprehensive than those implemented by Rajiv Gandhi in 1985.
The tone of the Statement of Industrial Policy 1991, coinciding with the reform 
of the economy in 1991, is substantially different from that of the 1956 Resolution. It 
recognises that, in public sector enterprises, "(s)erious problems are observed in the in­
sufficient growth in productivity, poor project management, over-manning, lack of con­
tinuous technological upgradation, and inadequate attention to R&D and human resource 
development" (Government of India (1991)). The Statement calls for a reduction in the 
number of industries reserved for the public sector, to those related to the military, fu­
els, mining, and railroads, and also for the abolishment of industrial licensing for almost 
all other industries. The limit on investments in large Indian and foreign companies was 
scrapped for many high-priority, advanced technology industries, and access to foreign 
technology was made much easier. Overall, it is a statement of industrial liberalisation.
The reform from a state-led economic system to a more free-market system has im­
plications for our empirical strategy to be detailed in section 3.3. Our empirical strategy 
assumes free, competitive markets. This poses no difficulty if the state, in implement­
ing its planning decisions, is a benevolent social planner which seeks to maximise social 
welfare, and there are no distortions in the economy. If that is the case, then the mar­
ket outcome simply replicates the planning outcome. However, it seems more likely that
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the state has other interests in addition to social welfare. Theory does not offer much 
guidance on how this affects the relationship between factor endowments and industrial 
structure. It may even be the case that government intervention had no impact on this 
relationship, since as noted above the government had the intention of changing capital 
and infrastructural endowments in parallel with redistributing industrial production. We 
include a direct measure of state policies in the form of labour regulation, and measures 
of the political histories of states to control for other ways in which government policy 
may influence industrial structure. In addition, one of our empirical strategies is to in­
clude a set of terms interacting a post-reform dummy with factor endowment measures. 
Then, the statistical significance of the coefficients on these terms would enable us to de­
termine whether the relationship between factor endowments, technology and industral 
structure, differs between state planning and market allocation.
3.2.2 Data
The main dataset that we use comes from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), pro­
duced by the Central Statistical Organisation of India. The ASI is a survey of registered 
manufacturing firms; that is, firms that have either ( 1) 20 or more workers without elec­
trical power, or (2) 10 or more workers with electrical power18. This annual publication 
consists of data at the 3-digit level at the state level. This gives us a total of 138 industries. 
The total number of industry-state-time observations is 30676. Because of confidential­
ity restrictions, some small industries do not appear in the dataset for each period. Since 
this would affect our TFP estimates, we retain in our sample only those industries which 
appear in every year. This reduces the total number of industry-state-time observations 
from 30676 to 18000.19
We then aggregate up to the two digit level, since factor endowment differences 
may be more important in determining the mix of broad industry aggregates. We further 
combine industries 24 and 25 into a single industry for the manufacture of all textiles
18 Throughout this chapter and the next, we use the term "manufacturing" to mean registered manufac­
turing. The ASI contains only data for registered manufacturing; any data on unregistered manufacturing 
reported below are from Besley and Burgess (2004). However, this data is not available at the industry level.
19 Including all 3 digit observations in our aggregation, as expected, injects much more noise into the 
results, especially on TFP. Nevertheless, the basic pattern of the findings holds if  all 3 digit observations are 
retained in the sample.
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other than cotton textiles. This is done because industry 25 (manufacture of jute and 
other vegetable textiles) appears in only a few states, hence the few TFP observations 
for that industry would prove problematic when running regressions including TFP as an 
independent variable. We therefore have a total of 18 industries.
There is a total of 25 states and 7 union territories in the sample period (in 2000, 
the borders of several states were redrawn and three new states created). The analysis is 
performed on the 16 largest states in terms of industrial output due to data limitations; 
these states represent over 97 percent of the total population of India. For each industry- 
state pair, data on a wide range of variables is available, from number of factories, to 
capital employed, workers employed, total inputs and output, value added, and capital 
formation. We have data for the period 1980 to 1997, which is an especially interesting 
period to investigate for the reason mentioned above: the liberalization of the economy, 
which began somewhat hesitantly in the 1980s, and was rapidly pushed forward in 1991 
as a direct result of the financial crisis faced by the Indian government. The sample 
period is thus one of rapid change and growth of the Indian economy.
Data on endowments comes from a variety of sources; the Data Appendix to this 
chapter provides further details on sources and construction of data. A key source of data 
is the dataset compiled by Ozler, Datt and Ravallion (1996), augmented by Besley and 
Burgess (2000, 2004), and further extended by the author using data from the Statistical 
Abstract of India (various years); see Besley and Burgess (2000,2004) for further details 
on the data. Key data sources include the Census of India for population figures, and 
Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1991) for political variables. Data for transport networks are 
from the Statistical Abstract of India.
Factor endowments
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of factor endowments. We use four mea­
sures of factor endowments: capital stock, number of literates and illiterates in the pop­
ulation (to capture skilled and unskilled workers), and crop area. Our capital variable is 
real fixed capital. On a per capita basis, this varies in 1980 from less than 100 rupees per 
capita in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh, to over 400 rupees per capita 
in Gujarat and Maharashtra. A similar pattern can be observed in 1997, giving no indi­
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cation of convergence in real capital-labour ratios. This is consistent with recent studies 
which find evidence of only conditional convergence in growth rates and polarisation in 
income levels across Indian states (see Trivedi (2002) and Bandyopadhyay (2004)).
Capital accumulation in India has been extremely rapid over the sample period, 
apart from Bihar where the capital-labour ratio actually decreased between 1980 and 
1997. On average, each state had almost four times as much real fixed capital per capita 
in 1997 as it did in 1980, with Gujarat posting the largest increase of almost seven times 
the 1980 real per capita capital stock.
Population and population growth rates also vary significantly across states. The 
most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, has close to 156 million people in 1997, and while 
we have omitted the smallest states and union territories from our sample, the smallest 
states in our sample in terms of population are Jammu and Kashmir and Haryana, which 
have 8.9 million and 18.9 million people respectively. In terms of growth rates, there 
are states with relatively low growth rates (Tamil Nadu and Kerala where the population 
grew 23.5 percent and 25.6 percent respectively between 1980 and 1997), and also states 
with high growth rates such as Jammu and Kashmir and Rajasthan where the increase in 
population over the sample period was 50.2 percent and 48.9 percent respectively.
With the increasing population and the much slower increase (and occasional 
declines) in the area under crops, cropped area per capita is declining in every state 
in India. Finally, since the skill level of the workforce is an important endowment, we 
have figures for literacy rates. There is a positive correlation between literacy rates and 
real per capita SDP (correlation is between 0.31 and 0.55 for each year). In terms of 
percentages, literacy rates range from 23.9 percent in Rajasthan in 1980 to 69.4 percent 
in Kerala in 1980, and from 45.1 percent in Bihar in 1997, to 90.5 percent in Kerala in 
1997.
Real fixed capital 
(million rupees)*
Real per capita fixed 
capital (rupees)
Area under crops 
(000 hectares)
Per cap cropped area 
(hectares)
Real per capita net 
SDP (rupees) Population (000) Literacy rate
State name 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997
Andhra Pradesh 8675 60000 163.44 807.06 12281 13777 0.2314 0.1854 1473.9 3445.9 53077 74324 29.37 54.27
Assam 795 3561 44.42 138.44 3446 3979 0.1926 0.1547 1380.4 2126.9 17893 25721 39.64 59.77
Bihar 26900 35100 388.7 353.46 11148 10262 0.161 0.1033 984.6 1445 69242 99309 25.57 45.09
Gujarat 17000 175000 502.18 3774.6 10695 11064 0.3169 0.2387 2073.5 5291 33754 46358 42.91 66.38
Haryana 4441 25300 347.15 1342.12 5462 6174 0.427 0.3271 2533.6 5738.8 12793 18878 35.18 63.55
Jammu & Kashmir 34 110 5.7 12.58 974 1081 0.1648 0.1214 1927.8 2464.5 5910 8907 25.89 48.91
Karnataka 8781 42800 238.94 863.55 10660 12712 0.2901 0.2565 1623.9 3805.1 36750 49560 37.8 62.62
Kerala 4330 10600 170.76 331.91 2862 2974 0.1129 0.0934 1620.5 3873 25357 31839 69.4 90.55
Madhya Pradesh 13700 43300 264.67 575.4 21402 25862 0.4143 0.3439 1463.1 2514.2 51655 75200 27.32 56.23
Maharashtra 27500 183000 441.32 2044.9 20270 22117 0.3256 0.2468 2603.2 5979.4 62263 89612 46.4 72.36
Orissa 4249 7751 162.12 217.61 8746 6764 0.3337 0.1899 1420.4 2084.9 26210 35619 33.4 57.77
Punjab 5682 19000 341.52 829.04 6763 7932 0.4065 0.3453 2858.6 6348.7 16638 22969 40.18 65.17
Rajasthan 4053 33500 120.02 666.42 17350 21714 0.5138 0.4317 1313.2 3035.9 33771 50293 23.87 52.22
Tamil Nadu 12600 74000 260.91 1243.32 6469 6646 0.1343 0.1117 1601.4 4229 48184 59513 46.07 69.28
Uttar Pradesh 8805 76900 80.28 494.08 24574 26465 0.2241 0.1699 1365.7 2364.8 109677 155723 26.65 51.65
West Bengal 13000 42100 240.3 554.92 7620 9145 0.1409 0.1205 1894.2 3460 54100 75864 40.13 64.73
* Base year 1981. Figures for capital stock in West Bengal in 1997 are actually for 1996 as data for 1997 is unavailable.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics.
63
Share of industries
Section 3.3 develops the neoclassical model from which is derived the main esti­
mation equation. The model predicts that the share of an industry in state GDP is asso­
ciated with factor endowments, technology, and prices. This industry share, measured at 
the 2-digit level, is the dependent variable in our regression.
Table 3.2 presents data on the share of registered manufacturing in each state in 
SDP, for 1980, 1991 and 1997, while Figure 3.1 presents the time series of this share 
(each state rescaled to show changes over time more clearly). What is clear from both the 
table and the figure is the difference across states in terms of share of SDP in registered 
manufacturing. This ranges from approximately 2 percent in Jammu and Kashmir, to 
over 15 percent in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.
There are also changes in this share over time. Despite the rapid growth of the 
Indian economy over the sample period, the share of registered manufacturing does not 
seem to have increased very much over time. Only four states posted large increases 
in the registered manufacturing share of SDP: Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and 
Punjab. West Bengal exhibited falling registered manufacturing as a share of SDP. In 
general, state industry share tends to follow the same trend before and after the reform; 
notable exceptions are Gujarat and Haryana, where industry share increased dramatically 
post-reform, and Karnataka, where industry had been increasing as a share of SDP before 
reform, but this trend has been reversed post-reform. Such changes in manufacturing 
share could also reflect changes in performance in other sectors; for example, some states 
may have experienced rapid increases in non-manufacturing growth post-reform.
Figure 3.2 shows the time path of the share of the different sectors in the Indian 
economy. We define the primary sector as agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining; the 
secondary sector as total manufacturing (registered plus unregistered); the tertiary sector 
as services, comprising transport, storage and communication, trade, hotels and restau­
rants, banking and insurance, real estate, business services, and other services; and other 
sectors as construction, electricity, water and gas, and public administration. The biggest 
change is that the share of the primary sector has declined over time, from 43.2 percent 
of national income in 1980, to 32.6 percent in 1997. Much of this decline has been re-
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Sta te  nam e Share o f  reg is te red  m anufac tu rin g  in SD P
1980 1991 1997
A n d h ra  P rad esh 5.85 9.57 9 .49
A ssam 4.16 7.44 4.84
B ih ar 3.45 9.15 7 .19
G u ja ra t 15.11 14.10 2 6 .04
H ary an a 10.05 10.53 16.27
Jam m u  &  K ashm ir 1.34 1.70 2 .70
K arn atak a 9.06 10.48 9.43
K era la 7 .59 8.22 7 .64
M ad h y a  P rad esh 6.86 6.16 10.64
M ah ara sh tra 19.13 17.73 17.22
O rissa 4 .74 7.25 5.34
Pun jab 5.91 7.82 8.86
R ajasthan 4.83 6.53 5.23
T am il N adu 14.95 16.42 14.56
U ttar P rad esh 4 .34 7.87 7 .54
W est B engal 12.16 7.10 6 .50
N o te : T he  va lue  for Jam m u and K ashm ir fo r 1997 is the 1996 value 
Table 3.2: Share of registered manufacturing in SDP
Figure 3.1: Share of registered manufacturing in state domestic product.
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Figure 3.2: Components of state domestic product.
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placed by an increase in the tertiary sector, which increased as a share of national income 
from 30.7 percent in 1980 to 37.2 percent in 1997. The share o f the secondary (manu­
facturing) sector increased only slightly in this time period, from 16.3 percent in 1980 to
17.6 percent in 1997. The share o f other sectors increased from 9.8 percent to 12.7 per­
cent. The evidence suggests that economic growth in India over the sample period was 
not primarily driven by manufacturing growth, but by a switch from primary sector ac­
tivities such as agriculture and mining, to tertiary sector activities such as transport and 
communication, financial and other services.
Figure 3.3 disentangles manufacturing into registered and unregistered manufac­
turing. We find that registered manufacturing as a share o f state domestic product was 
increasing (and the share of unregistered manufacturing was decreasing) before the re­
form of 1991. These shares appear to have stabilised post-reform, at about 11 percent for 
registered manufacturing, and 6 percent for unregistered manufacturing.
Turning to industry-level data for registered manufacturing, the share of 2-digit 
industries in total registered manufacturing also varies considerably across states and
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Figure 3.3: Time path o f registered and unregistered manufacturing as share of state 
domestic product.
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over time. Consider for example, industry 20 (food products). In 1980 the share of this 
industry in total industrial value added varied across states from less than 2 percent in 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and West Bengal, to over 10 percent in Andhra 
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh. Similar patterns can be found 
in different years and in different industries, sometimes to an even greater extent. For 
instance, almost 80 percent of manufacturing value added in Assam can be attributed 
to industry 21 (food products), while over 50 percent of manufacturing value added in 
Orissa consists o f industry 33 (basic metals and alloys).
At the national level, the performance of individual 2-digit industries is equally 
varied. Figure 3.4 shows the share o f each 2-digit industry in total industrial value added 
(individually scaled to show fluctuations in industry share more clearly). While most 
industries seem to have maintained their share o f industrial value added, industries 23 
and 27 (cotton textiles, and wood products) show decreasing shares over time, while 
industry 26 (textile products) experienced an increasing share over time.
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Figure 3.4: Share o f industry in country-wide registered manufacturing.
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Going into the details, there is also great variation in the time paths o f the shares of 
industries in states and states in industries over time. In terms o f “emergent” or rapidly 
growing industries, the best examples are industry 26 (textile products) in Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu, and industry 37 (transport equipment) in Haryana.20 Rapidly declining in­
dustries include industries 22 (beverages and tobacco) and 23 (cotton textiles) in Gujarat, 
industry 24 (man-made textiles) in Andhra Pradesh, industry 27 (wood products) in Ma­
harashtra, and industry 33 (metals and alloys) in Kerala and Rajasthan..
3.2.3 Summary: Empirical environment
The ideas to be drawn from this description of the data are twofold: First, there is a 
great variety of experiences across states and over time in India, both in terms of factor 
endowments and the performance o f industries, both individually and in the aggregate.
20 The much-discussed IT boom in Bangalore in Karnataka is lost in the coarseness o f  the industrial classi­
fication, and in the fact that a large proportion o f the activities o f  the IT sector fall under services rather than 
manufacturing.
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This leads to the second idea, which is what motivates this chapter: are the variations in 
factor endowments related to the variation in industrial performance?
3.3 Empirical Strategy
This section first outlines the theoretical background of the model, then presents the 
econometric specification, followed by a discussion of the measurement issues associated 
with calculating Total Factor Productivity, and estimation methods.
3.3.1 Factor endowments and technology
The model is derived from neoclassical trade theory. We consider first the basic specifi­
cation. This makes the usual assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect com­
petition, and identical preferences across states. However, we allow for technology dif­
ferences across states and industries. States are indexed by z  6 { 1 , Z},  goods by 
j  € {1,..., N} ,  factors of production by i G {1,..., M ) ,  and time by t.
Each state is endowed with an exogenous vector of factors of production, vzt. 
We assume Hicks-neutral technology differences such that the production function takes 
the form (see Dixit and Norman (1980) p. 138) yzj t =  9zj tF j  ( vzj t ), where 6zj t is 
the level of technology in industry j  in state 2 in year t. The Hicks-neutral technology 
implies that technological differences affect the productivity of all factors of production 
in industry j  in state z  by the same proportion. The revenue function r  (9ztpzt ,v zt) 
characterises general equilibrium in production, where 9zt  is an N  x N  diagonal matrix 
of the technology parameters 9zj t . As long as the revenue function is twice continuously 
differentiable, the vector of net output supplies y  (9ztpzt , vzt) is given by the gradient of 
r  (9ztpzt , v ^ )  with respect to pzt.21
21 A sufficient condition for the revenue function to be twice continuously differentiable and production 
patterns to be determinate is that there are at least as many factors as goods: M  > N .  If  there are more goods 
than factors, N  > M ,  production structures may still be determinate if  there are differences in technologies 
or relative prices across states. If  the production structure is indeterminate, then our estimated equation 
will perform poorly in explaining industry share across states, in terms o f having statistically insignificant 
right-hand side variables.
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We follow Harrigan (1997) and Redding and Vera-Martin (2004) in assuming a 
translog revenue function, which is a flexible functional form that provides an arbitrarily 
close local approximation to any true underlying revenue function:
l n r  (OztPzti Vzt) — @00 4" E j  @0j i^zjtPzjt)  +  ^  E j  E &  @jk i@zjtPzjt) I n  zktPzkt)
+  $0i l n  (vzit) + ^  E i  E h  &ih In (Vzit) I n  (vzht) (3.1)
+  E j  E i  7 j i  I n  (OzjtPzjt) I n  (vzit)
where j , k  G ( 1 , iV) index goods and i, /i G ( 1 , M }  index factors. Symmetry of 
cross effects requires that, for all j , k, i and h:
@jk = @kj and Sih = Shi (3.2)
Linear homogeneity in v and p requires:
E j  @0j =  1 E t^ o i =  1 Ej@jk  = 0 E i6 ih  = 0 E i T i i - O  (3.3)
Differentiating ln r  (6ztpzt, vzt) with respect to each ln pj gives the share of good j  in
GDP as a function of prices, technology and factor supplies:
s*jt= PzT £X t) ^ = l n  111 <***)+£* ■**111 m
(3.4)
This is a general equilibrium relationship between industry shares and prices, endow­
ments and technology. Changes in the RHS variables have different effects in different 
industries, as captured here by the industry-specific coefficients.
Alternatively, imposing the assumption of identical technology across states as in 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model gives the following relationship between industry shares and 
prices and factor supplies:
Szjt = @oj +  E j  @jk In (pzjt) +  E i I j i ln (vzit) (3.5)
3.3.2 Econometric specification
We first start with the specification with identical technology, and write equation (3.5) 
as:
Szjt = @oj +  E j  @jkln (Pzjt) +  E i  7ji In (vzit) +  £zjt  (3.6)
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where ezjt is a random error. Equation (3.6) is estimated for each industry, pooling 
observations across states 2 and time t. However, one problem with estimating (3.6) is 
that prices of individual industries are not observable across states.
If we assume that all goods are perfectly tradeable, then prices are equalized across 
states, and we can get around the problem of unobservable prices by adding a set of 
industry-specific time dummies Cjt to control for differences in prices across industries 
and time:
Szjt = Poj +  Cjt +  Ei I j i  ln (vzit) +  Szjt (3.7)
These industry-specific time dummies also control for industry-specific shocks that are 
common across states.
To allow for non-tradeables, first we partition the vector of goods prices pzt into 
the vectors of tradeable (pj t ) and non-tradeable (p^T) goods prices:
A t  =  ( p l  ■ P ^ ) '
where p^t is an 1 x nT vector of traded goods prices, p^tT is an 1 x n NT vector o f non­
traded goods prices, and nT +  n NT = n. Since free trade still allows equalized goods 
prices among tradeables, while in general we have different non-traded goods prices, we 
can write equation (3.6) as:
Szjt = Poj +  Cjt +  E j L ^ + i  Pjk In (pUjf) +  E i  I j i ln (Vzit) +  Szjt (3.8)
Since we once again do not have data on the prices of non-tradeables, we follow Harrigan 
(1997) and Redding and Vera-Martin (2004) in treating the price of non-traded goods as 
a random variable with some estimable probability distribution. Thus, let
EJ=nT+i p j k ln (pz£ )  = I z j  + Pjt + Uzjt uzjt ~ N  (0, a)) (3.9)
such that the price of non-traded goods comprises state-industry fixed effects r)zj,  industry- 
specific time dummies pjt , and a random component uzjt with constant variance a2-. 
Combining equations (3.8) and (3.9), we get:
Szjt  =  Poj +  Vzj +  djt +  Ei 7ji In (vzit) +  Uzjt (3.10)
where u zjt = ezjt +  uzjt, and djt = p.jt +  Cjt ls combined time-specific effect of 
all goods prices and nontraded goods technology parameters. The state-industry fixed 
effect rjzj  will also control for unobserved time-invariant differences across states that
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are allowed to have heterogeneous effects across industries. Equation (3.10) is the first 
estimated equation.
Alternatively, if instead of starting from (3.5), we begin developing our empirical 
framework from (3.4) exploiting the Hicks-neutral technology differences across states, 
then the analogue to equation (3.10) would be:
Szjt =  Poj +  Vzj "b djt +  0jk i^zjt) +  Yli 'iji ivzit) +  ^zj t  (3*11)
This is Harrigan’s (1997) equation (5), and is the second equation which we estimate. 
The advantage of using equation (3.11) rather than equation (3.10) is that, with equation 
(3.11), we can evaluate the relationship between both factor endowments and technol­
ogy, and industry share across industries, states, and time. Technological differences 
may have a strong association with industrial structure and may be correlated with fac­
tor endowments, in which case the parameter estimates from estimating equation (3.10) 
would be biased and inconsistent, due to the omitted variables.
3.3.3 Total factor productivity
In estimating equation (3.11), we also need a measure of 9zj t, the Hicks-neutral tech­
nology parameter. We calculate net-value-added (NVA) based total factor productivity 
(TFP) indices, using data on NVA, labour input and capital input. All values are de­
flated using industry-level price deflators; this deflation enables us to focus on changes 
in efficiency as opposed to changes in prices which may affect across-time comparisons, 
although we are unable to disentangle technological improvements against other reasons 
for efficiency gains. Deflating NVA in this way also implicitly assumes that intermediate- 
input and output prices are changing at the same rate; we therefore cannot control for 
changes in mark-ups22.
Thus, suppose that value added N V A  is a function of capital k and labour I. Sup­
pressing industry and time subscripts for readability, for any given industry-time pair, the
22 One possible way to control for changes in mark-ups is to use a double-deflation method to calculate 
output-based TFP. This involves using different deflators for inputs and outputs. We do not have the data to 
calculate TFP in this way.
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index for any two states x  and 2 is:
n v a - n v ‘- n V - ”'- a ,s w ‘-
TFP-  = N vt{rJ U; Ifj (312)
where I and k are geometric averages over all the observations in the sample, a lz — 
(slz +  sl) /2 , where slz is labour’s share in output in state 2. We calculate TFP relative to 
the geometric mean for each industry, so that, for state z, equation (3.12) simplifies to:
a\ /  1 \  1—a
T F P ^ w r X i ) \ i )  a i 3 )
This is the equation that is used to calculate TFP. It is a general superlative index number 
measure of TFP, meaning that it is exact for the flexible translog form.23 Since the share 
of labour is relatively noisy and sometimes exceeds one, we follow Harrigan (1997) in 
using a smoothing procedure. When the production function is translog and markets 
clear, labour’s share in NVA of industry j  at time t in state 2 is:
=  <*!Zj  +  a 2j ln ( 7“ ^ )  (3' 14)
If observed labour shares deviate from this equation by an i.i.d. error term, then the 
parameters of this equation can be estimated for each industry by regressing the share of 
labour on a set of state fixed effects and the capital-labour ratio. The fitted values from 
this equation are then used as the labour cost shares in the TFP equation (3.13).
3.3.4 Estimation
There are a couple of econometric issues to address. The first is the estimation method 
used. Since we control for both time and state fixed effects, identification of the parame­
ters of interest in equations (3.10) and (3.11) (i.e. the parameters on factor endowments 
and technologies) is through within-state time series variation.
The translog revenue function implies the presence of cross-equation restrictions 
on the coefficients on TFP in the model with TFP {Pjk = f3kj ) . These cross-equation re­
strictions imply that the errors are correlated across equations. Therefore, the appropriate 
way to estimate the system of equations is to use a restricted SURE (seemingly unrelated 
regressions) estimator. The resulting GLS estimator is asymptotically efficient if the re-
23 Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982a, 1982b) show how we can obtain the productivity index (3.12). 
Diewert (2000) is a highly readable discussion of measuring total factor productivity. Griffith, Redding and 
Van Reenen (2004) consider alternative ways of measuring TFP.
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strictions are valid (see Baltagi (1995) pp. 103-104 for a description). Also, in both 
equations (3.10) and (3.11), we can impose the linear homogeneity assumptions above 
(equation (3.3)), since these conditions must hold in the model. This leads quite natu­
rally to a test of whether the production function is constant returns to scale. In terms 
of the model, this is a test o f whether the revenue function is homogeneous of degree 
one, or equivalently that the sum of the factor endowment coefficients is equal to zero 
( S i  7ji = 0) in an unconstrained version of the model.
As a robustness check on our results, we include additional explanatory variables 
in the regression to control for income levels, politics and market access. We also conduct 
tests for parameter stability over time, to test for changes in the impact of endowments 
and technology on industry shares caused by economic reform in 1985 and 1991. As 
discussed below in subsection 3.4.4, this is done by including a set of interaction terms, 
interacting a reform dummy with the RHS variables, and performing an F-test on the 
joint significance of these interaction terms.
In our empirical work, factor endowments are used as exogenous variables that 
explain the share of an industry in a state. However, if factors of production are mo­
bile across locations, it is also possible that these endowments may be endogenously 
determined; that is, changes in production structure can lead to changes in factor endow­
ments. But even if this is the case, there would still exist a relationship between factor 
endowments and industrial structure which we are able to estimate; what changes is the 
interpretation of the estimated equation. If factor endowments are exogenously given, 
the estimated equation has a supply-side interpretation: factor endowments determine 
the shares of industries, whereas if factor endowments are endogenously determined, the 
estimated equation has a demand-side interpretation: industry share influences the lo­
cation of factor endowments. We do not distinguish between these two interpretations, 
and therefore we cannot interpret our results as representing causal relationships between 
the variables; this limitation should be borne in mind when reviewing the econometric 
results below. See Redding and Vera-Martin (2004) for further discussion of this issue.
3.4 Results
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3.4.1 Total factor productivity
The total factor productivity data is summarised in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, and Figures 3.5 
and 3.6. A clear result of the tables and the figures is the great heterogeneity in per­
formance across industries and states. From Figure 3.5 we can see that some industries 
are experiencing rapid improvements in technology, such as industries 20 (food prod­
ucts), 29 (leather products), 30 (basic chemicals), 37 (transport equipment) and 38 (other 
manufacturing). Many of the other industries do not appear to have experienced much 
change in TFP over the sample period. In industry 26 (textile products), TFP has actually 
declined in the post-reform period.
If we look at the mean of relative TFP across all industries over time (Figure 3.6), 
we find that TFP has been increasing overtime, from 0.869 in 1980 to 1.363 in 1997. This 
corresponds to an average growth rate of almost 2.7 percent, which is similar to the recent 
results on TFP growth in India by Unel (2003) and Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) for 
the same time period. While one might think that the liberalisation of the economy would 
boost TFP growth, visual inspection of Figure 3.6 does not suggest any increase in TFP 
growth after the reform of 1991. This is also consistent with the results of Aghion, 
Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2004) who find a small mean effect of liberalisation but 
substantial heterogeneity across states and industries.
Krishna and Mitra (1998) present evidence that productivity growth increased in 
several industries in the post-reform period in India. This is not inconsistent with our 
result, as we do find some industries experiencing more rapid TFP growth post-reform, 
for example industry 37 (transport equipment). Ahluwalia (1991) finds that TFP growth 
in India has been low throughout the post-independence period, growing by 0.2 percent 
per year between 1959 and 1966, falling at a rate of 0.3 percent per year betweem 1967 
and 1980, and increasing by 3.4 percent per year between 1981 and 1986.
TFP tends to be fairly noisy, a result which is also obtained by Harrigan (1997, 
1999) for cross-country data and may be attributable to business-cycle effects. Hall 
(1988) and Hall (1990) present evidence on the pro-cyclical nature of TFP. Hall (1990) in 
particular discusses possible explanations for this pro-cyclicality, including factor price 
movements and mismeasurement of inputs and outputs.
75
Figure 3.5: Time series of mean TFP, by industry
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Figure 3.6: Time series of the mean of TFP
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Total factor productivity
NIC2 20 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29
Year 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997
Andhra Pradesh 0.241 1.022 0.861 1.281 0.579 0.754 0.686 1.469 0.911 1.214 0.091 0.273 0.644 2.983 1.073 2.068 0.571
Assam 1.395 0.295 0.872 1.041 0.124 1.286 0.994 0.315 1.030 1.567
Bihar 0.134 1.313 0.488 2.648 1.331 5.766 0.305 0.150 1.233 5.835 1.509 0.255 1.232 1.372
Gujarat 0.500 1.473 0.747 0.734 1.025 0.269 1.033 0.897 0.754 0.547 0.531 0.632 1.039 0.924 0.878 1.517 0.208 1.575
Haryana 0.547 0.174 0.720 0.495 0.760 0.771 0.773 0.857 0.659 0.679 0.660 0.533 1.078 1.523 1.785 1.108 1.700 2.936
Jammu & Kashmir 0.671 2.566
Karnataka 0.229 1.730 0.741 1.117 1.258 1.620 0.842 2.152 0.422 2.928 0.881 0.878 0.793 0.643 0.902 1.898 0.524 1.476
Kerala 1.028 0.909 1.382 1.788 0.862 1.144 1.234 2.058 0.730 0.511 0.195 0.944 0.407 1.286 1.310
Madhya Pradesh 0.133 0.934 0.658 1.224 1.494 0.887 2.042 1.006 2.136 1.296 1.312 0.888 0.219 1.098 0.655
Maharashtra 0.097 0.745 1.341 1.214 0.917 0.622 1.129 0.876 1.038 0.708 0.998 1.115 1.735 0.912 1.417 3.283 0.825 2.858
Orissa 0.307 2.725 0.409 1.008 2.705 0.126 0.610 0.438 1.409 1.855 1.002 2.233
Punjab 0.580 1.914 1.082 2.246 0.718 0.551 1.019 1.959 0.653 0.741 1.430 1.609 1.011 0.857 0.212 1.841 0.464 0.623
Rajasthan 0.292 2.809 1.004 2.649 0.428 0.079 0.846 0.439 1.110 0.709 0.657 1.567 1.595 2.308 0.900 2.643
Tamil Nadu 0.463 1.132 0.840 1.587 0.430 2.034 1.309 1.692 0.851 0.530 0.595 0.908 0.959 0.671 1.291 2.574 0.708 0.976
Uttar Pradesh 0.214 1.223 2.517 0.996 0.920 0.992 0.919 1.077 0.218 0.416 0.677 0.615 0.719 0.537 0.757 3.008 0.634 1.810
West Bengal 0.004 0.159 0.585 0.517 1.316 0.471 0.785 2.102 0.791 1.003 0.921 1.283 0.936 0.635 0.964 1.125 0.587 2.044
each industry using the following formula:
T FP,  =
NVA ( I
NVA t \  I
where NVA is net value added, 1 is labour, k ts capital, and z is the state indicator. All values are deflated using industry-level price deflators. TFP is calculated relative to the 
geometric mean of the industry over all states. See the Data Appendix for details of the construction and sources of the variables.
Table 3.3: TFP measures relative to industry geometric mean, 1980 and 1997.
Total factor productivity
NIC2 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
Year 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997
Andhra Pradesh 0.394 1.248 1.466 0.719 0.862 2.030 0.646 5.160 0.605 0.772 0.704 1.402 0.800 2.327 0.263 1.035 0.692 1.401
Assam 1.800 1.272 0.548 0.836 1.071 1.242 0.894 1.983
Bihar 1.145 1.065 0.825 0.482 0.401 3.779 0.629 0.558 0.861 0.331 0.247 0.151 1.223 4.092
Gujarat 0.833 1.753 1.040 0.854 1.672 0.924 0.542 0.960 0.564 0.731 1.069 0.632 0.527 0.506 0.973 0.518 1.302
Haryana 1.640 2.360 1.376 1.302 0.863 1.426 0.403 1.586 1.424 0.959 1.954 0.903 0.950 1.007 3.186 0.649 1.643
Jammu & Kashmir 0.799 0.008 0.786 0.508 0.592 0.217 0.705 0.297 0.623
Karnataka 0.852 1.459 0.283 1.134 0.871 2.079 1.023 0.412 1.188 1.215 1.095 1.031 0.775 1.523 1.204 1.690 1.007 0.810
Kerala 1.047 1.254 0.779 1.244 1.531 0.484 1.538 0.505 0.543 1.135 0.519 2.250 0.970 0.422 0.535 2.591 1.117 2.811
Madhya Pradesh 0.591 3.722 0.297 0.865 0.769 0.939 1.422 3.579 1.039 0.875 1.024 0.667 0.909 1.475 0.514 0.937
Maharashtra 1.463 3.157 1.040 1.483 1.200 0.485 1.505 1.740 1.756 1.441 1.128 1.373 1.165 1.331 1.045 2.440 0.661 2.228
Orissa 0.710 0.105 1.405 1.009 1.447 1.756 0.997 0.359 0.760 0.590 1.075 0.958 1.196 2.456 0.460 0.911
Punjab 0.395 1.261 0.763 1.220 0.622 0.882 1.069 0.880 0.888 1.443 0.640 1.575 0.863 1.115 0.729 1.278 0.479 1.132
Rajasthan 0.303 1.273 0.400 0.791 1.194 0.938 1.036 1.341 2.171 1.089 1.106 0.703 0.232 0.671 3.580 0.439 1.190
Tamil Nadu 0.601 0.602 1.487 1.001 0.928 2.795 0.817 1.802 1.329 0.950 0.879 1.022 0.728 1.106 0.875 1.365 0.658 2.021
Uttar Pradesh 0.696 1.911 0.944 0.671 0.504 0.782 0.844 2.082 0.807 1.002 0.566 1.696 0.770 1.840 0.567 1.565 0.284 0.915
West Bengal 0.519 1.376 1.213 0.885 1.285 1.267 0.911 0.308 1.147 1.239 0.852 1.123 0.828 2.222 0.814 1.217 0.758 1.795
Notes: The figures for Jammu and Kashmir are for 1980 and 1996. NIC2 is the 2-digit National Industrial Classification, given in Table 3.14. Total factor productivity is calculated for 
each industry using the following formula:
TFP z =
where NVA is net value added, 1 is labour, k is capital, and z is the state indicator. All values are deflated using industry-level price deflators. TFP is calculated relative to the 
geometric mean of the industry over all states. See the Data Appendix for details of the construction and sources of the variables.
NVA
n v a A J J  {  k J
Table 3.4: (continued from Table 3.3): TFP measures relative to industry geometric mean, 1980 and 1997.
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A further concern with our TFP measures is that the price deflators which we 
use to obtain real values is of questionable value in an economy where the artificially 
low price set by the authorities and the frequent shortage of intermediate inputs led to 
a flourishing black market for such inputs, where clearly the prices do not follow those 
set by the authorities. Therefore, the use of official prices will overstate real output, and 
hence may overstate TFP in the pre-reform period, although this depends on the wedge 
betweeen official and true prices of both inputs and outputs. This is probably more true 
in the period before reform, but since the reform was a gradual process, some sectors and 
prices were probably highly distorted several years after the start of reforms.
It is interesting to compare the TFP growth experience of India with those of China 
and the East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan and South Korea, as these are all countries which have experienced rapid eco­
nomic growth in the last four decades. Young (1995, 2000) argues that economic growth 
in China and the NICs was primarily caused by factor accumulation rather than TFP 
growth.
3.4.2 Basic regression results
Table 3.5 presents the results for equation (3.10), imposing linear homogeneity con­
straints (J2i 'Yji = 0) f°r each industry but not including TFP in the specification24. To 
facilitate comparisons with later results, we report the results for the same number of 
observations as are used in later samples, where we lose observations because TFP mea­
sures are not available for all industries in all years.25 The reduces the number of obser­
vations from a possible 287 to 147.
All results presented include time dummies and state fixed effects (not reported 
due to space constraints). Because we are estimating general equilibrium effects of the 
endowments, and because of the linear homogeneity constraint, it is unsurprising that 
many of the coefficients are negative. For industries 21 (food products), 24 (man-made
24 The results if  the regression is run without imposing the linear homogeneity constraint are broadly sim­
ilar. Where coefficients are statistically significant in both constrained and unconstrained regressions, they 
always have the same sign (this is the case for all 20 coefficients which are significant in both regressions).
25 Table 3.17 in Appendix 3B presents the results with the full sample. Regressing equation 3.10 without 
TFP using the full sample gives very similar results to the regression with the restricted sample, as all 13 
coefficients which are significant in both samples, have the same sign.
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textiles), 29 (leather products), 32 (non-metallic mineral products) and 35 (machinery 
and equipment), factor endowments are not significantly related to industry shares. In­
dustries 21 and 24 are agriculture based and labour intensive, and it is somewhat surpris­
ing that the endowments of crop area and unskilled workers have no significant impact. 
The most likely reason for this is that total crop area is a poor indicator of how much 
area is suitable for food- or textile-related agriculture. The non-significant relationship 
between factor endowments and the share of leather products and non-metallic mineral 
products may be caused by the fact that we do not include natural resource endowments 
for the reasons noted above. For machinery and equipment, the non-significance of the 
endowment coefficients is somewhat surprising, especially since this finding is robust to 
the inclusion of TFP and other control variables. One possible explanation may be that 
the share of this industry is mainly driven by technological differences across states.26
For all other industries, there is at least one factor which has a significant associ­
ation with industry share at the 10 percent level. In some industries, one or more factor 
endowments are highly significant; this includes industries 23 (cotton textiles), 34 (metal 
products), 37 (transport equipment) and 38 (other manufacturing). Apart from cotton 
textiles, these are mainly heavy industries. Capital stock, literates and illiterates are each 
statistically significant in between 6 and 8 industries, while crop area is statistically sig­
nificant in only three industries.
To test the linear homogeneity constraint, we run the regression without imposing 
the linear homogeneity constraint, and test whether the sum of endowment coefficients 
is equal to zero. The results are presented at the bottom of Table 3.5. The null hypothesis 
that the sum of the coefficients is equal to zero is rejected at the 5 percent level for 6 of our 
18 industries. In industries 22 (beverages and tobacco), 27 (wood products) and 33 (non- 
metallic mineral products), the sum of endowment coefficients is positive, suggesting 
increasing returns to scale, while in industries 26 (textile products), 29 (leather products)
26 There is evidence of multicollinearity between literates and illiterates; the correlation between these 
two variables within states and over time is large (sometimes exceeding 0.9). This is not surprising, as 
literates and illiterates sum to the total state population. This casts doubt over the coefficient estimates 
o f literates and illiterates. However, as Wooldridge (2003) p. 99 shows, high correlation between two 
explanatory variables does not affect the estimated coefficients on the other variables, if  these other variables 
are not highly correlated with each other or with the multicollinear variables. Therefore, while we may be 
fairly confident about the coefficient estimates of capital stock and crop area, to obtain precise estimates 
o f the impact o f educated workers on industry share, we should drop one o f literates or illiterates from the 
specification.
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Dep. Var
(1)
share20
(2)
share21
(3)
share22
(4)
share23
(5)
share24
(6)
share26
(7)
share27
(8)
share28
(9)
share29
Log real fixed capital 0.008 -0.004 0.138 -0.72 -0.056 -0.064 -0.003 -0.111 0.007
(0.06) (0.06) (1.67)+ (2.31)* (0.33) (0.55) (0.22) (1.37) (0.13)
Log literates 1.579 0.032 -0.71 -3.814 -0.224 -1.374 0.057 -0.873 -0.422
(1.94)+ (0.08) (1.44) (2.05)* (0.23) (1.99)* (0.83) (1.80)+ (1.24)
Log illiterates -1.539 -0.034 0.511 4.53 0.245 1.347 -0.032 0.862 0.401
(1.72)+ (0.07) (0.95) (2.22)* (0.23) (1.78)+ (0.43) (1.62) (1.08)
Log crop area -0.049 0.006 0.06 0.005 0.034 0.091 -0.022 0.123 0.014
(0.57) (0.14) (1.15) (0.02) (0.33) (1.24) (3.00)** (2.39)* (0.38)
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.9 0.51 0.88 0.61 0.8 0.91 0.82 0.81 0.81
Sum of endowment
coefficients 0.6642 -0.1573 0.8478 0.7119 0.4889 -2.6799 0.1750 -0.0169 -0.6271
p-value 0.2204 0.5742 0.0092 0.5662 0.4580 0.0000 0.0001 0.9583 0.0052
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
(10) (H ) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Dep. Var. share30 share31 share32 share33 share34 share35 share36 share37 share38
Log real fixed capital 2.094 0.935 0.047 0.939 -0.207 -0.107 -0.366 -0.333 0.054
(3.81)** (1.51) (0.51) (4.48)** (2.66)** (0.65) (1.78)+ (0.86) (1.32)
Log literates -2.617 -8.117 -0.903 1.435 -2.346 0.546 -1.351 15.659 1.273
(0.80) (2.20)* (1.62) (1.15) (5.05)** (0.56) (1.10) (6.74)** (5.22)**
Log ill iterates 0.726 7.181 0.843 -2.307 2.572 -0.437 1.856 -15.143 -1.223
(0.20) (1.77)+ (1.38) (1.69)+ (5.05)** (0.41) (1.38) (5.95)** (4.57)**
Log crop area -0.203 0 0.012 -0.067 -0.019 -0.001 -0.139 -0.183 -0.105
(0.58) (0.00) (0.20) (0.50) (0.38) (0.01) (1.07) (0.74) (4.04)**
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.78 0.75 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.66 0.68 0.75 0.88
Sum of endowment
coefficients 2.7979 -3.7214 0.1386 3.4025 0.4712 -0.1820 0.9808 1.6479 -0.5983
p-value 0.1995 0.1299 0.7096 0.0000 0.1276 0.7800 0.2298 0.2867 0.0002
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All 
regressions run using SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) with the restriction that the coefficients on all endowment 
variables sum to 0. The dependent variable shareXX refers to the share of industry XX in a state's GDP. Real fixed 
capital is the total depreciated value of fixed assets in industry, deflated by an industry-level price deflator for machinery 
and transport equipment. Literates and illiterates are the number of people who are literate and illiterate in a state.
Crop area is the total area under crops, measured in thousands of hectares. The sum of endowment coefficients is the 
sum of coefficients on real fixed capital, literates, illiterates and crop area, if the regression is run without imposing 
the restriction that they sum to zero. The p-value is the p-value of the F-test that the sum of endowment coefficients 
is equal to zero, when the regression is run without imposing that restriction. See the Data Appendix for details 
of the construction and sources of the variables.
Table 3.5: Regression (3.10): factor endowments with homogeneity constraints.
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and 38 (other manufacturing), the sum of endowment coefficients is negative, suggesting 
decreasing returns to scale.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the results for equation (3.11), including TFP, and with 
linear homogeneity and cross-equation constraints on the TFP terms. In Tables 3.6 and 
3.7, own-TFP effects are in bold. According to the theory, the own-TFP effect should 
be non-negative; superior technology in a sector should be positively related to greater 
share of that industry in the state. We find this to be true in all industries. This coefficient 
is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in all industries, while in 16 industries 
it is significant at the 1 percent level.27
For cross-industry TFP effects, we get a mix of positive and negative coefficients, 
as expected, since the underlying model is a general equilibrium model. The results do 
not correlate closely with those obtained by Harrigan (1997); this is unsurprising since 
these are general equilibrium effects. With more than two factors and two goods, the 
predictions of the general equilibrium model hold only as averages or correlations, so 
that we should not necessarily expect the effects to be the same.
Nevertheless, it is informative to consider the implications of the cross-TFP ef­
fects. Positive cross-TFP effects may indicate industries which are complementary to 
each other, so that superior productivity in one industry, attracts the other industry to lo­
cate in that state. On the other hand, negative cross-TFP effects may suggest industries 
which compete with each other for factors of production, so that superior productivity in 
one industry, draws resources away from the other industry.
For example, the share of industry 20 (food products) is positively associated with 
productivity levels in industry 23 (cotton textiles), but negatively assocated with pro­
ductivity levels in industry 24 (man-made textiles). This may suggest complementar­
ities between the production of food products and cotton textiles, but competition for
27 There is a potential endogeneity problem with the own-TFP effects, as shocks to own TFP would also 
affect the share o f an industry in GDP. We regressed equation (3.11) using both IV and OLS, instrumenting 
TFP for each industry in each state, with the average o f TFP in that industry across all other states (following 
Harrigan (1997)). The instrument has high explanatory power in the first stage regression; an F-test of the 
excluded variables (the average TFPs) is always highly significant at better than 1 percent. A Hausman 
(1978) test o f the null hypothesis that the coefficients do not differ systematically between IV and OLS, 
cannot be rejected for any industry at any conventional significance level. This suggests that biases due to 
endogeneity problems are not severe. Another alternative would be to follow Nickell, Redding and Swaffield 
(2004) in smoothing TFP using a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Dep. Var.
(1)
share20
(2)
share21
(3)
share22
(4)
share23
(5)
share24
(6)
share26
(7)
share27
(8)
share28
(9)
share29
Log real fixed capital 0.029 -0.083 0.019 -0.623 0.032 -0.081 0.013 -0.016 0.108
(0.21) (1.01) (0.20) (2.41)* (0.21) (0.75) (0.28) (0.22) (1.10)
Log literates 1.359 -0.397 -0.41 -3.694 1.248 -1.119 0.102 -0.9 0.106
(1.55) (0.77) (0.71) (2.33)* (1.29) (1.66)+ (0.35) (1.91)+ (0.17)
Log illiterates -1.372 0.494 0.36 4.34 -1.24 1.15 -0.1 0.863 -0.233
(1.44) (0.89) (0-57) (2.52)* (1.18) (1.57) (0.32) (1.69)+ (0.35)
Log crop area -0.017 -0.014 0.031 -0.022 -0.041 0.05 -0.015 0.053 0.019
(0.19) (0.27) (0.54) (0.14) (0.42) (0.75) (0.52) (1.14) (0.31)
lnTFP20 0.185 -0.017 0.016 0.087 -0.115 0 -0.003 0.01 -0.019
(5.32)** (1.04) (0.89) (2.44)* (4.07)** (0.01) (0.35) (0.58) (1.03)
lnTFP21 -0.017 0.143 0.002 -0.054 -0.016 -0.015 0.002 0.019 -0.01
(1.04) (8.90)** (0.15) (2.37)* (0.91) (0.95) (0.25) (1.45) (0.71)
lnTFP22 0.016 0.002 0.171 0.06 0.041 0.02 -0.001 -0.039 -0.016
(0.89) (0.15) (8.94)** (2.47)* (2.08)* (1.20) (0.11) (2.64)** (1.03)
lnTFP23 0.087 -0.054 0.06 0.394 0.045 -0.02 -0.029 0.009 -0.034
(2.44)* (2.37)* (2.47)* (5.17)** (1.19) (0-65) (2.21)* (0.37) (1.29)
lnTFP24 -0.115 -0.016 0.041 0.045 0.221 0.085 -0.022 0.03 0.009
(4.07)** (0.91) (2.08)* (1.19) (5.55)** (3.57)** (1.98)* (1.54) (0.43)
lnTFP26 0 -0.015 0.02 -0.02 0.085 0.164 -0.019 0.003 0.003
(0.01) (0.95) (1.20) (0.65) (3.57)** (5.41)** (1.80)+ (0.18) (0.14)
lnTFP27 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.029 -0.022 -0.019 0.019 0.015 0
(0.35) (0.25) (0.11) (2.21)* (1.98)* (1.80)+ (1.97)* (1.55) (0.05)
lnTFP28 0.01 0.019 -0.039 0.009 0.03 0.003 0.015 0.181 0.007
(0.58) (1.45) (2.64)** (0.37) (1.54) (0.18) (1.55) (7.62)** (0.46)
lnTFP29 -0.019 -0.01 -0.016 -0.034 0.009 0.003 0 0.007 0.043
(1.03) (0.71) (1.03) (1.29) (0.43) (0.14) (0.05) (0.46) (1.91)+
lnTFP30 -0.065 0.032 -0.025 -0.171 -0.064 -0.102 0.034 0.038 0.031
(1.50) (1.20) (0.89) (2.36)* (1.37) (2.91)** (2.31)* (1.52) (1.03)
lnTFP31 -0.041 -0.023 0.014 -0.21 -0.025 -0.012 -0.004 -0.027 -0.029
(1.24) (1.19) (0.65) (3.72)** (0.68) (0.47) (0.38) (1.50) (1.26)
lnTFP32 0.002 0.011 -0.04 0.022 -0.006 0.028 0.013 0.01 0.047
(0.10) (0.73) (2.46)* (0.84) (0.27) (1.38) (1.08) (0.56) (2.64)**
lnTFP33 0.021 0.027 -0.003 -0.061 0.008 0.034 0.003 0.04 0.005
(0.76) (1.45) (0.18) (1.46) (0.25) (1.37) (0.24) (2.14)* (0.24)
lnTFP34 -0.019 0 0.008 -0.046 -0.006 -0.017 0.016 -0.023 0.017
(1.21) (0.03) (0.55) (2.24)* (0.36) (0.97) (1.31) (127) (1.06)
lnTFP35 -0.026 0.032 -0.092 0.019 -0.037 0.006 0.018 0.04 0.074
(0.93) (1.53) (3.81)** (0.50) (1.16) (0.19) (1.04) (1.44) (2.83)**
lnTFP36 0.046 0.052 -0.01 0.008 0.099 -0.055 0.014 0.039 0.056
(1.29) (2.04)* (0.36) (0.16) (2.52)* (156) (0.85) (1.32) (1.88)+
lnTFP37 -0.06 -0.034 0.017 0.124 -0.122 -0.075 -0.025 -0.059 -0.057
(1.25) (1.14) (0.52) (1.69)+ (2.35)* (1.87)+ (1.43) (2.00)* (1.66)+
lnTFP38 0.005 -0.01 -0.008 -0.009 -0.016 -0.019 0.001 0.007 -0.009
(0.30) (0.88) (0.59) (0.44) (0.97) (1.17) (0.06) (0.49) (0.64)
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sum of endowment
coefficients 0.3647 0.0382 0.9892 1.3506 1.3953 -1.9030 0.1275 0.0220 -0.5570
p-value 0.4665 0.8523 0.0001 0.1957 0.0103 0.0000 0.0003 0.9368 0.0169
R-squared 0.82 0.86 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.76 0.47 0.85 0.87
F test o f TFP 6.73** 6.44** 8.41** 4.12** 6.41** 4.80** 1.64* 5.46** 2.27**
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimation 
method is SURE with linear homogeneity and cross-equation TFP constraints. The dependent variable shareXX refers 
to the share o f industry XX in a state's GDP. The variable InTFPXX refers to the Log of TFP of industry XX, where TFP 
is calculated as described in the text. Own TFP is in bold. The sum of endowment coefficients is the sum of coefficients 
on real fixed capital, literates, illiterates and crop area, if  the regression is run without imposing the restriction that they 
sum to zero. The p-value is the p-value of the F-test that the sum of endowment coefficients is equal to zero, when the 
regression is run without imposing that restriction. The F test of TFP is a test of the joint significance of all the TFP terms. 
See the Data Appendix for details of the construction and sources of the variables.
Table 3.6: Regression equation (3.11) (factor endowments with technology differences) 
with cross-equation and homogeneity constraints
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(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Dep. Var. share30 share31 share32 share33 share34 share35 share36 share37 share38
Log real fixed capital 2.336 0.721 0.173 1.216 -0.003 0.098 -0.063 -0.478 0.063
(5.53)** (1.60) (2.00)* (6.86)** (0.05) (0.76) (0.37) (1.39) (0.87)
Log literates -0.873 -4.235 0.281 0.354 -1.241 0.893 0.035 14.292 0.869
(0.34) (1.56) (0.51) (0.32) (2.96)** (1.10) (0.03) (6.65)** (1.94)+
Log illiterates -1.255 3.597 -0.431 -1.491 1.231 -1.039 0.199 -13.646 -0.872
(0.45) (1.21) (0.73) (1.26) (2.70)** (1.18) (0.17) (5.85)** (1.80)+
Log crop area -0.207 -0.083 -0.023 -0.079 0.013 0.048 -0.172 -0.167 -0.06
(0.78) (0.29) (0.43) (0.72) (0.31) (0.60) (1.65)+ (0.78) (1.37)
lnTFP20 -0.065 -0.041 0.002 0.021 -0.019 -0.026 0.046 -0.06 0.005
(1.50) (1.24) (0.10) (0.76) (L21) (0.93) (1.29) (1.25) (0.30)
lnTFP21 0.032 -0.023 0.011 0.027 0 0.032 0.052 -0.034 -0.01
(1.20) (1.19) (0.73) (1.45) (0.03) (1.53) (2.04)* (1.14) (0.88)
lnTFP22 -0.025 0.014 -0.04 -0.003 0.008 -0.092 -0.01 0.017 -0.008
(0.89) (0.65) (2.46)* (0.18) (0.55) (3.81)** (0.36) (0.52) (0.59)
lnTFP23 -0.171 -0.21 0.022 -0.061 -0.046 0.019 0.008 0.124 -0.009
(2.36)* (3.72)** (0.84) (1.46) (2.24)* (0.50) (0.16) (1.69)+ (0.44)
lnTFP24 -0.064 -0.025 -0.006 0.008 -0.006 -0.037 0.099 -0.122 -0.016
(1.37) (0.68) (0.27) (0.25) (0.36) (1.16) (2.52)* (2.35)* (0.97)
lnTFP26 -0.102 -0.012 0.028 0.034 -0.017 0.006 -0.055 -0.075 -0.019
(2.91)** (0.47) (1.38) (1.37) (0.97) (0.19) (1.56) (1.87)+ (1.17)
lnTFP27 0.034 -0.004 0.013 0.003 0.016 0.018 0.014 -0.025 0.001
(2.31)* (0.38) (1.08) (0.24) (1.31) (1.04) (0.85) (1.43) (0.06)
lnTFP28 0.038 -0.027 0.01 0.04 -0.023 0.04 0.039 -0.059 0.007
(1.52) (1.50) (0.56) (2.14)* (1.27) (1.44) (1.32) (2.00)*' (0.49)
lnTFP29 0.031 -0.029 0.047 0.005 0.017 0.074 0.056 -0.057 -0.009
(1.03) (1.26) (2.64)** (0.24) (1.06) (2.83)** (1.88)+ (1.66)+ (0.64)
lnTFP30 0.958 0.443 0.082 0.158 0.039 -0.052 -0.067 -0.23 0.035
(7.05)** (5.20)** (2.91)** (3.05)** (1.80)+ (1.24) (1.22) (2.41)* (1.52)
lnTFP31 0.443 1.202 0.009 -0.037 0.001 0.027 0.015 0.03 0.008
(5.20)** (11.16)** (0.41) (0.91) (0.05) (0.88) (0.37) (0.40) (0.46)
lnTFP32 0.082 0.009 0.262 0.02 -0.016 0.019 0.046 -0.052 -0.019
(2.91)** (0.41) (8.86)** (0.95) (0.78) (0.59) (1.40) (1.54) (111)
lnTFP33 0.158 -0.037 0.02 0.396 0.001 0.033 0.084 -0.048 0.014
(3.05)** (0.91) (0.95) (8.53)** (0.05) (1.06) (2.11)* (0.85) (0.83)
lnTFP34 0.039 0.001 -0.016 0.001 0.338 -0.048 0.022 0.011 -0.029
(1.80)+ (0.05) (0.78) (0.05) (10.51)** (1.52) (0.77) (0.43) (1.67)+
lnTFP35 -0.052 0.027 0.019 0.033 -0.048 0.85 0.005 -0.097 0.028
(1.24) (0.88) (0.59) (1.06) (1.52) (12.92)** (0.09) (1.91)+ (1.14)
lnTFP36 -0.067 0.015 0.046 0.084 0.022 0.005 0.677 -0.011 -0.028
(1.22) (0.37) (1.40) (2.11)* (0.77) (0.09) (8.35)** (0.17) (1.09)
lnTFP37 -0.23 0.03 -0.052 -0.048 0.011 -0.097 -0.011 0.424 -0.035
(2.41)* (0.40) (1.54) (0.85) (0.43) (1.91)+ (0.17) (2.98)** (1.32)
lnTFP38 0.035 0.008 -0.019 0.014 -0.029 0.028 -0.028 -0.035 0.099
(L52) (0.46) (Ll l ) (0.83) (1.67)+ (1.14) (1.09) (1.32) (5.17)**
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sum of endowment
coefficients 0.7057 -4.0874 0.2457 3.8504 0.3690 0.1678 1.3845 3.3097 -0.6589
p-value 0.6886 0.0300 0.3832 0.0000 0.1372 0.7499 0.0478 0.0221 0.0000
R-squared 0.93 0.72 0.93 0.73 0.89 0.95 0.89 0.84 0.82
F test of TFP 6.31** 9.44** 6.78** 5.90** 7.65** 12.64** 5.74** 3.03** 2.56**
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimation 
method is SURE with linear homogeneity and cross-equation TFP constraints. The dependent variable shareXX refers 
to the share o f industry XX in a state's GDP. The variable InTFPXX refers to the Log of TFP of industry XX, where TFP 
is calculated as described in the text. Own TFP is in bold. The sum of endowment coefficients is the sum of coefficients 
on real fixed capital, literates, illiterates and crop area, if the regression is run without imposing the restriction that they 
sum to zero. The p-value is the p-value of the F-test that the sum of endowment coefficients is equal to zero, when the 
regression is run without imposing that restriction. The F test of TFP is a test of the joint significance o f all the TFP terms.
See the Data Appendix for details of the construction and sources of the variables.
Table 3.7: (continued from Table 3.6): Regression equation (3.11) (factor endowments 
with technology differences) with cross-equation and homogeneity constraints
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resources between food products and man-made textiles. To take another example, the 
share of industry 31 (rubber and plastic) is, perhaps unsurprisingly, positively associated 
with productivity levels in industry 30 (chemical products), and negatively associated 
with productivity levels in industry 23 (cotton textiles), which may again suggest sub­
stitutability in the employment of factors of production between these two industries. 
Given the broad industry classifications used, such inferences are necessarily imprecise, 
but they are not incompatible with our priors about the relationship between industries.
We can test whether the TFP terms are jointly statistically significant. This amounts 
to testing the general neoclassical model outlined above, against the more restrictive 
Heckscher-Ohlin model which assumes identical technologies across all locations for 
each industry. If the Heckscher-Ohlin model is correct, the coefficients on TFP should 
be jointly statistically insignificant. We therefore perform an F-test for the joint signifi­
cance of all the TFP terms. The results are in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. For all industries, the 
TFP terms are jointly significant at at least the 5 percent level. This result shows that 
technological differences across industries and locations have a statistically significant 
relationship with the share of an industry in a state.
For factor endowments, the results are similarly mixed. Of the four endowment 
variables, three of them (capital stock, literates and illiterates) have between 4 and 6 sig­
nificant coefficients out of a possible 18. The amount of crop area is statistically signif­
icant in only one industry: industry 36 (machinery and equipment). Factor endowments 
have highly significant associations with industry share in industries 23 (cotton textiles), 
30 (chemical products), 33 (basic metals), 34 (metal products) and 37 (transport equip­
ment). At the other end of the spectrum, there are no significant factor endowment coef­
ficients in industries 20 (food products), 21 (food products), 22 (beverages and tobacco), 
24(man-made textiles), 27 (wood products), 29 (leather products), 31 (rubber and plas­
tic) and 35 (machinery and equipment). Hence, once again there is some indication that 
factor endowments matter more in heavy industries, and less in food, textiles and light 
industries.
It is interesting to compare the results on the factor endowments between Table
3.6 and Table 3.7 with those of Table 3.5. We would expect there to be changes in the re­
lationship between industry share and factor endowments when technology is included,
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if technology is correlated with factor endowments. We find that there are not many dif­
ferences between the results with and without TFP. In Tables 3.6 and 3.7, when TFP is 
included, a total of 16 factor endowment coefficients are statistically significant, com­
pared to 25 in Table 3.5 without TFP. Out of these, 13 of these coefficients are significant 
in both tables, and all of these 13 coefficients have the same sign. Therefore, we can con­
clude that TFP, while being very significantly associated with industry share, does not 
change the relationship between industry share and factor endowments.
In Tables 3.6 and 3.7, we also report the test of linear homogeneity of the revenue 
function. The null hypothesis that the sum of endowment coefficients is equal to zero, 
is rejected for 10 out of 18 industries at the 5 percent level. For industries 22 (bever­
ages and tobacco), 24 (non-cotton textiles), 27 (wood products), 33 (basic metals), 36 
(machinery and equipment) and 37 (transport equipment), the sum of coefficients is pos­
itive, suggesting increasing returns to scale, while for industries 26 (textile products), 29 
(leather products), 31 (rubber and plastic) and 38 (other manufacturing), the sum of co­
efficients is negative, suggesting decreasing returns to scale. All the six industries which 
exhibited deviations from constant returns to scale without TFP in Table 3.5, also show 
the same deviations when TFP is included in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.
3.4.3 Robustness
The previous subsection has shown that factor endowments and technology are signifi­
cantly related to the structure of industrial activity in India. However, as noted in section 
3.2.1, the fact that the framework used is based on the assumption of perfectly com­
petitive markets does raise some questions as to the interpretation and robustness of the 
results. This is especially the case in India, in which there are large distortions and state 
intervention in the economy. This subsection presents results which show that, while 
other factors such as politics and government policies, and market potential, are signifi­
cantly related to the structure of Indian industry, factor endowments and technology con­
tinue to matter even when these additional factors are taken into account. The inclusion 
of the controls does not substantially change the pattern of estimation results.
We therefore run regression equation (3.11) with TFP, augmented to include sev­
eral robustness controls. First, we include a set of variables to control for the political
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history of the state, to capture potential political influences on industrial activity, for in­
stance, unobserved state-level policies that change over time. India is the world’s largest 
democracy, and the diversity of interests among the population, in terms of ethnic groups, 
religion, and caste, has given rise to a large number of political parties. For instance, in 
the 1989 general election, there were 8 national parties and 20 state parties. No party in 
India has survived the last 50-odd years since Independence without splits or amalgama­
tions. We therefore amalgamate the various parties into five broad groupings: the Janata 
parties, the Hindu parties, the Hard Left parties, the Congress party, and regional parties 
(details in the Appendix to this chapter). The measure we use is a measure for the num­
ber of years a Janata, Hindu, Hard Left, regional, or the Congress party has been in power 
in a state. There is a potential concern over the endogeneity of political histories, which 
may be influenced by economic performance. However, we believe that this is more im­
portant at the aggregate level, rather than at the industry level which we analyse here, 
where the political impact of success or failure of any one industry may be counteracted 
by opposite outcomes in other industries.
We also include a measure of labour regulation taken from Besley and Burgess 
(2004), which measures the extent to which labour regulation in a given state is pro­
labour or pro-capital. This measure is based on amendments to the Industrial Disputes 
Act of 1947. Industrial relations law is on the concurrent list under the Indian Constitu­
tion. This means that it can be modified by both central and state governments. These 
amendments are listed in Malik (1997). Besley and Burgess read the text of the state- 
level amendments, and code them as either pro-labour (+1) or pro-capital (-1) amend­
ments. This is a measure of the net direction of change in any one year, so for example if 
there are 4 pro-labour amendments in one year, this is coded as +1. They then cumulate 
these changes over time to form a measure of the state’s policy stance towards labour. 
By including this variable in the regression, we want to capture the possible effects that 
pro-capital or pro-labour policies may have on the shares of different industries.
Two measures of market potential are used to capture the effects of proximity 
to centres of economic activity. The idea here is that, all else equal, industries prefer 
to locate in places where more economic activity takes place, to benefit from closer 
proximity to markets and suppliers. But in equilibrium, all else is not equal; prices of 
immobile factors adjust so that some activities locate in central locations and others locate
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in more remote locations. We capture this idea of proximity to markets by constructing 
measures of domestic and foreign market access. Domestic market access is measured 
following Harris (1954) as distance-weighted SDP in all 16 major states within India:
D M  A zt =  E f = i  (3-15)
Cl yZ
where dyZ is the bilateral distance between the capitals of states y  and 2. Foreign market 
access is similarly defined to be distance-weighted size of ports:
F M A zt =  Ep=i T R A D E ”1 (3.16)
dpz
where the summation is over all major ports in the country, and T R A D E pt is the total 
trade volume of the port. The distance between any two states or between a state and a 
port, is the road distance between state capitals, or between the state capital and the port. 
The distance between a state and itself is set at the average distance between a state and 
itself, given by the formula § ( s rp )  2. the same js true when the state capital is itself 
a major port.28 In calculating values for D M A zt, we include Delhi in the summation, 
since it is a Union Territory that has a large SDP 29
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present the results. All our robustness measures are related to 
industry shares to a greater or lesser extent. One noteworthy aspect is that, for any given 
industry, the political histories tend to have the same coefficient sign, which suggests 
that all the political parties have preferences for the same industries. Political history can 
impact on the size of registered manufacturing as a whole relative to other industries. 
However, it is possible that political histories could have different effects in the non­
manufacturing industries not included here. Another point is that, when both domestic 
and foreign market potential are significant, they always have the same coefficient signs. 
This provides evidence that industries which are more sensitive to proximity to markets 
have increased sensitivity to both domestic and foreign markets.
28 See Overman, Redding and Venables (2003) for a discussion o f different measures o f market access.
29 There is a potential econometric concern in using domestic market access in the regression, as shocks 
that affect the share o f an industry in a state would also affect SDP and hence domestic market access. We 
explored using lagged values o f domestic and foreign market access as instruments for domestic market ac­
cess. An F-test o f the significance of the excluded variables in the first stage regression is highly significant 
at better than 1 percent, and the instruments also pass the Sargan-Hansen test for overidentification. These 
results show that the instruments are highly correlated with the instrumented variable, and are jointly valid. 
Further, a Hausman (1978) test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients do not differ systematically be­
tween IV and OLS, cannot be rejected for any industry at any conventional significance level. This suggests 
that biases due to endogeneity problems are not severe. As an additional robustness check, we excluded own 
SDP when calculating domestic market potential, and ran the regression with this alternative measure. The 
results were almost identical to the ones reported in the text.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Var. share20 share21 share22 share23 share24 share26 share27 share28 share29
Log real fixed capital -0.005 -0.154 -0.01 -0.384 -0.052 -0.232 0.014 -0.104 0.021
(0.03) (1.94)+ (0.11) (1.67)+ (0.32) (2.40)* (0.40) (1.30) (0.28)
Log literates 0.876 0.142 -0.448 0.814 0.203 -0.95 0.076 -0.245 0.767
(0.83) (0.24) (0.71) (0.49) (0.17) (1.32) (0.30) (0.41) (1.42)
Log illiterates -0.892 0.023 0.403 -0.507 -0.175 1.2 -0.076 0.319 -0.792
(0.81) (0.04) (0.61) (0.29) (0.14) (1.60) (0.29) (0.52) (1.40)
Log crop area 0.021 -0.011 0.055 0.077 0.024 -0.018 -0.014 0.03 0.004
(0.24) (0.23) (1.06) (0.55) (0.24) (0.31) (0.68) (0.62) (0.09)
Own TFP 0.178 0.141 0.165 0.301 0.256 0.127 0.02 0.192 0.028
(5.17)** (9.31)** (8.26)** (4.45)** (5.84)** (4.67)** (2.46)* (7.81)** (1.51)
Janata majority 0.039 0.021 0.093 -0.013 0.044 -0.007 -0.001 0.059 0.004
(1.22) (1.17) (4.80)** (0.25) (1.22) (0.34) (0.11) (3.29)** (0.23)
Hindu majority 0.12 0.023 0.065 0.038 0.101 -0.089 -0.001 0.064 0.013
(2.38)* (0.84) (2.15)* (0.47) (1.79)+ (2.64)** (0.07) (2.29)* (0.49)
Hard left majority 0.018 0.012 0.096 0.065 -0.006 -0.059 0 0.04 -0.012
(0.57) (0.71) (5.04)** (1.27) (0.16) (2.73)** (0.03) (2.25)* (0.73)
Regional majority 0.042 0.03 0.096 0.101 0.057 -0.008 -0.002 0.048 0.01
(1.29) (1.69)+
OO00 (1.96)* (155) (0.39) (0.20) (2.67)** (0.61)
Congress majority 0.037 0.021 0.093 -0.032 0.031 -0.028 -0.005 0.038 -0.011
(1.32) (1.34) (5.56)** (0.70) (0.98) (1.46) (0.68) (2.47)* (0.75)
Labour regulation 0.02 0.005 -0.017 -0.177 0.039 -0.044 0.012 -0.029 -0.014
(0.36) (0.17) (0.49) (2.00)* (0.63) (1.15) (0.91) (0.93) (0.48)
Foreign market -1.234 0.116 -2.411 -1.435 -2.329 3.176 -0.117 -0.243 1.072
potential (0.99) (0.17) (3.28)** (0.73) (1.68)+ (3.79)** (0.40) (0.36) (1.71)+
Domestic market -0.162 -0.382 -0.998 0.772 -0.277 0.561 0.034 -0.722 -0.077
potential (0.34) (1-44) (3.41)** (1.02) (0.51) (1.72)+ (0.28) (2.64)** (0.30)
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sum of endowment
coefficients -0.8851 0.4380 0.9037 5.7187 1.3710 -1.1803 0.1796 -0.5567 -0.3501
p-value 0.1927 0.1093 0.0069 0.0000 0.0502 0.0127 0.0001 0.1178 0.2355
R-squared 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.84 0.75 0.87 0.91
F test of TFP 7.32** 6.62** 7.53** 3.20** 5.76** 3.29** 1.4 5.74** 2.07
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimation 
method is SURE with linear homogeneity and cross-equation TFP constraints. The dependent variable shareXX refers 
to the share o f industry XX in a state's GDP. Own TFP refers to the log of TFP in that industry; cross-industry TFP is 
included in the regression but not reported. Janata, Hindu, Hard Left, Regional and Congress majority are variables 
measuring the number of years these political groupings have had a majority in the state assembly. Foreign and domestic 
market potential are distance-weighted international trade of major ports and State Domestic Product respectively.
The sum of endowment coefficients is the sum of coefficients on real fixed capital, literates, illiterates and crop area, 
if the regression is run without imposing the restriction that they sum to zero. The p-value is the p-value of the F-test 
that the sum of endowment coefficients is equal to zero, when the regression is run without imposing that restriction.
The F test o f TFP is a test of the joint significance of all the TFP terms. See the Data Appendix for details of the 
construction and sources of the variables.
Table 3,8: Robustness checks on regression equation (3.11) (factor endowments with 
technology differences) with cross-equation and homogeneity constraints
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(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Dep. Var. share30 share31 share32 share33 share34 share35 share36 share37 share38
Log real fixed capital 2.063 0.395 0.051 0.953 -0.056 0.039 -0.163 -0.097 0.028
(5.04)** (0.85) (0.63) (5.91)** (0.78) (0.29) (1.02) (0.34) (0.41)
Log literates -6.896 -2.132 -0.029 -2.02 -1.689 0.707 -1.747 4.139 0.767
(2.34)* (0.63) (0.05) (1.69)+ (3.23)** (0.71) (1.48) (1.99)* (1.49)
Log illiterates 5.012 1.804 0.073 1.085 1.75 -0.702 2.149 -3.715 -0.707
(1.61) (0.51) (0.12) (0.87) (3.19)** (0.68) (1.75)+ (1.70)+ (1.32)
Log crop area -0.179 -0.067 -0.095 -0.018 -0.005 -0.044 -0.239 -0.327 -0.088
(0.71) (0.23) (1.96)* (0.19) (0.12) (0.55) (2.52)* (1.91)+ (2.15)*
Own TFP 0.873 1.305 0.277 0.342 0.318 0.893 0.6 0.437 0.088
(6.71)** (11.70)** (10.00)** (7.44)** (9.57)** (13.35)** (8.18)** (4.01)** (4.25)**
Janata majority -0.09 -0.027 0.058 0.083 0.029 0.028 0.003 -0.141 -0.045
(1.00) (0.27) (3.17)** (2.37)* (1.82)+ (0.92) (0.09) (2.28)* (2.82)**
Hindu majority 0.441 0.174 -0.047 0.095 0.005 -0.068 0.117 -0.331 -0.076
(3.04)** (1.07) (1.65)+ (1.69)+ (0.20) (1.45) (2.10)* (3.34)** (3.10)**
Hard left majority -0.187 -0.14 0.016 0.005 0.024 -0.01 -0.03 -0.298 -0.053
(2.05)* (1.37) (0.87) (0.13) (151) (0.35) (0.85) (4.78)** (3.40)**
Regional majority -0.211 -0.026 0.027 0.064 0.024 -0.001 -0.048 -0.304 -0.047
(2.28)* (0.25) (1.49) (1.79)+ (1.49) (0.03) (1.33) (4.79)** (3.00)**
Congress majority -0.048 -0.064 0.022 0.078 0.033 -0.021 -0.016 -0.302 -0.042
(0.60) (0.70) (1.40) (2.51)* (2.39)* (0.80) (0.53) (5.48)** (3.10)**
Labour regulation 0.079 0.291 -0.02 0.122 -0.034 -0.071 -0.18 -0.157 0.002
(0.50) (1.65)+ (0.60) (1.93)+ (1.21) (1.34) (2.84)** (1.45) (0.07)
Foreign market 3.581 6.594 -0.006 -3.882 -0.925 0.303 -0.232 -0.707 1.278
potential (1.00) (1.65)+ (0.01) (2.83)** (1.54) (0.26) (0.17) (0.29) (2.17)*
Domestic market 0.832 0.791 -0.684 -1.423 -0.391 0.027 0.143 6.081 0.453
potential (0.62) (0.53) (2.47)* (2.66)** (1.60) (0.06) (0.27) (6.57)** (1.89)+
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sum of endowment
coefficients -7.7866 -5.6257 0.4367 3.9323 0.2622 1.0505 -0.7362 3.8520 -0.5304
p-value 0.0006 0.0317 0.2053 0.0000 0.4278 0.1361 0.3949 0.0115 0.0072
R-squared 0.95 0.74 0.95 0.82 0.9 0.96 0.92 0.91 0.86
F test of TFP 5.14** 10.51** 8.01** 4.31** 6.46** 14.01** 5.31** 4.25** 1.73*
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at S%; ** significant at 1%. Estimation 
method is SURE with linear homogeneity and cross-equation TFP constraints. The dependent variable shareXX refers 
to the share of industry XX in a state's GDP. Own TFP refers to the log of TFP in that industry; cross-industry TFP is 
included in the regression but not reported. Janata, Hindu, Hard Left, Regional and Congress majority are variables 
measuring the number of years these political groupings have had a majority in the state assembly. Foreign and domestic 
market potential are distance-weighted international trade of major ports and State Domestic Product respectively.
The sum of endowment coefficients is the sum of coefficients on real fixed capital, literates, illiterates and crop area, 
if the regression is run without imposing the restriction that they sum to zero. The p-value is the p-value of the F-test 
that the sum of endowment coefficients is equal to zero, when the regression is run without imposing that restriction.
The F test of TFP is a test of the joint significance of all the TFP terms. See the Data Appendix for details of the 
construction and sources of the variables.
Table 3.9: (continued from Table 3.8): Robustness checks on regression equation (3.11) 
(factor endowments with technology differences) with cross-equation and homogeneity 
constraints
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After controlling for these other factors, own TFP remains significantly positively 
associated with industry share in 17 of our 18 industries. Factor endowments tend to have 
fewer significant coefficients which may be attributed to increasing multicollinearity and 
loss of degrees of freedom as more control variables are included in the regression. Nev­
ertheless the results mirror those of Tables 3.6 and 3.7 fairly closely. Factor endowments 
have particularly significant associations with industry share in industries 30 (chemical 
products), 33 (basic metals), 34 (metal products) and 37 (transport equipment). Each 
factor endowment has between 3 and 5 significant coefficients. In industries 20 (food 
products), 22 (beverages and tobacco), 24 (man-made textiles), 27 (wood products), 28 
(paper products), 29 (leather products), 31 (rubber and plastic) and 35 (machinery and 
equipment), factor endowments are not significantly related to industry shares when po­
litical histories and market access are taken into account. Once again there is evidence 
that factor endowments matter more for heavy industries than for textile and other light 
industries.
In Tables 3.8 and 3.9, we also report the results of the test of linear homogeneity. 
The null hypothesis that the sum of endowment coefficients is equal to zero, is rejected at 
the 5 percent level for 9 industries. In industries 22 (beverages and tobacco), 23 (cotton 
textiles), 27 (wood products), 33 (basic metals) and 37 (transport equipment), the sum of 
coefficients is positive, indicating increasing returns, while in industries 26 (textile prod­
ucts), 30 (chemical products), 31 (rubber and plastic) and 38 (other manufacturing), the 
sum of coefficients is negative, indicating decreasing returns. This result is again similar 
to that in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. Therefore, introducing political and market access variables 
as robustness checks on the association between factor endowments and technology, and 
industry shares, while reducing the statistical significance of these variables, does not 
fundamentally alter the relationship between them.
Comparing the results on linear homogeneity across tables, we can conclude that 
there is mixed evidence on the presence of constant returns to scale in the production 
technology across Indian industries. Across the different specifications, industries 22 
(beverages and tobacco), 27 (wood products) and 33 (basic metals) consistently exhibit 
increasing returns to scale, while industries 26 (textile products) and 38 (other manufac­
turing) consistently exhibit decreasing returns to scale. On the other hand, in industries 
20 (food products), 21 (food products), 28 (paper products), 32 (non-metallic mineral
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0 )
share20
(2)
share21
(3)
share22
(4)
share23
(5)
share24
(6)
share26
(7)
share27
(8)
share28
(9)
share29
Log real fixed capital -0.008 -0.559+ -0.024 -0.239+ -0.062 -0.600* 0.353 -0.328 0.066
Log literates 1.439 0.48 -1.034 0.47 0.225 -2.283 1.804 -0.717 2.25
Log illiterates -1.568 0.082 0.995 -0.313 -0.208 3.087 -1.932 1.001 -2.487
Log crop area 0.028 -0.031 0.102 0.036 0.021 -0.035 -0.265 0.071 0.009
lnTFP20 0.326** -0.053 . 0.008 0.072** -0.124** 0.097+ -0.273 -0.014 -0.05
lnTFP21 -0.021 0.435** -0.025 -0.018 -0.018 -0.029 0.049 0.028 -0.044
lnTFP22 0.004 -0.029 0.281** 0.018+ 0.009 0.006 -0.09 -0.103** -0.088**
lnTFP23 0.132** -0.082 0.072+ 0.124** 0.072* -0.067 -0.300+ -0.094+ -0.035
lnTFP24 -0.112** -0.04 0.018 0.036* 0.192** 0.139** -0.415** -0.05 0.003
lnTFP26 0.046+ -0.034 0.006 -0.017 0.073** 0.235** -0.073 -0.028 0.019
lnTFP27 -0.012 0.006 -0.009 -0.008+ -0.021** -0.007 0.355* 0.032+ 0.005
lnTFP28 -0.007 0.033 -0.105** -0.025+ -0.027 -0.028 0.330+ 0.535** 0
lnTFP29 -0.024 -0.053 -0.089** -0.009 0.002 0.019 0.051 0 0.077
lnTFP30 -0.101+ 0.044 -0.024 -0.041 -0.042 -0.102 0.054 0.09 -0.005
lnTFP31 -0.043 -0.028 0.018 -0.049+ -0.007 0.016 0.019 -0.054 0.002
lnTFP32 -0.002 0.01 -0.093** -0.007 -0.052** 0.035 0.236 0.051 0.082*
lnTFP33 -0.005 0.022 -0.047 -0.025 -0.026 -0.005 0.145 0.031 -0.062
lnTFP34 -0.021 -0.01 0.008 -0.013* -0.011 -0.026 0.128 -0.02 0.006
lnTFP35 -0.022 0.04 -0.115** -0.005 -0.038* -0.004 0.136 0.063+ 0.086**
lnTFP36 0.016 0.048 -0.008 0 0.029 -0.076+ -0.013 0.062 0.041
lnTFP37 -0.078 -0.073 0.035 0.017 -0.079 -0.102 -0.456+ -0.274** -0.063
lnTFP38 0.01 -0.015 0.001 -0.006 -0.014 -0.032 0.077 0.031 0.018
Janata majority 0.385 0.419 1.293** -0.044 0.294 -0.108 -0.119 1.038** 0.068
Hindu majority 0.134* 0.054 0.102* 0.015 0.076+ -0.146** -0.015 0.128* 0.025
Hard left majority 0.196 0.272 1.446** 0.243 -0.042 -0.921** -0.032 0.760* -0.227
Regional majority 0.907 1.343+ 2.910** 0.771* 0.828 -0.268 -0.496 1.862** 0.394
Congress majority 0.648 0.743 2.284** -0.194 0.364 -0.706 -1.155 1.194* -0.337
Labour regulation 0.082 0.044 -0.096 -0.256* 0.11 -0.264 0.738 -0.214 -0.102
Foreign market 
potential
-0.249 0.048 -0.683** -0.102 -0.317+ 0.938** -0.339 -0.087 0.386+
Domestic market 
potential
-0.19 -0.92 -1.643** 0.318 -0.22 0.963+ 0.57 -1.509** -0.161
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
R-squared 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.84 0.75 0.87 0.91
Notes: + significant at 10% * significant at 5% ** significant at 1%. Normalised beta coefficients reported. Beta 
coefficients are constructed by taking the regression coefficients, multiplying by the standard deviation of the 
explanatory variable, and dividing by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. A beta coefficient of 0.S for 
example means that a one standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable will increase the dependent variable by 
0.5 standard deviations. Estimation method is SURE with linear homogeneity and cross-equation TFP constraints. The 
dependent variable shareXX refers to the share of industry XX in a state's GDP. The variable InTFPXX refers to the 
log of TFP o f industry XX, where TFP is calculated as described in the text. See the Data Appendix for details of the 
construction and sources of the variables.
Table 3.10: Standardised beta coefficients for regression equation (3.11) with robustness 
controls.
92
(10)
share30
(11)
share31
(12)
share32
(13)
share33
(14)
share34
(15)
share35
(16)
share36
(17)
share37
(18)
share38
Log real fixed capital 0.596** 0.23 0.098 1.462** -0.165 0.036 -0.171 -0.056 0.154
Log literates -1.851* -1.155 -0.052 -2.880+ -4.606** 0.602 -1.706 2.227* 3.878
Log illiterates 1.44 1.046 0.138 1.657 5.111** -0.64 2.247+ -2.140+ -3.827
Log crop area -0.039 -0.029 -0.136* -0.021 -0.011 -0.031 -0.189* -0.143+ -0.363*
lnTFP20 -0.022+ -0.019 -0.004 -0.005 -0.08 -0.029 0.019 -0.032 0.045
lnTFP21 0.004 -0.005 0.007 0.01 -0.015 0.021 0.023 -0.012 -0.028
lnTFP22 -0.002 0.004 -0.076** -0.024 0.013 -0.073** -0.004 0.007 0.002
lnTFP23 -0.016 -0.038+ -0.023 -0.05 -0.089* -0.013 -0.001 0.013 -0.055
lnTFP24 -0.008 -0.003 -0.081** -0.025 -0.037 -0.046* 0.031 -0.029 -0.06
lnTFP26 -0.01 0.003 0.029 -0.002 -0.046 -0.002 -0.044+ -0.02 -0.072
lnTFP27 0.001 0 0.019 0.007 0.022 0.008 -0.001 -0.008+ 0.017
lnTFP28 0.009 -0.011 0.042 0.016 -0.036 0.040+ 0.036 -0.053** 0.071
lnTFP29 0 0 0.068* -0.032 0.011 0.055** 0.024 -0.012 0.04
lnTFP30 0.198** 0.143** 0.118** 0.122* 0.103+ -0.024 -0.06 -0.048 0.092
lnTFP31 0.072** 0.602** 0.006 -0.077 -0.023 0.03 -0.025 -0.042 0.043
lnTFP32 0.015** 0.001 0.338** -0.008 -0.031 0.018 0.028 -0.022+ 0.036
lnTFP33 0.024* -0.03 -0.013 0.433** -0.071 -0.006 0.015 -0.017 0.062
lnTFP34 0.006+ -0.003 -0.014 -0.021 0.433** -0.024+ 0.009 0.007 -0.100*
lnTFP35 -0.004 0.01 0.023 -0.005 -0.067+ 0.327** -0.005 -0.023* 0.061
lnTFP36 -0.011 -0.009 0.041 0.013 0.026 -0.005 0.320** 0.001 -0.107
lnTFP37 -0.026 -0.044 -0.092+ -0.045 0.066 -0.077* 0.002 0.211** -0.186
lnTFP38 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.014 -0.078* 0.017 -0.027 -0.016 0.324**
Janata majority -0.146 -0.09 0.617** 0.719* 0.477+ 0.142 0.019 -0.459* -1.369**
Hindu majority 0.081** 0.064 -0.057+ 0.092+ 0.009 -0.039 0.077* -0.121** -0.260**
Hard left majority -0.327* -0.494 0.18 0.042 0.417 -0.058 -0.19 -1.044** -1.732**
Regional majority -0.744* -0.188 0.637 1.206+ 0.852 -0.01 -0.614 -2.151** -3.155**
Congress majority -0.137 -0.365 0.417 1.184* 0.955* -0.19 -0.17 -1.723** -2.259**
Labour regulation 0.053 0.395+ -0.087 0.435+ -0.231 -0.152 -0.440** -0.212 0.024
Foreign market 
potential
0.118 0.439+ -0.001 -0.680** -0.31 0.032 -0.028 -0.047 0.793*
Domestic market 
potential
0.159 0.306 -0.863* -1.448** -0.763 0.017 0.1 2.336** 1.636+
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 147 147 147 • 147 147 147 147 147 147
R-squared 0.95 0.74 0.95 0.82 0.9 0.96 0.92 0.91 0.86
Notes: + significant at 10% * significant at 5% ** significant at 1%. Normalised beta coefficients reported. Beta 
coefficients are constructed by taking the regression coefficients, multiplying by the standard deviation o f the 
explanatory variable, and dividing by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. A beta coefficient of 0.5 for 
example means that a one standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable will increase the dependent variable by 
0.5 standard deviations. Estimation method is SURE with linear homogeneity and cross-equation TFP constraints. The 
dependent variable shareXX refers to the share of industry XX in a state's GDP. The variable InTFPXX refers to the 
log of TFP of industry XX, where TFP is calculated as described in the text. See the Data Appendix for details of the 
construction and sources of the variables.
Table 3.11: (continued from Table 3.10): Standardised beta coefficients for regression 
equation (3.11) with robustness controls
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products), 34 (metal products) and 35 (machinery and equipment), we never reject the 
null hypothesis in any specification, thus giving strong evidence of constant returns to 
scale in these industries.
The finding that factor endowments, technology and politics are statistically sig­
nificantly associated with industry share is important, but one would also like to know 
the economic importance of these variables. To address this issue, we report in Tables 
3.10 and 3.11 the standardised beta coefficients of the regression in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. 
Beta coefficients are constructed by multiplying the regression coefficients by the stan­
dard deviation of the explanatory variable, and dividing by the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable. A beta coefficient of 0.5, for example, means that a one standard 
deviation increase in the explanatory variable, increases the dependent variable by 0.5 
standard deviations.
From Tables 3.10 and 3.11, we see that, for the endowment variables, when capital 
stock and crop area are statistically significant, they have moderate to large associations 
with industry share, with absolute beta coefficients in the region of 0.13 to 1.46. In con­
trast, endowments of literates and illiterates have much larger associations, with absolute 
beta coefficients ranging from 1.8 to 5.1 when they are statistically significant. Own TFP 
tends to have moderate effects, with absolute beta coefficients of between 0.12 and 0.6 
when it is statistically significant, while cross TFP effects are much weaker, with beta 
coefficients between 0.01 and 0.27 when it is statistically significant.
Political variables show much more variation in economic importance. When sta­
tistically significant, political history has beta coefficients ranging from 0.05 to 3.1. The 
number of years under a Hindu party has the smallest association with industry share, 
while the number of years under a regional party has the largest association, among the 
political groupings considered. Labour regulation, measuring the policy stance of a state 
towards labour, has moderate effects, with beta coefficient of between 0.25 and 0.44 
when statistically significant. Finally, measures of market access, while not frequently 
statistically significant, have large associations with industry share (beta coefficients of 
between 0.31 and 2.3) when they are statistically significant. Domestic market potential 
tends to have larger effects than foreign market potential.
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3.4.4 Testing for Structural Breaks
Another specification test performed is to test for structural breaks in the data. There are 
two candidates for the time of the structural break - the reform initiated by Rajiv Gandhi 
in 1985, and the more general reform begun in 1991.
We perform the tests for both specifications, with and without TFR As in the pre­
vious section, to facilitate comparisons, we focus on a consistent sample of observations 
across all specifications, so we have 147 observations in each regression. To test for the 
presence of a structural break in 1985 against the null hypothesis of no structural breaks, 
we augment the estimated equations (3.10) and (3.11) with a set of terms interacting the 
RHS variables with a reform dummy. That is, we run the following regressions:
Rzjt — P o j "b Vzj "b djt +  Szj [-R X 'Hzj] +  Ei Tjt (Vzit) (3.17)
~b $ ~2i 4>ji [ -^  x  {vzit)] “b  bJzjt
S zj t  = Poj +  Vzj  +  djt  +  <$zj [R x  rlzj\  +  Ej Pjk (Ozjt) (3.18)
+  £ i  I j i  I n  (vzit) +  Ej f j k  [ R  X l n  (Ozjt)]
“b  E i  $ ji  [R  X -^n  ~b wzjt
where R  is an indicator variable taking value 0 if the observation is from 1985 or be­
fore (pre-reform), and taking value 1 if the observation is from after 1985 (post-reform). 
Therefore, the coefficients on the interaction terms may be interpreted as the additional 
impact of that variable in the period after reform. An F-test of the joint significance of 
the coefficients 5zj  and in equation (3.17), and an F-test of the joint significance of 
Szj^ , (frji and ( f j k in equation (3.18), is a test of whether the coefficients on all variables 
(factor endowments, technology, state dummies) differ before and after 1985. This is 
equivalent to a Chow (1960) test for structural breaks.30
The same test is performed using 1991 as the year of the structural break, and for 
the test that there are two structural breaks (1985 and 1991), where we have two sets 
of interaction terms, one for each possible break time. When considering two structural
30 This assumes that the impact o f the liberalisation on the relationship between industry share, factor 
endowment and, technology, is instantaneous. More realistically, the liberalisation should affect this rela­
tionship with a lag. This lagged response is being explored in ongoing research.
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Break in 1991 Break in 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFP No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat
20 4.28** 5.33** 3.99** 5.87** 1.90* 1.17 3.71** 3.12**
21 1.96* 1.55 1.17 1.88* 1.66 1.23 0.63 0.91
22 5.99** 4.20** 2.68** 3.97** 2.83** 1.69 1.74* 1.20
23 6.38** 5.50** 4.40** 4.05** 23.16** 11.10** 10.70** 9.58**
24 4.54** 4.47** 5.83** 5.67** 6.15** 5.03** 5.84** 4.59**
26 16.56** 12.49** 9.94** 8.91** 5.05** 1.99* 2.23** 2.03*
27 6.99** 2.16** 0.69 0.65 3.63** 7.73** 0.30 0.53
28 3.00** 2.40** 2.61** 2.72** 2.68** 2.72** 1.59 2.37**
29 14.93** 12.02** 3.41** 4.73** 4.78** 2.72** 2.46** 1.49
30 15.47** 11.33** 9.50** 9.11** 10.80** 5.72** 7.13** 6.63**
31 4.03** 2.60** 3.78** ■ 4.02** 4.61** 3.05** 3.75** 3.30**
32 4.22** 5.05** 3.01** 3.17** 2.61** 3.02** 2.43** 2.74**
33 3.19** 4.76** 3.40** 3.16** 9.46** 3.80** 5.33** 3.47**
34 2.20* 2.41** 4.02** 5.24** 3.00** 3.26** 1.79* 1.75*
35 1.84 3.90** 3.93** 3.99** 3.90** 3.00** 3.52** 3.56**
36 3.65** 1.32 3.35** 2.87** 7.11** 4.49** 5.09** 4.68**
37 14.37** 7.12** 9.53** 9.28** 5.48** 3.67** 4.34** 4.18**
38 10.64** 7.17** 2.61** 2.71** 2.23* 2.34** 1.44 1.06
Notes: * significant at 5% ** significant at 1%. The table reports the F-statistic for the test that the 
interaction terms of all RHS variables are jointly insignificant Each column reports the test for a different 
specification. TFP refers to whether or not the specification includes TFP and its interaction terms, and 
Controls refers to whether or not the specification includes political and market access controls and their 
interaction terms. The critical values at the 5 and 1 percent levels of the F statistic are:
Columns (1) and (5): F (ll, 91)=1.87, 2.42. Columns (2) and (6): F(18, 75)=1.73, 2.16.
Columns (3) and (7): F(29, 55)=1.67,2.07.Columns (4) and (8): F(37, 39)=1.70, 2.13.
Table 3.12: Test of structural breaks in 1985 and 1991.
breaks, we can test for the alternative hypothesis of the presence of two structural breaks, 
against different null hypotheses of no breaks, or a single break in 1985 or 1991.
Table 3.12 reports the results of these tests for a single structural break in either 
1991 or 1985, against the null hypothesis of no structural breaks. There is strong evidence 
of a structural break in 1991 for all industries. The only exception is industry 27 (wood 
products), when we include TFP in the specification. There is also evidence of structural 
breaks in many industries in 1985, except that the null hypothesis of no structural breaks 
is rejected for fewer industries (between 13 and 17 out of 18 industries, depending on 
the specification).31 Industry 21 (food products) in particular shows no evidence of a 
structural break in 1985 under any specification.
31 We also find evidence of a structural break in 1985 for the majority of industries across all specifications 
if  we limit the sample period to 1980-1990.
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Break in both 1985. and 1991 (test 
of 2 breaks against no break)
Test structural break in 1985 
(assuming break in 1991)
Test structural break in 1991 
(assuming break in 1985)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
TFP No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Controls No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Industry F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat
20 2.65** 3.49** 4.27** 0.78 1.17 2.35* 2.98** 5.11** 1.95
21 1.73* 1.93* 0.97 1.30 1.77 0.80 1.59 2.30* 1.14
22 3.94** 3.51** 2.46* 1.27 0.52 1.57 4.09** 3.20** 2.05
23 16.96** 8.90** 10.04** 18.10** 9.96** 8.89** 3.73** 3.31** 3.67**
24 5.33** 6.98** 6.81** 4.47** 5.80** 4.01** 3.02** 5.36** 5.29**
26 10.07** 7.25** 9.35** 1.52 0.93 2.57* 10.68** 10.26** 12.24**
27 4.94** 5.80** 0.79 1.84 6.86** 0.45 4.82** 1.75 1.03
28 3.52** 3.15** 2.84** 3.26** 3.03** 1.87 3.57** 2.82** 3.10**
29 12.43** 9.75** 3.46** 4.49** 2.92** 1.70 14.46** 12.51** 3.51**
30 16.70** 14.89** 11.61** 7.87** 6.07** 6.43** 12.10** 11.71** 9.16**
31 3.63** 2.63** 6.12** 2.40* 2.13* 6.13** 1.96* 1.99* 6.29**
32 4.19** 5.16** 3.90** 3.11** 3.07** 3.32** 4.75** 5.11** 3.78**
33 6.59** 5.39** 5.39** 7.95** 3.62** 5.48** 2.09* 4.65** 2.68*
34 2.77** 3.18** 3.77** 2.81** 1.53 2.64* 2.02* 2.11* 4.49**
35 4.33** 4.83** 5.44** 5.94** 3.95** 4.46** 3.60** 4.58** 3.94**
36 4.99** 3.78** 4.63** 4.87** 4.37** 3.85** 1.83 1.14 2.62*
37 10.61** 7.67** 8.54** 3.16** 1.46 3.45** 10.88** 6.99** 8.90**
38 6.12** 5.16** 2.03* 0.86 1.10 1.29 8.48** 6.87** 2.34*
Notes: * significant at 5% ** significant at 1%. The table reports the F-statistic for the following tests. Testing 
for two structural breaks against the null of no structural breaks involves running the regression with two sets 
of interaction terms, and testing for the joint significance of all interaction terms. Testing for a structural break 
in 198S assuming a structural break in 1991 involves running the regression with two sets of interaction terms, 
and testing for the joint significance of the 1985 interactions. Testing for a structural break in 1991 assuming a 
structural break in 1985 is performed analogously. TFP refers to whether or not the specification includes TFP 
and its interaction terms, and Controls refers to whether or not the specification includes political and market 
access controls and their interaction terms. The critical values at the 5 and 1 percent levels of the F statistic are: 
Column (1): F(22,72)= 1.68,2.09. Column (2): F(36,48)=1.65,2.04.
Column (3): F(58, 18)=2.02,2.7S. Columns (4) and (7): F(11,72)=1.90,2.47.
Columns (5) and (8): F(18,48)=1.80,2.32. Columns (6) and (9): F(29, 18)=2.11,2.92.
Table 3.13: Test for the presence of two structural breaks in 1985 and 1991.
We also test for the presence of two structural breaks, against three different null 
hypotheses: no structural breaks, a structural break in 1985, and a structural break in 
1991. For example, testing for two structural breaks against a null of one structural break 
in 1985, involves an F-test of the joint significance of the interaction terms associated 
with the break in 1991. The results are in Table 3.13. The null of no structural breaks is 
rejected in favour of two structural breaks, for all industries in all specifications, except 
for the specification including TFP, where the null is not rejected for industries 21 (food 
products) and 27 (wood products). Testing for the presence of a structural break in 1985 
when we assume a structural break in 1991 produces less strong results, although the null 
(that there is a break in 1991 but not in 1985) is still rejected for the majority of industries 
in all specifications. Finally, testing for a structural break in 1991 assuming a structural
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Break in 1991 Break in 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Test Endow TFP Controls State Endow TFP Controls State
Industry F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat F-stat
20 0.52 6.07** 3.48** 2.58* 0.27 4.09** 1.03 1.63
21 3.26* 1.87* 1.69 1.37 0.91 1.06 0.43 0.55
22 13.65** 2.63** 2.89* 4.45** 1.59 0.98 0.66 0.67
23 1.78 3.27** 2.69* 2.16 1.19 2.07* 2.96* 5.39**
24 0.54 6.16** 4.41** 3.55** 2.20 3.74** 2.99* 3.04**
26 5.45** 6.37** 1.76 5.13** 2.23 1.53 1.39 2.01
27 0.71 1.03 0.66 0.78 1.89 0.60 0.85 0.70
28 2.70 3.72** 1.75 2.39* 2.19 2.06* 2.54* 2.77*
29 5.37** 3.39** 6.68** 6.92** 1.74 0.68 1.29 1.76
30 2.08 2.12* 1.99 1.82 5.46** 2.58** 3.01** 3.92**
31 1.27 4.61** 0.96 1.01 2.08 2.10*' 2.04 2.47*
32 2.66 3.04** 3.08** 2.70* 0.95 1.68 4.56** 3.88**
33 3.19* 1.79 2.02 2.06 2.76 1.79 1.83 2.65*
34 4.32* 5.75** 4.79** 5.08** 5.29** 0.92 1.05 1.66
35 4.68** 3.81** 5.58** 4.21** 3.60* 2.30* 5.18** 4.39**
36 5.55** 2.40** 1.49 3.08** 4.38** 2.56** 6.18** 9.20**
37 3.51* 5.58** 5.74** 5.31** 6.15** 1.64 4.50** 2.72*
38 2.69 2.28* 2.67* 2.73* 1.38 0.88 0.67 0.83
Notes: * significant at 5% ** significant at 1%. The full specification, including endowments, TFP, controls, 
and state and year effects, and a full set of interactions, is run twice: once for a break in 1991, and once for 
a break in 1985. The table reports the F-statistic for the test that the interaction terms of subsets of RHS 
variables are jointly insignificant. Endow is the test of the joint significance o f the endowment interactions. 
TFP is the test of the joint significance of the TFP interactions. Controls is the test o f the joint significance 
of the political and market access interactions. State is the test of the joint significance of the state 
interactions. The critical values at the 5 and 1 percent levels of the F statistic are:
Columns (1) and (5): F(3, 39)=2.85,4.33. Columns (2) and (6): F(18, 39)=1.85, 2.39.
Columns (3) and (7): F(8, 39)=2.19, 3.01. Columns (4) and (8): F(8, 39)=2.19, 3.01.
Table 3.14: Structural breaks in subsets of RHS variables.
break in 1985, we reject the null that there is a break in 1985 but not in 1991, for the 
majority of industries in all specifications.32
Finally, we can test for structural breaks in subsets of the RHS variables. This 
simply involves an F-test of the interaction terms of the subset for which we want to 
test. We divide the RHS variables into four groups: factor endowments, TFP, all controls 
(political and market access), and state effects. The regression we run is with a single set 
of interaction terms, either for a break in 1985 or 1991. Table 3.14 shows the results.
For the test of a break in 1991, there is evidence of a structural break in at least 
one subset of RHS variables in all industries except industry 27 (wood products). For 
the break in 1985, six industries showed no evidence of a structural break in any sub­
32 When testing for two structural breaks, we are unable to test for a break for the full specification including 
endowments, TFP, and political and market access controls, because o f insufficient degrees o f freedom.
98
set of variables: industries 21 (food products), 22 (beverages and tobacco), 26 (textile 
products), 27 (wood products), 29 (leather products), and 38 (other manufacturing). In 
1991, there is most evidence of a structural break (in terms of having the largest num­
ber of significant coefficients) in the TFP effects, while in 1985 the state effects have 
the largest number of significant coefficients. For both years, there is least evidence of 
a structural break in the effect of the factor endowments. Because the degrees of free­
dom differs across columns, although the values of the F-statistic in columns (1) and (5) 
appear large, this does not reflect the size of the rejection as the critical values of the F 
statistic are also larger in those columns.
While Tables 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14 present the summary results of reform on the re­
lationship between factor endowments, technology, and industry share for various spec­
ifications, Table 3.15 reports the detailed results for one of these regressions. It presents 
the results for a single structural break, corresponding to the reform of 1991, for the spec­
ification including factor endowments and TFP but not including any political or market 
access controls. These are the results which are summarised in column (3) of Table 3.12.
In Table 3.15, own TFP is significantly positively associated with industry share 
in 16 of our 18 industries. The interaction term between the reform dummy and own 
TFP, is significant and positive in six industries: industries 20 (food products), 24 (man- 
made textiles), 26 (textile products), 30 (chemical products), 37 (transport equipment) 
and 38 (other manufacturing). The interaction term of own TFP with the reform dummy 
is negatively associated with industry share post-reform in four industries: industries 21 
(food products), 23 (cotton textiles), 31 (rubber and plastic) and 34 (metal products). This 
suggests that, for the first six industries, the positive relationship between own TFP and 
industry share became larger after the 1991 reform, whereas in the latter four industries, 
this positive relationship became smaller; the point estimates of the coefficients show 
that in no case does the net effect become negative (the net effect is obtained by adding 
the interaction term and the non-interacted term).
For factor endowments, the pattern of results is much more mixed. There is, as 
with previous results, some evidence that factor endowments are more significantly asso­
ciated with industry share in heavy industries (industries 30 to 37) than in light industries 
(industries 20 to 29). However, there is no evidence that the reform has had a larger
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Var. share20 share21 share22 share23 share24 share26 share27 share28 share29
Log real fixed capital 0.032 0.012 -0.141 -0.234 0.215 0.079 0.013 0.04 0.095
(0.22) (013) (132) (0.84) (1.33) (0.76) (0.25) (0.40) (0.97)
Log literates 1.94 -0.844 -1.759 -6.194 -0.097 -0.397 0.049 -0.27 -0.323
(1.96)+ (1.45) (2.53)* (3.38)** (0.09) (0.58) (0.14) (0.41) (0.51)
Log illiterates -1.971 0.851 1.88 6.365 -0.104 0.3 -0.053 0.196 0.208
(1.87)+ (1.37) (2.53)* (3.25)** (0.09) (0-41) (0.15) (0.28) (0.31)
Log crop area -0.001 -0.02 0.02 0.063 -0.015 0.017 -0.009 0.034 0.02
(0.01) (0.49) (0.43) (0.50) (0.20) (0.36) (0.38) (0-74) (0.45)
Own TFP 0.077 0.167 0.123 0.618 0.111 0.134 0.026 0.234 0.008
(2.37)* (6.27)** (4.02)** (5.66)** (2.08)* (5.48)** (137) (8.25)** (0.37)
R*Log real fixed 0.12 -0.193 0.598 0.21 -0.212 0.142 0.03 -0.268 0.051
capital (0.44) (1.29) (3.29)** (0.46) (0.76) (0.72) (0.30) (149) (0.29)
R*Log literates -1.778 1.512 1.433 4.471 -1.064 -4.404 0.253 0.574 0.358
(0.75) (1.14) (0.90) (111) (0.43) (2.60)** (0.30) (036) (0.23)
R*Log illiterates 1.048 -0.153 -1.981 -8.438 0.973 5.14 0.002 0.061 -3.704
(0.42) (0.11) (1.17) (1.92)+ (0.37) (2.92)** (0.00) (0.04) (2.32)*
R*Log crop area 0.61 -1.167 -0.05 3.756 0.304 -0.878 -0.285 -0.367 3.295
(0.45) (151) (0.05) (151) (0.21) (0.92) (0.62) (0.41) (3.74)**
R*own TFP 0.283 -0.054 0.014 -0.413 0.331 0.237 -0.017 -0.056 -0.013
(3.80)** (1.68)+ (0.35) (2.91)** (3.77)** (3.69)** (059) (1.07) (0.32)
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
R-squared 0.9 0.9 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.62 0.89 0.93
(10) (ID (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Dep. Var. share30 share31 share32 share33 share34 share35 share36 share37 share38
Log real fixed capital 0.525 0.037 0.086 1.172 0.064 0.102 -0.477 -0.027 -0.008
(1.33) (0.07) (0.88) (5.33)** (0.70) (0.70) (2.31)* (0.08) (0.12)
Log literates -1.653 -1.624 0.763 -2.753 -2.006 0.95 -0.401 9.668 0.191
(0.64) (0.47) (1.19) (1.90)+ (3.45)** (0.99) (0.30) (4.51)** (0.41)
Log illiterates 1.341 1.626 -0.856 1.593 1.952 -1.108 1.133 -9.487 -0.102
(0.49) (0.44) (1.25) (1.03) (3.12)** (108) (0.78) (4.14)** (0.20)
Log crop area -0.214 -0.039 0.007 -0.012 -0.009 0.055 -0.255 -0.154 -0.08
(1:20) (016) (0.17) (0.12) (024) (0 85) (2.74)** (105) (2.53)*
Own TFP 0.587 1.522 0.223 0.359 0.357 0.885 0.713 0.328 0.065
(5.44)** (12.91)** (7.47)** (6.92)** (9.69)** (12.13)** (8.88)** (2.93)** (2.91)**
R’Log real fixed 1.177 0.642 0.013 -0.272 0.331 0.313 1.083 0.307 -0.088
capital (1.72)+ (0.75) (0.07) (0.71) (1.93)+ (115) (2.84)** (055) (0-65)
R*Log literates 0.766 9.728 -1.754 7.299 1.296 3.684 -4.791 -5.618 0.914
(0.12) (1.29) (1.09) (2.15)* (0.89) (152) (1.44) (109) (0.78)
R*Log illiterates -7.454 -5.407 -0.093 -4.605 -0.764 0.948 3.651 2.178 -1.445
(1.14) (0-65) (0.06) (1.28) (0.51) (0.38) (105) (0.40) (1.21)
R*Log crop area 5.511 -4.963 1.835 -2.422 -0.863 -4.945 0.057 3.134 0.619
(1.52) (105) (2.07)* (1.22) (109) (3.78)** (0.03) (106) (0.96)
R+own TFP 0.725 -1.187 0.041 -0.047 -0.253 -0.11 0.062 0.736 0.12
(1.91)+ (5.43)** (0.64) (0.47) (3.34)** (0.82) (0.32) (3.03)** (2.68)**
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
R-squared 0.97 0.82 0.95 0.8 0.93 0.97 0.92 0.93 0.91
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimation 
method is SURE with linear homogeneity and cross-equation TFP constraints. The dependent variable shareXX refers 
to the share o f  industry XX in a state's GDP. Real fixed capital is the total depreciated value of fixed assets in industry, 
deflated by an industry-level price deflator for machinery and transport equipment. Literates and illiterates are the 
number of people who are literate and illiterate in a state. Crop area is the total area under crops, measured in thousands 
of hectares. The interaction terms are R*variable, where R is a dummy variable taking value 0 before 1991, and 1 after 
1991. Own TFP refers to the impact of the industry's own TFP on its share of output; cross industry TFP coefficients 
not reported. See the Data Appendix for details of the construction and sources of the variables.
Table 3.15: Regression (3.18) with a reform dummy in 1991.
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effect on the relationship between factor endowments and industry share in heavy indus­
tries than in light industries. The direction of change indicated by the interaction terms 
is also interesting. For example, in industry 33 (basic metals), the endowment of liter­
ates was negatively related to industry share before reform, but the interaction term is 
positive, and the net effect post-reform is positive. Similarly, in industry 36 (machin­
ery and equipment), capital stock is negatively related to industry share before reform, 
whilst the interaction term is positive, yielding a net effect post-reform which is positive. 
This interesting pattern of results is not unexpected, since as noted above, with more 
industries than factors of production, the relationship between industry share and factor 
endowments holds only in terms of correlations. It is therefore difficult to draw any sharp 
conclusions from the results of Table 3.15.
All in all, the results of Tables 3.12, 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15 show that the reform 
of the Indian economy begun in 1985 and 1991 had extremely diverse and significant 
impacts on the different industries in India.33 The reform of the Indian economy changes 
the relationship between factor endowments, technology, and industrial structure. This 
is consistent with the idea that the relationship between these variables is different in a 
centrally planned economy than in a market-orientated economy.
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
The objective of this chapter is to understand industrial structure across the states of In­
dia: what it looks like, and how observed structures may be explained. To do so, we use 
a neoclassical trade model, relating industrial structure to differences in factor endow­
ments and technology across locations, which has been used successfully in explaining 
industrial structure in more developed countries. This allows us to consider the extent to 
which such a neoclassical model can be successfully used for developing countries. Our 
dataset, which is a panel of 16 states and 18 industries from 1980 to 1997, covers a pe­
riod of change in the policy environment towards private economic activity in India. We 
are therefore able to consider the impact of these economic reforms on the relationship 
between factor endowments, technology, and industrial structure.
33 See Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2004) on the uneven impact of liberalisation on productivity 
and output across Indian industries.
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Our main results are as follows. First, we find evidence of improvements in av­
erage TFP over time. However, there is also great heterogeneity in TFP performance 
across states and industries, with some industries not exhibiting any growth in TFP. Sec­
ond, both factor endowments and technology are strongly related to the location of in­
dustries. The only exceptions to this are those industries which are agriculture based, as 
our measure of crop area may not capture how suitable the land is for different types of 
agriculture. Capital stock, and skilled and unskilled labour, have more statistically sig­
nificant associations with the structure of production than agricultural land area. Higher 
levels of technology in an industry are associated with a larger share of that industry in a 
state.
Third, the results on the relationship between factor endowments, technology and 
industry shares, are robust to the inclusion of additional variables controlling for political 
factors and market access. The different political parties relate to industry shares in the 
same direction. Fourth, domestic and foreign market access relate to industry share in the 
same direction; access to markets applies to both domestic and foreign markets. In terms 
of economic importance of the explanatory variables, factor endowments, political his­
tory and market access are the most important, while TFP, while frequently statistically 
significant, has a much smaller impact on industrial structure.
Our fifth main result is that there is strong evidence of structural breaks in In­
dian industry in 1985, at the start of Rajiv Gandhi’s initial reforms, and in 1991, when 
a more general liberalisation was put into effect. Our results indicate that the change 
from a centrally planned economy to a more market orientated economy has changed the 
relationship between factor endowments, technology and industrial structure.
In conclusion, the neoclassical model, when suitably extended, provides a rela­
tively successful explanation of the pattern of production across regions within a de­
veloping country such as India. Its application is not therefore limited to the developed 
world, and it provides a suitable framework for exploring the impact of market orientated 
reforms on industrial structure.
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3.A Data Appendix to Chapter 3
The data comes from many sources. Our dataset builds on Ozler, Datt and Ravallion 
(1996) and Besley and Burgess (2004).
The labor regulation variable comes from state-specific text amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 as reported in Malik (1997). Besley and Burgess (2004) 
code each change in the following way: a +1 denotes a change that is pro-worker or 
anti-employer, a 0 denotes a change that was judged not to affect the bargaining power 
of either workers or employers and a -1 denotes a change which they regard to be anti­
worker or pro-employer. There were 113 state specific amendments coded in this manner. 
Where there was more than one amendment in a year they collapsed this information 
into a single directional measure. Thus reforms in the regulatory climate are restricted 
to taking a value of 1, 0, -1 in any given state and year. To use these data, they then 
construct cumulated variables which map the entire history of each state beginning from 
1947 — the date of enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act.
State population data used to express magnitudes in per capita terms comes from 
the 1951,1961, 1971, 1981,1991 and 2001 censuses [Census of India, Registrar General 
and Census Commissioner, Government of India] and has been interpolated between 
census years.
State domestic product comes from Estimates of State Domestic Product published 
by Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India.
Fixed capital and industrial output come from the Indian Annual Survey of In­
dustries, Central Statistical Office, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Gov­
ernment of India. Fixed capital represents the depreciated value of fixed assets owned 
by the factory on the closing date of the accounting year. Fixed assets are those which 
have a normal productive life of more than one year. Fixed capital covers all types of as­
sets new or used or own constructed, deployed for production, transportation, living or 
recreational activities, hospitals, schools etc. for factory personnel. Industrial output is 
the total ex-factory value of products and by-products manufactured and receipts from 
non-industrial services rendered to others, work done for others on materials supplied
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by them, value of electricity produced and sold, sale value of goods sold in the same 
condition as purchased, addition in stock of semi-finished goods and own construction.
Literacy is from various issues of the Statistical Abstracts of India, Central Statis­
tical Office, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India.
The data on political histories comes from Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1991), updated 
from the website of the Election Commission of India (http://www.eci.gov.in/). Political 
history is measured by the number if years during our data period that particular political 
groupings have held a majority of the seats in the legislature. State political configu­
rations are held constant between elections. In our data period, the relevant groupings 
are: the Congress party, the Janata parties, hard left parties, the Hindu parties, and re­
gional parties. These groupings contain the following parties (i) Congress Party (Indian 
National Congress + Indian Congress Socialist + Indian National Congress Urs + Indian 
National Congress Organization), (ii) Janata parties (Lok Dal+Janata+Janata Dal), (iii) 
a hard left grouping (Communist Party of India + Communist Party of India Marxist), 
(iv) Hindu parties (Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)), and (v) a grouping made up of regional 
parties.
Industry data is from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). Data is avail­
able at the 3-digit level, following the National Industrial Classification (NIC). The data 
in the ASI is for registered manufacturing, defined as firms with 20 or more workers but 
no electrical power, or firms with 10 or more workers and electrical power. There is a 
change in industrial classification in 1987 and, in order to match the 1970 and 1987 NICs, 
we aggregate a small number of 3-digit industries. We exclude miscellaneous manufac­
turing industries, as these are likely to be heterogeneous across states. The industries 
‘Minting of Currency Coins’ and ‘Processing of Nuclear Fuels’ are also excluded, as 
outcomes in these industries are likely to be determined by special considerations. This 
leaves a total of 138 industries, which are then aggregated to the 2-digit level. The de­
pendent variable in the regressions is the share of industry value added in state domestic 
product. Industry value added is calculated as the sum of net value added and deprecia­
tion. This is divided by state domestic product to get the share of an industry.
Market potential is calculated from the formula in the text. Distance data is road 
distance, from the website http://mapsofindia.com/distEmces/. Distances between states
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are road distances between state capitals, and distances between states and ports are 
road distances between state capitals and ports. Own distance is given by the formula 
§ 3»which gives the average distance between two points in a circular state. Total
trade volume of a port is from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of India.
To calculate total factor productivity using the net value added approach, the fol­
lowing variables from the ASI are used:
Industry level net value added: Defined as the increment to the value of goods and 
services that is contributed by the factory.
Industry level fixed capital: Defined as the depreciated value of fixed assets owned 
by the factory.
Industry level workers: Defined to include all persons employed directly or through 
any agency whether for wages or not and engaged in any manufacturing process or in 
cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for manufacturing process or in 
any other kind of work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process or the 
subject of the manufacturing process.
The industry level share of labour in value-added is calculated as the sum of emol­
uments plus welfare payments, divided by net value added. Emoluments are defined as 
all remuneration paid to all employees including payments in kind, while welfare pay­
ments include provident fund, pension, gratuity, other social security charges, and group 
benefits like direct expenditure on maternity, creches and canteen facilities.
Net value added, fixed capital and payments to labour are deflated by the industry- 
level price deflator for Machinery and Transport Equipment, obtained from the Indian 
Handbook of Industrial Statistics (various issues), 1980-97.
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3.B Appendix Tables
20 manufacture o f food products
21 manufacture o f food products
22 manufacture o f beverages, tobacco and related products
23 manufacture o f cotton textiles
24 manufacture o f wool, silk and man-made fibre textiles
25 manufacture o f jute and other vegetable fibre textiles (except cotton and coir)
26 manufacture o f textile products (including wearing apparel)
27 manufacture o f wood and wood products; furniture and fixtures
28 manufacture o f paper and paper products and printing, publishing and allied industries
29 manufacture o f leather and products o f leather, fur and substitutes o f leather
30 manufacture o f basic chemicals and chemical products
31 manufacture o f rubber, plastic, petroleum and coal products; processing o f nuclear fuels
32 manufacture o f non-metallic mineral products
33 basic metal and alloys industries
34 manufacture o f metal products and parts, except machinery and equipment
35 manufacture o f machinery and equipment other than transport equipment
36 manufacture o f machinery and equipment other than transport equipment
37 manufacture o f transport equipment and parts
38 other manufacturing industries
Table 3.16: India National Industrial Classification (2 digit level).
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Dep. Var
(1)
share20
(2)
share21
(3)
share22
(4)
share23
(5)
share24
(6)
share26
(7)
share27
(8)
share28
(9)
share29
Log real fixed capital 0.041 0.031 0.017 -0.156 -0.065 0.069 -0.009 0.016 0.027
, (1.33) (0.59) (0.88) (2.34)* (1.56) (2.73)** (1.13) (0.85) (2.35)*
Log literates 0.408 0.398 -0.091 0.111 0.428 -0.365 -0.227 0.038 -0.096
(2.46)* (1.45) (0.89) (0.31) (1.94)+ (2.71)** (5.57)** (0.37) (1.58)
Log illiterates -0.376 -0.38 0.006 -0.03 -0.293 0.177 0.273 -0.213 0.041
(2.57)* (1.57) (0.06) (0.10) (1.50) (1.49) (7.58)** (2.35)* (0.78)
Log crop area -0.074 -0.048 0.068 0.075 -0.071 0.12 -0.037 0.159 0.028
(1.09) (0.43) (164) (0.52) (0.79) (2.18)* (2.22)* (3.80)** (1.13)
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.88 0.91 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.67 0.92 0.86 0.88
Sum of endowment
coefficients 0.2203 0.3300 -0.0416 -0.1035 1.0960 -0.5167 0.2272 -0.2051 -0.1536
p-value 0.2965 0.3458 0.7495 0.8188 0.0001 0.0024 0.0000 0.1164 0.0454
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Dep. Var. share30 share31 share32 share33 share34 share35 share36 share37 share38
Log real fixed capital 0.487 0.247 0.082 -0.125 -0.004 -0.019 0.036 -0.068 0.011
(4.03)** (1.90)+ (2.37)* (0.81) (0.21) (0.55) (0.80) (0.72) (1.27)
Log literates -1.024 -0.649 -0.077 -0.724 -0.168 0.163 -0.066 1.004 0.172
(1.59) (0.94) (0.42) (0.88) (1.79)+ (0.87) (0.28) (1.97)+ (3.57)**
Log illiterates 0.963 0.297 0.059 0.986 0.17 -0.11 0.072 -0.634 -0.073
(1.69)+ (0.49) (0.37) (1.36) (2.05)* (0-67) (0-34) (1.41) (1.72)+
Log crop area -0.425 0.106 -0.064 -0.137 0.002 -0.034 -0.042 -0.302 -0.11
(1.62) (0.38) (0.85) (0.41) (0.05) (0.45) (0.43) (145) (5.62)**
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.91 0.5 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.94 0.88 0.77 0.84
Sum of endowment
coefficients 1.4785 -1.2877 0.6505 1.1646 0.0478 0.3251 0.0106 1.6990 0.0087
p-value 0.0707 0.1436 0.0052 0.2660 0.6894 0.1709 0.9722 0.0085 0.8869
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All 
regressions run using SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) with the restriction that the coefficients on all endowment 
variables sum to 0. The dependent variable shareXX refers to the share of industry XX in a state's GDP. Real fixed 
capital is the total depreciated value of fixed assets in industry, deflated by an industry-level price deflator for machinery 
and transport equipment. Literates and illiterates are the number of people who are literate and illiterate in a state.
Crop area is the total area under crops, measured in thousands of hectares. The sum of endowment coefficients is the 
sum of coefficients on real fixed capital, literates, illiterates and crop area, if the regression is run without imposing 
the restriction that they sum to zero. The p-value is the p-value o f the F-test that the sum of endowment coefficients 
is equal to zero, when the regression is run without imposing that restriction. See the Data Appendix for details 
of the construction and sources of the variables.
Table 3.17: Regression (3.10): factor endowments with homogeneity constraints, full 
sample.
107
Chapter 4 
Endogenous Economic Policy and the 
Structure of Production: Theory and 
Evidence
4.1 Introduction
What role do initial conditions play in determining the pattern of international trade and 
the location of production? The standard response to this question is to point to the role 
of increasing returns to scale in production technology, and its role in creating path- 
dependent outcomes. This is the line of reasoning adopted by many authors including 
Krugman (1981), Arthur (1989), Krugman (1991), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) 
and Redding (2002). In this chapter, differently from these previous papers, initial con­
ditions influence the pattern of trade through its impact on policy, which in turn affects 
agents’ locational decisions, and hence the pattern of production and trade.
We propose a model of trade between two locations34 that makes the following 
two predictions. First, the location with a greater absolute stock of capital will have 
policies which are more favourable to capital35. Once we allow for capital to move 
across locations, the location with greater absolute capital stock will attract inflows of 
capital from the other location, changing relative capital-labour endowments, so that 
the location, with an initial absolute advantage in capital stock, will end up having a 
comparative advantage in the capital intensive good. Therefore, the second theoretical 
prediction is that locations with more different policies will also have more different 
industrial structures. Both of these predictions are then tested empirically.
34 The mechanism underlying the model are more general than the precise two location setup, and could be 
extended to multiple locations.
35 A note on terminology: we use "locations" to distinguish between geographical areas. We prefer this 
term to alternatives such as "countries" or "states" as the mechanism in the model would operate irrespective 
o f the geographical area involved, as long as different locations have different policies and capital is mobile 
between locations.
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The way the model works is as follows. We start with a standard model of trade 
with identical technologies but different relative endowments of capital and labour across 
locations. Then, comparative advantage implies that each location will export the good 
which uses intensively its relatively abundant factor. However, capital owners are able 
to lobby the government for policies that favour them, at the expense of labour; labour 
owners as assumed to be unorganised and hence unable to counter-lobby the government. 
The location with greater absolute levels of capital will therefore implement policies that 
are more favourable to capital, because the cost of policy is spread over more units of 
capital.36
Once we allow for capital mobility, lobbies in each location play a two stage game 
in which they first simultaneously choose whether to lobby their respective governments 
or not, and then whether to stay in their original location or move to the other location. 
In general there are two (pure strategy) subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, in which all 
the capital in the world locates in either location. However, if initial absolute capital 
endowments are different across locations, the two equilibria are not symmetric, and 
we can obtain conditions for which one of the equilibria disappears leaving us with a 
unique Nash equilibrium, that all the capital in the world will locate in the location that 
has the larger initial stock of capital. This somewhat extreme outcome is a result of a 
simplifying assumption we make on the technology side which makes the model much 
simpler to solve. Relaxing this assumption would result in incomplete capital relocation, 
which is what is observed in reality. Therefore, while comparative advantage matters for 
current patterns of trade, initial absolute endowments of capital determine policies and 
hence the future location of capital, future comparative advantage, and future patterns of 
production. This can lead either to the reinforcement or reversal of initial comparative 
advantage.
The key contribution of this chapter is to combine the microfoundation of pol­
icy with comparative advantage and trade patterns. Following the lead of Grossman and 
Helpman (1996), we endogenise the relative weights which the government places on 
campaign contributions versus voter welfare, and show that the share of tax revenue de­
rived from capital depends on how effective is lobbying activity, how dispersed are voter
36 If the government-provided good is a public good that is nonrival in consumption, e.g. national defence, 
then the benefits o f government policy do not decline with the units o f capital.
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preferences for different parties in an election, and how well-informed are voters. Our 
two main contributions relative to Grossman and Helpman (1996) are, first, to incor­
porate a Heckscher-Ohlin production structure with two sectors that use two factors of 
production with different intensities. Second, we allow for capital mobility across loca­
tions. Both of these new dimensions of the analysis substantially change the predictions 
of the model.
There have been previous models on the impact of endogenous policy formation 
on capital mobility; examples include Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Haufler (1997). 
At least two key features distinguish our model from previous models. First, it is based 
on a two-good, two-factor model of international trade; this allows us to derive some 
results on the impact of factor mobility on the structure of production. Second, and fairly 
crucially for our results, the government in our model maximises the probability that it 
will win an election. In the process of doing so, it has to compete with a rival party 
using a combination of campaign contributions and policies, but this results in the capital 
lobby being able to exploit this rivalry to maximise its own welfare at the expense of the 
political parties.
The model of absolute advantage which we present also differs from previous 
models in which absolute advantage is an explanation for trade, for example Copeland 
and Kotwal (1996), Ricci (1999) or Neary (2003). In Copeland and Kotwal (1996), 
absolute (technological) advantage combined with non-homothetic preferences may lead 
to no gains from trade, so that absolute advantage reduces trade flows. Ricci (1999) 
allows for technological differences across locations in a two-location model of economic 
geography with increasing returns at the level of the firm, and finds that agglomeration 
may occur in the location with an absolute technological disadvantage, if the difference 
in productivities between the two countries is not too large. In Neary (2003), a fall in 
production costs in one country in a many-sector oligopolistic general equilibrium model 
may lead both countries to specialise less in accordance with comparative advantage 
through changes in factor prices. Differently from these papers, in our model, absolute 
advantage in terms of initial absolute capital stock has an indirect effect on patterns of 
trade, by influencing the location of capital through its impact on policy. Trade in goods, 
taking factor endowments as given, is still governed by comparative advantage.
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This chapter is also related to the literature on tax competition. The evidence 
from this literature has been that corporate tax revenue as a share of total tax revenue 
has been falling in OECD countries over the last 30 years (see e.g. Devereux, Griffith 
and Klemm (2002)). The traditional tax competition literature has emphasised a race- 
to-the-bottom as countries compete with one another to capture internationally mobile 
capital. However, Baldwin and Krugman (2002) show that, empirically, there is no clear 
evidence of a race to the bottom, and they develop a theoretical model of economic 
geography which predicts that closer integration between countries may lead first to a 
race-to-the-top and then a race-to-the-bottom. The model in the present chapter predicts 
no race of either kind, as governments are compelled to implement policies subject to the 
special interest groups’ interests.
In the theoretical model, we model the government’s policy variable as the tax 
rate on capital and labour. In our empirical analysis, we take a broader interpretation of 
policy. We test for the impact of capital endowments on economic policy using state- 
level data on India between 1959 and 1997, using Besley and Burgess’ (2004) labour 
regulation indicator as a measure of how favourable is the policy stance of a state to 
capital.
Since capital stock is endogenous in our model, our empirical strategy uses instrumental- 
variables methods to overcome this problem. We instrument capital stock using electric­
ity generating capacity and bank credit. These are intuitively appealing instruments as 
they are highly correlated with capital stock, but at the same time, are not correlated with 
the error term, as they are primarily determined by the central government. Burgess and 
Pande (2004) present evidence that the location of bank branches in India was largely 
driven by the Banking Regulation Act of 1949, which requires banks to obtain a license 
from the central bank of India before opening a new branch. This effectively gave the 
central bank control over the location of bank branches. Under the Industrial Policy Res­
olution of 1956, the generation and distribution of electricity was one of the industries 
placed under the exclusive responsibility of the central government, and was a part of 
the central government policy to reduce regional disparities in income and wealth. Both 
instruments therefore are controlled by the central government and should be uncorre­
lated with the error term. The instrumental variables estimates passed the Hansen (1982)
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test of overidentification. As an additional robustness check, we use ordered logit as an 
alternative estimation method, due to the discrete nature of the labour regulation variable.
Both predictions of our theoretical model are confirmed in the data. First, even 
after controlling for numerous other factors, absolute capital endowments have a strong 
impact on policy. More precisely, the greater the endowment of capital in a state, the 
more pro-capital will be its policy stance. We see this as evidence in support of the 
mechanism proposed in our theory. Second, states which are more similar in their labour 
regulations, tend to have more similar industrial structure, which again is in accord with 
the theoretical prediction.
Our empirics differ from previous work such as Besley and Burgess (2000,2004), 
Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2004) and Dollar, Iarossi and Mengistae (2002), 
who focus on the impact of policy on economic performance. Here, in our first main 
econometric specification, we use a measure of policy as our dependent variable, and 
investigate the impact of capital endowments on policy. In our second main estimated 
equation, we also investigate how differences in policy across states impact on industrial 
structure.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section lays out the 
theoretical model, starting with a closed economy and then allowing for capital mobility 
and trade across locations. Section 4.3 performs the empirical tests. The final section 
concludes.
4.2 The Model
The model combines elements of both a model of political economy and a model of trade 
based on factor endowments. First, we describe the production side of the economy, 
which is a 2 x 2 x 2 Heckscher-Ohlin model. Assume two locations, Home and Foreign, 
two goods, 1 and 2, and two factors of production, capital and labour, both inelastically 
supplied. The two goods are produced under perfect competition using the following 
technologies which are assumed to be identical across locations:
X i  =  x x (K ) X 2 = x 2 (L ) (4.1)
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That is, capital is the only factor of production used in producing good 1, while labour is 
the only factor of production used in producing good 2. These production technologies 
ensure that, in the presence of free trade in goods, factor prices are equalised at every 
point in the Edgeworth Box, which simplifies the analysis considerably, and also give rise 
to the result of complete relocation of capital between locations when capital mobility is 
allowed. The production technologies are specialised versions of the more general case 
where X \  =  x\  (K , L ) and =  £2 (X,  L ) with good 1 capital-intensive relative to 
good 2 at any given factor price.
Equilibrium in production is given by the set of equilibrium conditions familiar 
from standard trade theory (see Helpman and Krugman (1985)):
Pi  = M C i { w , r )  (4.2)
h { w ) X 2 =  L  (4.3)
k 1 ( r ) X 1 = K
* l ( P l , P 2)  =  „  / t T - v ' '  (4 -4)
P 1X 1 + P 2 X 2
M{Pl ,P2) = P2X2P1X 1 -\-p2X 2
where the first condition is simply the zero profit condition, the second condition is the 
factor market clearing condition, where k  and ki are the unit factor input requirements, 
and the third condition is the goods market clearing condition, where Ai (p) and A2 (p) 
are the shares of goods 1 and 2 respectively in total expenditure.
The political model is based on a heavily modified version of Grossman and Help- 
man’s (1996) model of electoral competition and special interest politics; our exposition 
actually follows Chapter 10 in Grossman and Helpman (2001) more closely. The main 
difference between our model and theirs is that we extend their framework to consider 
the role of factor endowments on policy, and the impact of policy on the industrial struc­
ture, which enables us to derive a number of new results linking policy, factor location 
and production structure. Reflecting the Heckscher-Ohlin nature of the model, special in­
terests are defined along factor lines, as capital owners and labour owners, respectively. 
Instead of their policy vector, we consider a simpler setup with only a single policy in­
strument, which may favour either capital or labour.
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We divide consumers into those who own labour, whose net labour income is WL,  
and those who own capital, whose net capital income is R K .  This is a simple way of 
capturing the reality that the main source of income is labour wage for some agents in 
society, and capital rents for other agents, while avoiding issues related to the distribu­
tion of wage versus rental income. The model is set up so that capital and labour have 
opposing interests. This is in line with recent evidence which suggests that individual 
preferences are split along factor endowment lines (see for example Mayda and Rodrik 
(2004), O’Rourke (2003), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), Scheve and Slaughter (2001)).
Also, suppose that capital owners do not vote, while all labour owners vote. All 
capital owners form a single special interest group (SIG) which can lobby the govern­
ment, while labour is unorganised. The assumption that all labour owners vote captures 
the idea of universal suffrage in modem democracies, while the assumption that labour 
does not lobby the government captures the problems of organising a special interest 
group, when each agent is small relative to the group as a whole (although in reality, 
labour unions may overcome these concerns). Allowing capital to lobby the government 
captures the fact that capital ownership is highly concentrated so that capital is easier 
to organise as a special interest group, while not allowing capital to vote captures the 
fact that capital’s influence on the policy process through voting is small relative to its 
potential to lobby the government.
4.2.1 Modelling the policy instrument
The data we use for the empirical section uses Besley and Burgess’ (2004) indicator of 
labour regulation as pro-worker or pro-capital. Therefore, we would like to model the 
policy instrument in the same way. First, we give a brief description of the labour regu­
lations as used in Besley and Burgess (2004), then we explain our modelling procedure.
The legislation which Besley and Burgess use is the Industrial Disputes Act of 
1947. This is a Federal Act, enacted in 1947, and falls under the Concurrent List, for 
which both central and state governments are allowed to make law. Besley and Burgess 
consider state-level amendments to the Act, as listed in Malik (1997). Therefore, while 
under the Federal Act all states started out with the same level of policy, these state-level 
amendments mean that they have diverged over time.
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Figure 4.1: Labour regulation in India, 1958-1997.
Andhra P ra d esh A ssam Bihar G ujarat
O -
T -
— i _ —
Hary an a Ja m m u  & K ashm ir K arnataka Kerala
-
CM - M M '
M adhya P ra d esh M aharash tra O rissa Punjab
CM ~ J — _______
o  -
CM -
T  -
R a ja s th a n Tamil N adu U ttar P ra d esh W e st Bengal
'* ■ w
CM
O
CM
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Graphs by State Name
Besley and Burgess code 113 amendments to the Act, as either pro-employer, 
pro-worker, or neutral. An amendment is coded as +1 if it is pro-worker, -1 if it is 
pro-employer, and 0 if it is neutral, with multiple amendments in the same direction in 
the same year given the same coding as if it is a single amendment (for further details, 
see Besley and Burgess (2004)). Therefore, the measure of labour regulation captures 
the net direction of change in any one year. Figure 4.1 shows the trends in the policy 
measure across states. Six states which have made no amendments to the Industrial 
Disputes Act can be classified neutral or control states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu 
& Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. The treatment states are either pro-employer (six 
states: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu) 
or pro-worker (four states: Gujarat, Maharashtra, Orissa and West Bengal).
What exactly are these changes in labour regulation? The Appendix Table in 
Besley and Burgess (2004) lists all the changes. Examples of pro-worker regulation in­
clude requiring workers to be paid before closing down firms, giving preference to prior 
workers when rehiring, allowing individual workers to apply to the labour court for ad­
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judication, widening judicial powers to recover money owed to workers by employers, 
and lengthening the notice employers must give workers about changes in the condition 
of service. Examples of pro-employer regulation include prohibiting strikes and lockouts 
when in the public interest, facilitating the settlement of industrial disputes in labour 
courts, and allowing firms to continue layoffs due to natural disasters for more than 30 
days without requiring permission from the government.
Our simple model is of course unable to capture all the richness of the policy 
environment in India. Nevertheless, the message that comes through very clearly in the 
policy changes noted above is that any given policy change generates a benefit to capital 
or labour, and a policy that favours capital tends to hurt labour. To keep the model simple, 
we model the policies as tax rates on labour and capital, although we want to keep in mind 
that this is a simplification of the much more complex policies involved. Let the policies 
toward labour and capital be related in the following manner:
tLL  +  tKK  = G (4.5)
That is, there is a government revenue requirement that is satisfied by taxes on capital 
and labour. Assume that tK, tL > 0; the government cannot subsidise factors. This is a 
fairly crucial assumption. First, in the absence of lobbying activity by capital, it prevents 
the political parties from attempting to win votes from labour by taxing all of capital 
income and transferring the surplus to labour. Second, while more capital is associated 
with a lower tax rate on capital when a given quantity of revenue needs to be raised from 
capital, conversely, more capital is associated with a lower subsidy rate when capital is 
being subsidised.
This formulation of policy, where the government revenue requirement is inde­
pendent of capital and labour stocks, is what drives the result that it is absolute factor 
endowments that matters. Doubling capital and labour stocks will halve the tax rates on 
capital and labour. This may be rationalised on the grounds that there are fixed costs and 
scale economies in the supply of public goods, because these goods are non-rival in con­
sumption. As Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) note, there are fixed costs in establishing a 
set of institutions, and a legal, monetary and fiscal system. The costs of certain public 
goods such as parks, libraries, roads and telecoms infrastructure, grow less than propor­
tionally with the size of the population. Alesina and Spolaore (1997), for example, use
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a government cost that is independent of country size in their model of the number and 
size of nations. There is also strong evidence that the share of government expenditure 
in GDP decreases as country size (as measured by total GDP) increases; see for example 
Alesina (2003) or Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). However, this assumption is stronger 
than is required; it can be shown that the key result, that the tax rate on capital decreases 
the more capital there is in the economy, will go through as long as there are some con­
straints on the parameter values, for alternative specifications of the government budget 
constraint. The cost of relaxing this assumption is a more complicated expression for 
tax rates, which would make the extension of allowing for capital mobility analytically 
intractable.
Therefore, the net return to labour is W  = w — tL, while the net return to cap­
ital is R  = t  — tK Interpreted in this way, policy is more favourable to capital the 
lower is the tax rate on capital. We believe that other formulations of policy that involve 
a transfer of resources between factor owners should yield similar results. Since it is fac­
tor owners rather than firms who pay the taxes, these taxes do not influence the firms’ 
decisions: firms will maximise their profits taking pre-tax wage and rental rates as given. 
This allows us to retain the Factor Price Equalisation result, which simplifies the model 
considerably.
We now establish a link between the way we have modelled the policy, with the 
actual policies we use in our empirical work. The tax rates in the model may be thought 
of as the monetary equivalent of the cost of the labour regulations imposed on labour or 
capital owners in the data. Our interpretation of events is as follows. All states started 
out at the same level of tax rates (policy) on capital in 1947. But after that, lobbying 
activity in individual states changes the policy to reflect the political equilibrium in each 
state, with the result (to be shown below) that the more capital there is in a state, the more 
favourable to capital will be the policy.
37 Modelling policy as multiplicative rather than additive as we do here does not change the basic insight 
o f the model.
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4.2.2 Political environment and equilibrium without capital mobility
First, consider the case without capital mobility. We seek a subgame-perfect Nash equi­
librium of a two-stage political game. The timing of the game is as follows:
(1) In Stage 1, interest groups announce their contribution schedules to each party.
(2) Then in Stage 2, parties choose their policy platforms. Contributions are paid 
and campaigns are waged. The election takes place and the legislature meets to imple­
ment the winning party’s platform. Finally, output is produced and factors are paid.38
Let W A and W B be the return to labour net of the policy implemented by parties 
A and B. Substituting from the government budget constraint (4.5), we get the welfare of 
voters given the policy platform of each party:
W A = w - t LA 
-
W B = w - t LB 
=
where tA, tB are policy platforms of parties A and B. This implies that voter welfare is 
linear in income.
First, we discuss the behaviour of voters. There are two classes of voters: informed 
and uninformed, and two political parties, A and B. A two-party system is a reasonably 
close approximation of the politics of many countries, for example the Republicans and 
the Democrats in the United States, the Labour party and the Conservative party in the 
United Kingdom, or Congress and the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) in India.
Informed voters are those who are aware of each party’s platforms, and vote based 
on the policy platforms and other characteristics of each party. Let (1 — a)  denote the 
fraction of informed voters in the total voting population. Voters differ in their prefer­
ences for each party’s exogenous characteristics; let (31 measure voter i ’s assessment of 
the superiority of party B ’s exogenous characteristics relative to party A, drawn from a
38 Since contributions are paid before factors are paid, we implicitly assume that there are perfect financial 
markets on which factors can borrow/lend costlessly.
G
L
G
L
(4.6)
(4.7)
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uniform distribution on j j  — j ,  — j ' j ,  where /  >  0 is a parameter measuring the 
diversity o f ex ante views about the parties. The parameter b can be interpreted as the ex 
ante voter bias in favour of party A. We might expect b > 0 if party A is the incumbent 
party, and b <  0 if party B is the incumbent party. An informed voter i votes for party A 
only if W B — W A <  /3\ or if the net return to labour under party A’s policy is greater.
^ + b + f ( W A - W B)
=  ( l - « )
Then the total number of informed votes cast for party A equals
(1 -  a) L  (4.8)
Q  + b ^ L  + f ( t K A - t KB) K
where the second row is obtained by substituting for W A and W B from equations (4.6) 
and (4.7). Uninformed voters (making up the remaining fraction a  of the voting popula­
tion) vote based on campaign spending by the two parties, and party characteristics. A 
party would be able to attract more uninformed voters to vote for it if it spends more than 
its rival in its campaign. Hence, denote by su the number of uninformed voters who vote 
for party A, and assume that it depends on the difference in the parties’ total campaign 
budgets:
SV = Q  +  b j  a L  +  h [(C A) “ -  (C B) ’ ] (4.9)
where h > 0  is a parameter reflecting the productivity of campaign spending, and Cp 
is total campaign spending by party P, P  = A,  B.  This specification shows that there 
are diminishing returns to campaign spending. This is a natural assumption to make, as 
more effective campaigning methods are used first, followed by less effective methods. 
Assume that the voter bias b is the same for both groups of voters.
The total number of votes won by party A (denoted s; this implies that party B 
wins 1 — s) is the sum of informed and uninformed votes:
s =  /  +  su  (4.10)
=  (b + ^ ] L  + ( l - a ) S { W A - W B) L  + h\ i {CAY  -  (CB) ’
Now we discuss the behaviour of political parties. Each party is committed to imple­
menting its policy platform if it wins the election. If the two parties happen to endorse 
the same policies, and spend the same amounts on their campaigns, then party A will 
capture a total of Q  +  b) L  of the votes. To inject some uncertainty into the outcome of 
the election, suppose that when party platforms tA and tB are chosen, each party regards
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b (the relative popularity of party A) as the future realisation of a random variable b. Ex 
ante, b can be positive or negative, so that even if the platforms converge, each party has a 
chance to win a majority. Denote by ip (•) the distribution of b as perceived by the parties 
at the time they announce their policies.
Each party sets its policy to maximise its chance of winning a majority, in light of 
its prior beliefs about the distribution of b. The best that each party can do is to choose its 
own policy and campaign spending W p  and C p  to maximise this probability. While the 
number of votes won by each party depends on what the other party does, the linearity of 
the objective function (4.10) means that the marginal incentive for each party to change 
its tax platform does not depend on what the other party does. This feature makes solving 
the model very simple. Nevertheless, in equilibrium party platforms cannot be very 
different from one another, because they are both constrained by the platform-contingent 
contributions of the SIG. This is consistent with the observation that the platforms of 
rival parties tend not to be veiy dissimilar from one another.
From the number of votes won (4.10), we can obtain the objective function of each 
political party. For party A, the probability that s > is maximised when the party 
adopts the tax platform tK that maximises
Ga  = max {(1 - a ) f  ( W A) L  + h (C A) * } (4.11)
while for party B, the probability that (1 — s) > \ L  is maximised when the party max­
imises
Gb  = max {(1 -  a) f  (W B) L  + h (CB) » } (4.12)
Each party maximises a weighted sum of campaign contributions and the welfare of the 
informed voters. The weight on welfare is greater, the greater is the fraction of informed 
voters (the larger is 1 -  a), and the narrower is the range of their ideological view (the 
larger is /) .
We now consider the behaviour of the special interest group. Denote by (r — tK) K  
the aggregate utility that members of the interest group derive from the policy t; the util­
ity of capital owners is again linear in their income. The SIG knows that party A will win 
a majority only if the realisation of b is such that s >  \  L. This happens with probability
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(p( A), where
A =  Ga  -  Gb  =  (1 -  a) f  ( W A -  W B) L  + h \ (CAY  -  (CB)» (4.13)
The SIG attaches a probability (A) to the event t =  tA, and a probability 1 -  <p (A) to 
the event t = tB . Hence the objective function of the SIG is:
VL = <p (A) [(r -  tKA) K ] + [  1 - c p  (A)] [(r -  tKB) K]  -  C A -  C B (4.14)
The key feature of the political model is that it is effectively the lobby that decides gov­
ernment policy through its campaign contributions. The lobby chooses contributions and 
hence policy to maximise its welfare Vi,  taking as given the two parties’ responses to its 
contributions, while the two parties each choose policy platforms to maximise its vote 
share, given the platform of the other party and the contribution schedule of the lobby. 
Because of its first mover advantage and its ability to offer a platform-contingent con­
tribution schedule to each party, the lobby is able to exploit the competition for votes 
between the two parties to set its own agenda. The solution is a Nash equilibrium in 
contributions and policies.
If the lobby offers nothing to a party, then the party would support the policy that 
best served the average informed voter. From the government’s budget constraint (4.5), 
the equilibrium policy would then be:
tL* = 0 tK* = %  (4.15)
That is, in the absence of lobbying activity, policy favours labour and hurts capital. A 
party will deviate from this policy only if it can get at least as many votes by deviating 
as it would by implementing this policy. Deviating from this policy in favour of the 
SIG costs the party some votes from informed voters. Therefore, to induce the party to 
implement a more favourable policy to itself, the lobby must compensate the party for the 
loss of votes from informed voters, with a gain in votes from uninformed voters. Hence 
from equation (4.13), the SIG must offer to party A a contribution of at least
a - a) p *
CA >
h
L2 ( W * - W a ) 2 (4.16)
Notice that this does not depend on the policy position adopted by party B; this again 
follows from the linearity of the objective function. Similarly, to induce it to adopt the
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platform tB, the lobby must offer party B a contribution of at least
C B > ( ! - < * ) /h
2
L 2 ( W * - W b ) (4.17)
The lobby’s problem is then to choose tA, tB to maximise its objective function (4.14), 
subject to the constraints (4.16) and (4.17). We assume that the lobby offers each party 
a contribution that leaves it with exactly the same chance of winning the election as it 
would be endorsing t*, so that both constraints hold with equality. This is optimal for the 
lobby if additional contributions will not substantially change the election outcome; this 
is what Grossman and Helpman (1996) refer to as influence-seeking behaviour by the 
lobby: the lobby contributes in order to influence policy platforms but not the outcome 
of the election.39
If both parties do not receive any contributions, then party A would win the elec­
tion with probability <p (0). But since the contribution leaves each party with the same 
chance of winning the election as without the contribution, then the probability that A 
wins the election is (f (0) regardless of the pair of policies chosen by the SIG. The SIG 
finds it beneficial to offer contributions to both groups because of the uncertainty over 
which party will win the election, at the time when contributions are offered.
Appendix 4.A shows the conditions for which the SIG will maximise its objective 
function by lobbying. If both parties are equally likely to win the election, that is, if 
<p (0) =  then for a range of parameter values b e  (—J , J ) , derived in the appendix, the 
SIG will obtain a higher level of welfare by lobbying than by not lobbying. Substituting 
for campaign contributions in the lobby’s objective using the fact that, with influence- 
seeking behaviour, the constraints (4.16) and (4.17) hold with equality, we find that the 
SIG will maximise its welfare by lobbying both parties, provided that neither party is too 
popular (b is not too large in absolute value).
39 Grossman and Helpman (1996) also consider the possibility that the SIG offers more contributions than 
are required to satisfy the constraints (4.16) and (4.17). They refer to this as an electoral motive for campaign 
contributions, as this would change the outcome o f the election. For simplicity we do not consider this 
possibility here.
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Substituting the contributions into the lobby’s objective function using the con­
straints gives:
The influence-seeking lobby induces both parties to behave as if they were maximis­
ing weighted sums of the collective welfare of interest group members, and the welfare 
of informed workers. The weight on the welfare of the SIG depends on the probabil­
ity that the party will win the election, while the weight on the welfare of the informed 
voters depends on the fraction of voters who are informed, the dispersion of voter prefer­
ences across the two parties, and the effectiveness of lobbying activity in influencing the 
uninformed.
Define <pA = ip (0) and <pB = [1 — tp (0)]. Then the first order condition implies:
Therefore, tKP < tK*. The tax rate on capital imposed by party P  when it receives 
campaign contributions from the SIG is lower than when the party does not receive any 
contribution. In order to win the uninformed vote, each party will accept contributions 
from the SIG, in exchange for policies that favour the SIG and harm the voters. Proposi­
tion 4.1 summarises the role of the absolute capital stock on policy:
Proposition 4.1: All else equal, policies are more favourable to capital the more 
capital there is in the economy: <  0 for tKP >  0. A party’s policy platform is more
favourable to capital the more likely it is to win the election (the larger is ipp), the more 
effective is campaign spending (the larger is h), the larger the fraction o f  uninformed 
voters (the larger is a), and the more dispersed are voter preferences (the smaller is f).
VL = V (0) [(r -  tKA) K] + [1 - < p (0)] [ ( r - t KB) K]  (4.18)
2
-  f- l 2 [ ( v r  -  w Af  +  ( w* -  w B f
The lobby chooses tKA and tKB to maximise the objective function above:
arg max
arg max
(4.19)
(4.20)
P  = A,  B  (4.21)
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The more effective is campaign spending and the larger is the fraction of unin­
formed voters, the larger the gain to each party of campaign spending in terms of votes 
won, hence the more willing are parties to accept contributions from the SIG. The larger 
the dispersion of voter preferences across the two parties, the less costly in terms of votes 
lost will be a shift in policy away from the optimal platform for labour, since there are 
fewer marginal voters who will change their votes in response to a change in platforms.
Lobbying activity by the SIG changes the tax regime from one in which all tax 
revenue is obtained from capital alone, to one in which tax revenue is obtained from 
both capital and labour. From the government revenue requirement, if a given fraction 
of government revenue is obtained from capital taxation, then clearly tax rates can be 
lower if there is more capital, and still meet the government revenue requirement. In 
the presence of lobbying activity, the tax rate on capital is lower than in the absence of 
lobbying activity; political parties offer lower tax rates to the capital SIG in return for 
campaign contributions.
The tax rate on labour can be obtained by substituting the tax rate on capital back 
into the government budget constraint:
With labour as with capital, the more labour there is in the economy, the lower is the tax 
rate on labour in equilibrium. With lobbying, the tax rate on labour is positive as opposed 
to zero without lobbying, as parties sacrifice votes from informed voters by reducing their 
welfare, for votes from uninformed voters by spending more on their election campaigns. 
The tax rate on labour is higher the higher the party’s probability of winning the election, 
as this induces larger contributions from the SIG hence shifting the party’s platform away 
from the voters’ ideal. The labour tax rate is also higher the more effective is campaign 
spending, the smaller the fraction of informed voters (1 — a),  and also the greater the 
dispersion of voter preferences across parties (the smaller is / ) ,  as the greater is this 
dispersion, the fewer the number of informed voters who will change their vote as a 
result of a change in the party’s platform.
(4.22)
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Notice that total tax revenue from labour and capital, tLPL  and tKPK,  are con­
stants that depend on how effective are campaign contributions, but not on the amount of 
capital or labour in the economy, provided that there are positive amounts of either factor 
of production. The more effective are campaign contributions (i.e. the larger are a  and 
h), the larger the total tax revenue from labour, and the lower the total tax revenue from 
capital, as parties put more weight on the welfare of the SIG.
Finally, note also that the SIG does not contribute equally to each party, and hence 
the policy platforms of both parties do not converge, if the parties are not identical. From 
the SIG’s optimal choice of tKA and tKB, equations (4.19) and (4.20), the party that 
has the higher probability of winning will place a greater weight on the SIG’s welfare. 
To induce the front-runner to implement a policy more favourable to itself (and hence 
more harmful to voters), the SIG must (from the contribution functions (4.16) and (4.17)) 
offer a larger contribution to compensate the party for the loss of votes that this would 
otherwise imply. This can also be seen more formally by substituting for the welfare 
levels of labour in the contribution functions (4.16) and (4.17) from the voter welfare 
functions (4.6) and (4.7) and equilibrium tax rates on labour from equation (4.22):
C p =
(1 - o ; ) /
h
(1 - a ) f
P \ 2
h 
P \ 2
l  ( w*  -  w p )
(tLPL ) 2 
2
L(1 -  «) / .
Therefore, the contribution paid by the SIG to a party depends positively on its 
probability of winning (fp  and the effectiveness of campaign spending h, and negatively 
on the share of informed voters (1 — a)  and the density of voter preferences / .  Notice 
also that the level of contribution is independent of the capital stock, a result which 
will be useful in the following subsection where we consider the implications o f capital 
mobility.
4.2.3 Capital mobility
Now suppose that we have capital mobility across locations (while labour remains im­
mobile across locations). This is a simplification of the idea that in reality, capital is
125
relatively mobile while labour is relatively immobile.40 Assume that the two locations 
are identical except for different endowments of capital and labour. Therefore, if the gov­
ernments in both locations are lobbied by the capital SIG, the total tax revenue derived 
from capital and labour are identical, so that any differences in the tax rate on capital be­
tween the two locations is due solely to differences in the capital stock. We can therefore 
drop the locational subscript for the total tax revenue.
Let there be a linear cost of capital mobility, c ( K m ) = 7 K m , where K m  is the 
amount of capital that moves from one location to the other, so that the cost of moving 
one unit of capital is 7 . Suppose that the cost of capital mobility is small, but nonzero. 
This is a simple way of formalising the idea that capital is not perfectly free to move 
between locations. From a technical standpoint, a cost of capital movement is necessary 
to obtain a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium when absolute capital stocks differ 
between locations.
Recall that our production functions in the two sectors are X \  =  x \  (Ki) ,  and 
X 2 = X2 (L2), for both Home and Foreign. This implies that, with free trade, every 
point within the Edgeworth Box has factor prices completely equalised across locations, 
thus allowing us to ignore the impact of changing factor prices on the analysis.
Given the linear specification for mobility costs and the linear technology, if one 
unit of capital gains by moving, then all units of capital in that location must gain by 
moving, so that the movement decision can be simplified to whether or not all the capital 
in a location moves to the other location. More generally, if the FPE set is a subset of the 
Edgeworth Box, then we can get an interior equilibrium whereby some capital remains in 
each location. Appendix 4.B sketches the outcome allowing for factor prices to change; 
this still enables the mechanisms of the model to operate, but the analysis would be 
complicated by the additional consideration on factor prices. In terms of notation, in this 
subsection we work exclusively with tax rates on capital, so we suppress the superscripts 
indicating capital or labour tax rates.
40 Labour mobility across states in India is very low. From the 1981 census, 95.2 percent o f the Indian 
population was bom in the state in which they currently reside; the equivalent number was 95.9 percent in 
1991. This compares with the US, where, in 2000, some 8.7 percent o f the population did not live in the 
same state as they did in 1995 (see Franklin (2003)).
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The game in the previous subsection may be rewritten to allow for the possibility 
of capital mobility. Then, the outcome of the previous subsection may be interpreted as a 
special case of the game where capital is not allowed to move between locations. When 
we allow capital to move, it moves after policies are announced, but before production 
takes place, and taxes are paid to the government in the location where capital finally 
locates. We assume that capital that moves from one location to the other cannot be 
excluded by the incumbent capital from the benefits of lower tax rates. Lobbies can only 
lobby the government of the location in which they are initially located.
The timing of the game is now as follows:
(1) In Stage 1, the SIG in each location simultaneously decide whether or not to 
offer campaign contributions to their own governments.
(2) In Stage 2, campaigns are waged, elections take place, and policies are imple­
mented. Policies are observed by all agents prior to the start of Stage 3.
(3) In Stage 3, capital in each location simultaneously decides whether or not to 
move, production takes place, factors and taxes are paid in their final location.
Figure 4.2 is the extensive form representation of this game. All the action takes 
place in Stages 1 and 3. The choices faced by the SIGs H  and F  in Stage 1 are whether 
to contribute (C ) or to not contribute (NC)  to the government in their initial locations, 
having .solved in the previous section the optimal contribution level conditional on Con­
tributing. The dashed line linking the two nodes of H  indicates that the two nodes form 
a single information set; that is, H  does not know which node in the information set has 
been reached, since the SIGs move simultaneously.
In Stage 3, each SIG decides whether to locate in Home or in Foreign. Fh  denotes 
the decision of all capital in Foreign to move to Home, while Fp  denotes the decision of 
the capital in Foreign to stay in Foreign. Once again the dashed lines linking the nodes 
of Home indicate that both SIGs move simultaneously.
The payoffs are written first for the Home SIG, then for the Foreign SIG, and 
represent the impact on the per unit return on capital. Take for example the case when 
both SIGs contribute, and both locate in Home (the lower left branch of the game tree).
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Figure 4.2: Game tree, extensive form. 
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Recall that each SIG contributes to the government in its initial location, but pays the tax 
in its final location. Then the payoff to Home’s SIG is ( - ^ 7  -  , while the payoff
to Foreign’s SIG is ( - ^ 7  — 7^ 7 -  7f )  > where T c  is the total tax revenue from capital 
when the capital SIG offers contributions to the government; recall from the previous 
subsection that, conditional on the government being lobbied, the total tax revenue from 
capital is independent of the amount of capital in the economy, and only depends on 
the parameters o f the model (which we assume to be identical in the two countries). 
K w  =  K h  + K p  is the total endowment of capital in the world. Therefore, if this is the 
outcome of the game, then since Home has contributed and all the capital in the world is 
in Home, the tax rate on capital is while the cost of contribution per unit of capital 
is For Foreign, it gets the same tax rate as Home since it has moved to Home, it 
has paid the cost of contributing to its own government, and it has incurred the cost of 
moving, 7F .
4.2.4 Equilibrium with capital mobility
The Nash equilibria for each Stage 3 subgame can be seen most clearly if there are no 
capital mobility costs (7 =  0). Then, in the subgame where both SIGs have contributed, 
if Home chooses to stay in Home, then Foreign’s best response is to move to Home since 
the tax on capital is spread over a larger number of units of capital ( —^ 7  > ~ k ^)> 
while if Foreign decides to move to Home, then Home’s best response is to stay at Home 
for the same reason ( —^ 7  >  Therefore, for this subgame, the outcome that
both SIGs locate in Home (Fjj, H h ) is a Nash equilibrium41. But there is another Nash 
equilibrium, since if Home decides to move to Foreign, then Foreign is better off stay­
ing in Foreign ( —^ 7  >  while if Foreign stays in Foreign, then Home’s best
response is to move to Foreign ( - ^ 7  > ~ K ^ j -  Hence for this subgame, both SIGs 
locating in Foreign (F>, Hp)  is another Nash equilibrium.
Performing the same exercise for all the remaining Stage 3 subgames yields the 
following Nash equilibria listed in Table 4.1. Note that these equilibria also hold for 
positive but small mobility costs. Each of the Nash equilibria has both SIGs locating in
41 In this case, since all the capital in Foreign has located in Home, to satisfy the government budget 
constraint in Foreign, the entire tax burden must fall to labour, so that the tax rate on labour is tLF =
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1 Foreign SIG contributes to the Foreign government, Home SIG contributes to the Home 
government, Foreign capital moves to Home, and Home capital remains at Home
(Fc , H c , F h , H h )
2 Foreign SIG contributes to the Foreign government, Home SIG contributes to the 
Home government, Foreign capital remains in Foreign, Home capital moves to Foreign
(F c , H c , F f , H f )
3 Foreign SIG contributes to the Foreign government, Home SIG does not contribute, Foreign 
capital remains in Foreign, Home capital moves to Foreign (F c ,  H n c ,  F f , H f )
4 Foreign SIG contributes to the Foreign government, Home SIG does not contribute, Foreign 
capital moves to Home, Home capital remains in Home (F c ,  H n c ,  F h , H h )
5 Foreign SIG does not contribute, Home SIG contributes to the Home government, Foreign 
capital moves to Home, Home capital remains at Home ( F n c ,  H e ,  F h ,  H h )
6 Foreign SIG does not contribute, Home SIG contributes to the Home government, Foreign 
capital remains in Foreign, Home capital moves to Foreign ( F n c ,  H e ,  F p , H p )
7 Foreign SIG does not contribute, Home SIG does not contribute, Foreign capital remains 
in Foreign, Home capital moves to Foreign ( F n c ,  H n c , F f ,  H p )
8 Foreign SIG does not contribute, Home SIG does not contribute, Foreign capital moves to 
Home, Home capital remains in Home ( F n c ,  H n c ,  F h ,  H h )
Table 4.1: Nash equilibria in the game tree in Figure 4.2
the same location, because it is assumed that the relocation costs of capital are sufficiently 
low relative to the benefit from lower tax rates that they would get if they locate together.
Next, we show which of the above Nash equilibria are subgame perfect. Now it 
is useful to re-introduce the cost of capital mobility. Note first that, if the movement 
cost of capital is sufficiently low, that is if , the Nash equilibrium 4:
( F c , H n c , F h , H h )  is dominated by 3: (Fc, H n c , Ff , H F), in the sense that both 
Home and Foreign SIGs would prefer the latter outcome to the former. Similarly, if 
y F < , then the Nash equilibrium 6: ( F n c , H e ,  F f , H f ) is dominated by 5:
( F n c , H e ,  F h , H h )- In the rubric of game theory, the latter Nash equilibrium in each 
case is the only admissible equilibrium. We assume this to be the case in what follows; 
this reduces the number of admissible Nash equilibria from 8 to 6.
If Foreign contributes, then Home’s best response would be to not contribute, 
since this response leads to the outcome (Fc, H n c , F f , H f ),  which yields the payoff to 
Home of - 7H j^, which is greater than the possible payoffs if Home contributes,
~  f e )  for outcome ( F c , H c , F h , H h ) or -  7# )  for outcome
(Fc,  He ,  F f , Hf ), as long as j H < Therefore, provided this condition holds, 
one subgame perfect equilibrium is (F c , H n c , F f , H f ); that is, the Foreign SIG con­
tributes while the Home SIG does not, and the Home SIG moves to Foreign. Intuitively,
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by not contributing and moving to Foreign, the Home SIG gets the benefit of the Foreign 
SIG’s lobbying for lower taxes on capital, and avoids paying contributions to the Home 
government.
Doing the same on the other side of the game tree, we find that, provided j F < 
the other subgame perfect outcome is ( F n c , H e ,  F h , H h )', that is, the Foreign SIG 
does not contribute but instead moves to Home, while the Home SIG stays at home and 
lobbies the Home government for pro-capital policies. If the two locations are identical 
in every way, there is nothing to distinguish between the two subgame-perfect outcomes; 
they are symmetric. In fact, as long as the two conditions 7F < ^  and ^  hold, 
each SIG will prefer a different subgame perfect outcome, so that it is not possible to 
choose between the two outcomes.
This multiple equilibria outcome of the game appears at first sight to hamper our 
attempt to draw a prediction from initial endowments of capital to final endowments. 
However, we can eliminate one of the two equilibria if initial capital stocks are suffi­
ciently different between locations. What we want to do is to derive a set of conditions 
for which the only subgame perfect outcome of the game is that the location with ini­
tially larger capital stock is the one that lobbies its government, and that the SIG from 
the other location will decide to relocate to the first location. This is equivalent to the 
set of conditions that will eliminate the second subgame perfect outcome as a possible 
outcome of the game.
The first step in doing this is to notice that the derivation of the two subgame 
perfect outcomes depends on the two conditions 1h  < ^  and 7 f  < - Since the two
locations are assumed to be identical apart from their factor endowments, total lobbying 
costs and per unit movement costs are identical across locations: Ch  = Cf  and j H = 
j F . Therefore, if K h  > K F, then for some values of K h  and K F, the condition 
7#  < is violated, while the other condition l F < remains valid.
Because the per unit cost of moving is a constant, while the per unit lobbying cost 
decreases the more capital there is (recall that total lobbying cost is a constant from the 
above subsection), the location with more capital will have an absolute and comparative 
advantage in lobbying. This means that when 7h  > and j F <  7^ ;, the cost of the 
Home SIG moving is greater than its cost of lobbying, while the opposite is true for the
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Foreign SIG. It follows that, rather than lobbying its own government, the Foreign SIG 
would prefer to move to Home, while the Home SIG would prefer to stay at Home and 
lobby the Home government. The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is therefore 
( F n c , H e ,  F h , H h ) ' ,that is, the Home SIG, which has initially more capital, will remain 
at Home and lobby its government, while the Foreign SIG will not lobby its government 
but instead will relocate to Home. We now demonstrate more formally that this is indeed 
the case.
Violation of the condition that 7 h  <  implies that the two outcomes ( F c ,  H n c , F f , H p )
and ( F n c , He ,  F h , H h ) are no longer both subgame perfect outcomes. Now, both SIGs 
will prefer the outcome ( F n c , H e ,  F h , H h ),  since for both SIGs, the payoff from this 
outcome is superior to that of the other outcome: >  ( —^ 7  -  1 h )  f°r
the Home SIG since 7#  > ^J-, and j f e  -  7^  > ( —^ 7  — § 7)  for the Foreign 
SIG since 7F < Therefore, the outcome ( F n c , H c , F h , H h ) is now the only 
admissible subgame perfect outcome of the game as it dominates the other candidate 
outcome.
That the cost of capital movement is neither too small nor too large is crucial for 
this result. If it is too expensive for capital to move between locations, it will never be 
optimal for capital to move. On the other hand, if capital mobility is costless, then both 
SIGs would be indifferent between the two subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
Intuitively, it is simple to see why we get this outcome. The SIGs face a choice of 
paying the contribution and getting lower tax rates, or incurring a mobility cost to move 
to the other location to free ride on the other SIG’s contribution (provided of course that 
the other SIG does in fact contribute). But since the previous subsection has shown that 
the total cost of contributing is independent of the capital stock, the cost of contribution 
per unit of capital decreases the more capital there is in the economy, while the per unit 
mobility cost is constant. Therefore, the larger is the capital stock in a location relative 
to the other location, the less willing is the SIG in the first location to move. Given this 
unwillingness to move, the SIG in the other location would then find it always beneficial 
to move.
To see how this mechanism can lead to a reversal of initial comparative advantage, 
suppose that initially Home has absolutely more capital than Foreign, K h  > Kp,  but that
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Home is relatively capital-scarce compared to Foreign, ( j ; ) H < ( t ) f ' Then, initially, 
Home would have had a comparative advantage in the labour-intensive good. But since 
capital moves from Foreign to Home, Home will become capital-abundant relative to 
Foreign, and so will have a comparative advantage in the capital-intensive good.
As noted in the introduction, in this model, absolute factor endowments influence 
comparative advantage indirectly. Absolute factor endowments influence tax rates on 
capital, which provides capital with an incentive to relocate to the location which gives 
the higher (post-policy) rate of return. This changes the locations’ relative factor endow­
ments, causing a change in its comparative advantage. What the model does not consider 
is that it is possible for policies to influence locations’ comparative advantage directly, 
through factor prices. The reason this is the case, is that we focus on the case where factor 
prices are equalised, and that government policy does not affect firms’ profit-maximising 
decisions (see the brief discussion in subsection 4.2.1 above). If we relax these assump­
tions, the model would yield a direct impact on locations’ comparative advantage.
To conclude this section on theory, we briefly summarise the two main theoretical 
predictions. The first main theoretical prediction, from Proposition 4.1, is that larger 
absolute capital stock is related to more favourable policy towards capital. This is the 
case whether or not we allow for the possibility of capital mobility across locations. The 
second main theoretical prediction, from the extension of the model to allow for capital 
mobility, is that differences in policy stance across locations, by providing capital with 
an incentive to move between locations, will lead to a divergence in both absolute and 
relative factor endowments between the two locations, and hence to different industrial 
structures across locations. We test both these predictions in the next section.
4.3 Empirical evidence
In this section, we consider evidence from a state-time panel dataset from India on the 
two predictions of our theoretical model: the relationship between factor endowments 
and policies, and the impact of policy on industrial structure. The advantages of us­
ing within-country data are: first, that other sources of cross-location heterogeneity in 
government policies would be smaller within a country than across countries, and sec­
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ond, that capital mobility, crucial for the second theoretical prediction, is higher within 
than across countries. However, the model could in principle also be tested using cross­
country data.
4.3.1 Campaign contributions in India
Our theoretical model is based on the role of campaign contributions in influencing the 
policy stance of governments. One of our tasks must therefore be to show that campaign 
contributions do in fact play a significant role in elections in India. Here, we present 
a brief history of the laws and reality of campaign contributions in India in the last 50 
years42.
Political parties in India do not receive direct state subsidies. They do receive 
some subsidised television time and other indirect benefits, such as office space in the 
capital, but Indian parties raise most of their funds from corporate contributions. There 
is also evidence that corruption is high (see e.g. Das (2002); in 2002 Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked India joint 71st out of 102 countries 
in terms of the level of corruption, where a rank of 1 is the lowest level of corruption and 
102 the highest level of corruption).
From 1951 to 1969, most private donations to political parties were legal, but 
public-sector firms were not allowed to make political contributions. Contributions were 
not subject to limits, but campaign spending itself was limited. In 1969, corporate con­
tributions were banned. Then, in 1975, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that political ex­
penditures not authorised by a candidate do not count towards that candidate’s spending 
limits. As a result of these events, political finance moved underground. When corporate 
contributions became legal again in 1985, most parties and their corporate benefactors 
had become used to the underground system of unreported cash or in-kind contributions.
Since 1990, campaign contributions have continued to increase, while expenditure 
limits remain unrealistically low. But since unauthorised expenditures do not count to­
42 The following exposition is based on the report on The Democracy Forum for East Asia’s working 
conference "Political Finance and Democracy in East Asia: The Use and Abuse o f Money in Campaigns and 
Elections", 28-30 June 2001. The report is available online at 
http://www.ned.org/asia/june01/introduction.html.
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Figure 4.3: Log of real fixed capital
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ward candidate limits, such expenditures technically do not violate the law. In effect, 
there are no limits either on contributions or expenditures. Not only do researchers not 
have reliable data on campaign expenditures; the parties themselves may not fully know 
what was expended in the campaigns. Consistent with the model, campaign contribu­
tions play an important role in Indian politics. Although we cannot observe campaign 
contributions, we examine the model’s prediction of a direct link between capital stocks 
and policies.
4.3 .2  D a ta  a n d  m eth o d s
The test o f our first theoretical prediction on the determinants o f government policy is 
performed for the period 1959-1997, using data on the 16 largest states in India, which 
account for about 97% of the total population, while the test o f our second theoretical 
prediction on industrial structure is based on a subset o f this period, from 1980 to 1997, 
as this second test exploits information on patterns o f specialisation across more than 100
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individual manufacturing industries. The data appendix lists the data sources. Real fixed 
capital stocks across Indian states are shown in Figure 4.3, which shows the disparity in 
capital accumulation, with no indication that states with initially less capital are catching 
up with those that have more capital. We use three alternative estimation methods. First, 
using OLS, we estimate regressions of the form:
L R st = ois 4 -  In (K at ) +  <j>2 {Lst) +  Sxst +  £st (4*23)
where L R st is the measure of labour regulation in state s in year t, as discussed above in 
section 4.2.1. As discussed there, pro-worker amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act 
are coded as +1, while pro-capital amendments are coded as -1. This fits in nicely with 
the theoretical model, as a lower tax rate on capital is a pro-capital policy.43 ln(ATat) and 
In (L at ) are the log of capital stock and population in state s in year t.
a 3 are the state dummies, which pick up all inter-state differences which are con­
stant over time, and /3t are year dummies, which control for common shocks. The in­
clusion of state and year dummies in all our regressions means that identification of the 
coefficients comes from the within-state relationship between changes in absolute capital 
endowments and changes in labour regulation.
The x st are other exogenous variables. One problem which we face in adding ad­
ditional controls on the RHS of the equation is that most potential controls are themselves 
endogenous. Therefore we constrain ourselves to two control variables: the political his­
tory of states and the per capita state domestic product. Political histories capture the 
idea that different political parties may have different preferences toward labour and cap­
ital. These histories are driven by many factors, including ideology, religion and ethnic 
mix. The use of state domestic product as a control variable captures the idea that if voter 
preferences change with income levels, then policymakers may change their policies in 
response. Besley and Burgess (2004) show that labour regulation has only weak effects 
on aggregate GDP, although it has large effects on registered manufacturing. Equation
(4.23) seeks to uncover the impact of capital endowments on the policy stance of the state 
government.
43 The use of labour regulation as the dependent variable in the regression means that we assume that there 
are no reinforcing or offsetting contemporaneous changes in states’ capital legislation.
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According to our model, the capital stock may be an endogenous variable. There 
are two possible effects of labour regulation on capital stock. First, if a state enacts more 
pro-worker legislation, capital could leave the state, thus inducing a positive correlation 
between capital stock and pro-employer regulation. On the other hand, it may also be the 
case that, faced with more pro-worker legislation, firms decide to switch to more capital- 
intensive techniques of production, in which case there would be a negative correlation 
between capital stock and pro-employer regulation. Therefore, we follow up the OLS 
regression with an instrumental-variables regression. The direction of any difference 
between the OLS and IV estimates of the impact of capital stock on labour regulation 
can indicate which of these two possible effects dominates.
We use two instruments: the log of total bank credit and the log of installed elec­
tricity generating capacity. These variables capture the impact of financial services and 
electrical power on the location of capital. Bank credit and electricity generating capacity 
were effectively determined by the central government, through the Banking Regulation 
Act of 1949, the Banking Companies (Acquisitions and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 
of 1969, and the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, while labour regulation was deter­
mined by state governments. In the Banking Regulation Act of 1949, new bank branches 
require licenses from the central bank of India. This gave the central bank control over 
the location of bank branches. The Banking Companies Act of 1969 nationalised the 14 
largest commercial banks in India, under the direct control of the Indian central bank. 
The objective of nationalisation was to formally involve the banks in improving finan­
cial provision in financially backward regions, by setting up new branches in unbanked 
locations (areas that did not have any commercial bank branches). The objective of re­
ducing regional disparities was also an important part of the Industrial Policy Resolution 
of 1956. In this resolution, electricity generation was placed under the exclusive respon­
sibility of the state, and there was an objective to improve provision of electrical power, 
water supply and transport facilities in areas that were lagging behind industrially, to 
encourage industrial development in these areas.
For a set of instruments to be valid, the instruments must be both highly corre­
lated with the instrumented variable(s), but uncorrelated with the errors. The availability 
of bank credit in a state makes it easier for firms to exploit profitable opportunities by 
lowering the cost of installing new capital, while electrical power is essential for the
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productive use of modem industrial machinery, but is difficult and expensive to transmit 
across long distances. Both instruments should therefore be highly correlated with the in­
strumented variable; we document that this is indeed the case in subsection 4.3.4 below. 
At the same time, bank credit or electrical generating capacity should be uncorrelated 
with the error term, since as noted above, these instruments are determined by central 
government policy, while labour regulation is determined by state governments.44
We can also perform some tests for instrument validity. Because we have more in­
struments than instrumented variables, the model is overidentified. The overidentifying 
restrictions require that the extra instruments should also be uncorrelated with the errors. 
We can use a Sargan (1958) or Hansen (1982) test to test for the validity of these restric­
tions. The test statistic is the criterion function of the IV model45, divided by the estimate 
of the error variance of the model, which, under the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the errors, is distributed as a x 2 with  ^ — & degrees of freedom 
(where I is the number of instruments, k  is the number of regressors). The test assumes 
that at least one instrument is valid (i.e. orthogonal to the error term), and tests whether 
the additional instruments satisfy the same assumption of orthogonality with respect to 
the error term. This however limits the effectiveness of the test, as our two instruments 
are highly correlated with one another, implying that the test’s approach of assuming the 
orthogonality of one instrument, and testing for the orthogonality of the other instrument, 
is difficult to justify.
Because the LHS variable in our regression, labour regulation, has characteristics 
of a discrete dependent variable, running regression (4.23) using OLS implies running 
a linear probability model. As Maddala (1983) for example points out, the linear prob­
ability model is heteroskedastic, and may give unreasonable estimated probabilities of 
observing certain outcomes (for example, negative probabilities, or probabilities exceed­
ing 1), since OLS does not constrain the predicted value.
44 However, there remains the possibility that state governments that are more sympathetic to capital may 
lobby the central government for a more favourable allocation of electricity generating capacity and banking 
services. If this is the case, the exclusion restrictions on the instruments would not be satisfied, as electicity 
generating capacity and bank credit will be influenced by state governments. This possibility should be kept 
in mind when reviewing the following results.
45 The criterion function is defined as Q (0, y) =  (y — Xf3)r  Pw {y — Xf$) where Pw  is the orthogonal 
projection matrix of the instruments W: Pw =  W (WTW ) -1 W T. See Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) 
p. 321.
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Therefore, as a separate robustness check, we also perform the regression using 
ordered logit. This directly addresses the issue of constraining the predicted value, and, 
with the use of heteroskedastic-robust standard errors, also deals with the issue of het- 
eroskedasticity. The estimation method is maximum likelihood, which raises the issue 
of the appropriate functional form for the probability function of the discrete dependent 
variable, as the desirable properties of maximum likelihood are dependent on the dis­
tributional assumptions of the likelihood function. The two main alternative functional 
forms are the standard normal (in which case we get a probit model), and a logistic distri­
bution (from which we get a logit model). If the true model is a probit and we maximise 
the likelihood function associated with a logit, the estimates will be inconsistent. How­
ever, we do not have any priors about the preferred functional form of the probability 
function, and using either ordered logit or ordered probit gives qualitatively similar re­
sults.46 47
4.3.3 The impact of factor endowments on policy in India
Table 4.2 presents the results of our regressions. For each specification we report IV 
results next to the OLS results, all with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors.
Columns (1) and (2) are the baseline specifications, simply regressing labour reg­
ulation on capital endowment, population, and state and year dummies. We find that, 
using either estimation method, controlling for population, larger capital stocks are asso­
ciated with lower values of the policy variable; that is, larger capital stocks imply more 
pro-capital policies. Greater population is associated with less pro-capital policy. Taken 
together, these results support the prediction of our theoretical model, which is that larger 
absolute capital stocks are associated with more favourable policies toward capital, while 
a larger population implies more favourable policies toward labour.
Comparing the results in columns (1) and (2), we find that the coefficient on capital 
stock is more negative using IV than OLS; this is also the case in the other specifications
46 The results are so similar between the ordered logit and ordered probit models that we are unable to 
discriminate between the two models using the test that twice the difference between the two log-likelihood 
functions is distributed x 2 (1) (see Johnston and DiNardo (1997) p. 430).
47 The results are also robust to the number of categories used; in Table 4.4 below, we use each discrete 
value as one category. Dividing the dependent variable into three categories, for negative, zero and positive 
values, gives the same qualitative results.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Labour regulation
IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS
Log o f real fixed capital -1.891 -0.391 -2.002 -0.358 -1.478 -0.192 -1.509 -0.172
(5.92)** (5.21)** (5.48)** (4.73)** (6.11)** (3.15)** (5.77)** (2.70)**
[-2.299] [-0.475] [-2.376] [-0.425] [-1.797] [-0.233] [-1.791] [-0.204]
Log o f population 6.360 4.692 7.313 4.775 9.737 9.413 10.551 9.863
(6.75)** (7.62)** (7.24)** (7.90)** (6.31)** (9.14)** (6.82)** (9.60)**
[4.420] [3.260] [5.051] [3.298] [6.767] [6.541] [7.287] [6.812]
Janata majority -0.167 -0.377 -0.158 -0.388
(1.99)* (8.91)** (1.85)+ (8.62)**
[-0.409] [-0.925] [-0.388] [-0.951]
Hindu majority -0.233 -0.485 -0.232 -0.498
(2.25)* (8.36)** (2.20)* (8.28)**
[-0.156] [-0.324] [-0.155] [-0.333]
Hard left majority -0.012 -0.193 0.003 -0.200
(0.15) (4.74)** (0.04) (4.60)**
[-0.040] [-0.661] [0.012] [-0.686]
Regional majority -0.076 -0.288 -0.071 -0.298
(1.00) (7.55)** (0.91) (7.26)**
[-0.385] [-1.450] [-0.355] [-1.501]
Congress majority -0.076 -0.280 -0.065 -0.290
(0.95) (6.93)** (0.80) (6.72)**
[-0.631] [-2.335] [-0.529] [-2.353]
Log o f real net state 0.978 -0.300 0.679 -0.052
domestic product p/c (1.96)+ (1.06) (1.62) (0.21)
[0.3381 r-0.1031 [0.234] r-0.0181
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 605 605 592 592 605 605 592 592
Hansen test 1.39 1.18 0.48 0.27
Prob (Hansen)>chi2 0.24 0.28 0.49 0.6
Test 21.04 51.82 28.91 57.31 25.75 82.45 31.04 91.92
capital+popul ation=0
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.72 0.73 0.8 0.81
C test 41.48 41.8 86.11 82.1
Prob (C)>chi2 0 0 0 0
Notes: Heteroskedastic-robust t statistics in parentheses, and standardised beta coefficients in square brackets. The 
dependent variable is a cumulative measure o f amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act, coded as -1 if  it is 
pro-capital, 0 if  it is neutral, and +1 if  it is pro-labour. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
In the IV regression, fixed capital is assumed to be endogenous, and is instrumented using total bank credit and 
installed electricity generating capacity. The number o f  observations varies across specifications because not all 
variables are available for all observations. Using the same number o f observations for all specifications does not 
change the results. Congress, hard left, Janata, Hindu and regional majority are counts o f the number o f years for which 
these political groupings held a majority o f the seats in the state legislatures. The Hansen test is the test for 
overidentification. The C test is the test for whether the capital stock variable is orthogonal to the error term, thus 
providing a test for the endogeneity o f capital stock.
The test that capital+population=0 is the test that the coefficients on capital and labour are the same, i.e. only the 
capital-labour ratio matters. A rejection o f the null hypothesis implies that absolute capital and labour stocks play a  
role beyond the capital-labour ratio. See the Data Appendix for details on the sources and construction o f the variables.
Table 4.2: IV and OLS results for the measure of labour regulation.
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in Table 4.2. This may be interpreted as a positive impact of the measure of labour regu­
lation on capital stock. From the discussion in subsection 4.3.2, this finding is consistent 
with the argument that more pro-labour policy encourages firms to switch towards more 
capital-intensive techniques. The remaining columns in Table 4.2 control for other pos­
sible factors that might influence policy. However, the results on capital and population 
are robust to our alternative specifications.
Columns (3) and (4) control for state domestic product (SGDP) per capita. This 
has no significant impact under OLS, but is significant at the 10 percent level under IV. 
The sign of the coefficient indicates that the greater the state domestic product per capita, 
the less pro-capital is policy. The coefficients on capital and population are only mar­
ginally affected and remain highly significant. While SGDP may be endogenously deter­
mined by labour regulation, evidence from Besley and Burgess (2004) suggest that labour 
regulation has no significant impact on SGDP. However, SGDP is highly correlated with 
capital stock (correlation in excess of 0.83), which may account for the non-significance 
of SGDP under OLS, due to multicollinearity.
Columns (5) and (6) control for the political history of the states. The identity of 
the ruling party in a state clearly has great influence on the policy stance. Using IV, states 
with more years under a Janata party or a Hindu party, have significantly more pro-capital 
policies than states under the rule of other parties. Using OLS, more years spent under 
the rule of any party leads to more pro-capital policies, even though we have controlled 
for year fixed effects. This large difference between the IV and OLS results suggest 
that the endogeneity bias that affects all parameter estimates is very strong, leading us to 
prefer the IV to the OLS estimates. Finally, columns (7) and (8) include all the controls, 
which does not change any of the previous results.
4.3.4 Effectiveness of using Instrumental Variables
In this subsection we report additional results which lend support to our argument that 
our instrumental variables are appropriate. Table 4.3 presents the first stage results for 
the IV estimation, and the reduced form for the main specification (4.23), both with 
heterokedastic-robust standard errors. These are OLS regressions of the log of fixed 
capital and labour regulation, on the full set of exogenous variables.
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First, consider column (1), the first stage regression for fixed capital. Controlling 
for all other exogenous variables in the main regression, total bank credit and installed 
electricity generating capacity have highly significant effects. The more bank credit or 
electricity generating capacity there is in a state, the greater the amount of fixed capital, 
which agrees with our intuition. As noted above, increased provision of bank credit or 
electricity generating capacity makes it more attractive to invest in capital equipment.
Column (1) of Table 4.3 also reports the F-test of the joint significance of the 
excluded exogenous variables in the first-stage regression. We find that the instruments 
are highly jointly significant, and therefore play an important role in determining the 
stock of fixed capital. This provides evidence of the power of the instruments in the 
first-stage regression, and shows that the instruments we have chosen do in fact have 
important influences on the instrumented variable.
In polumn (2), in the reduced form regression, both the instruments have strong 
direct impacts on labour regulation. Greater bank credit and installed electricity gener­
ating capacity are associated with more pro-capital policy. Also, as in Table 4.2, longer 
political histories tend to be associated with more pro-capital policy.
Since we have more instruments than instrumented variables, we can perform a 
Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions. The results are in Table 4.2. We find 
that the Hansen test passes comfortably in all specifications.
To test for whether capital stock is orthogonal to the error term, and hence whether 
IV is required, we perform a C test of orthogonality (see Hayashi (2000) pp. 218-221 
and 232-234, or Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003)). The C statistic is calculated as 
the difference between the Hansen statistics of the efficient regression (OLS) and the 
inefficient but consistent regression (IV), where the estimate of the error variance from 
the OLS regression is used to calculate the Hansen statistic for the IV regression as well. 
This ensures that the C statistic is always positive. The C statistic is distributed as x 2 
with 1 degree of freedom (equal to the number of potential endogenous variables being 
tested), and the null hypothesis is that the variable to be tested is orthogonal to the error 
term.
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(1) (2)
Dependent variable Log of fixed capita] Labour regulation
Log of bank credit 0.406 -0.644
(5.97)** (8.03)**
Log of installed electricity generating capacity 0.202 -0.258
(3.39)** (3.38)**
Log of population -0.55 11.295
(0.76) (12.58)**
Log of net state domestic product p/c 0.321 0.187
(1.68) (0.82)
Janata majority 0.207 -0.476
(6.59)** (9.47)**
Hindu majority 0.236 -0.591
(6.63)** (9.55)**
Hard left majority 0.213 -0.324
(6.88)** (6.77)**
Regional majority 0.213 -0.396
(7.04)** (8.78)**
Congress majority 0.212 -0.39
(6.88)** (8.13)**
State dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 592 592
R-squared 0.98 0.84
F-test of excluded variables 29.63 59.2
Prob>F 0 0
Notes: Heteroskedastic-robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Column (1) is the first stage regression of the IV regression in table 4.1. Column (2) is the reduced
form regression. The F-test of excluded variables is a test of the joint significance of the instruments 
included in the first stage regression but excluded in the second stage regression (log of installed 
electricity generating capacity, and log of bank credit). See the Data Appendix for details on the 
sources and construction of the variables.
Table 4.3: First stage and reduced-form regressions.
The results are in Table 4.2. The null hypothesis that capital stock is orthogonal 
to the error term under an OLS regression, is rejected in all specifications. This is not 
surprising, as we see large differences in the coefficient estimates between OLS and IV, 
which strongly suggests a correlation between one or more explanatory variables with 
the error term leading to a bias in all the OLS estimates.
4.3.5 Robustness
One possible concern of our results is that the capital stock variable in Table 4.2 may be 
capturing the impact of capital-labour ratio rather than absolute capital stock. If  instead 
of running equation (4.23), we replace capital stock and population by the capital-labour 
ratio, this is equivalent to running equation (4.23) with the constraint that the coefficients
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on capital and labour sum to zero:
L R st = ots +  Pt +  03 In ^ +  Sxst +  eat (4.24)
=  a s +/3t + <p3 In (Kgt) -  <j)3 In (Lst) +  +  est
Therefore, testing if the coefficients on capital and labour in equation (4.23) sum to zero 
is a test of this constraint. A significant test statistic would indicate that the coefficients 
do not sum to zero, and therefore that there is additional information from separating the 
effects of capital and labour. Table 4.2 reports the test statistic, which is always highly 
significant in every specification, thus supporting our claim that the impact of capital 
stock on policy is at least partly due to absolute capital rather than relative capital-labour 
ratios.
While the coefficients of interest are statistically significant, there is the question 
of how important they are. To explore this, we report standardised or beta coefficients in 
square brackets in Table 4.2. These are the coefficients that would have been obtained if 
all the variables were standardised to have mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Under 
the consistent IV regressions, the variables that have the largest beta coefficients are fixed 
capital and population. The beta coefficient for fixed capital takes values from 1.7 to 2.4; 
that is, a 1 standard deviation increase in capital stock reduces the measure of labour 
regulation by 1.7 to 2.4 standard deviations. Population has even larger beta coefficients, 
ranging from 4.4 to 7.3 under IV. We can therefore conclude that both capital stock and 
population have significant and large effects on labour regulation.
Table 4.4 presents the results of the ordered logit regressions. Column (1) is the 
baseline regression, with fixed capital and population on the RHS, heteroskedastic-robust 
standard errors, and state and time dummies. Both capital and population are significant 
at the 1 percent level, and are signed as in the OLS regression: more fixed capital is 
associated with pro-capital policies, while more population is associated with pro-labour 
policies.
Column (2) adds state domestic product per capita, which has no significant impact 
on policy. Political histories (column (3)) have the same impact as they do under OLS: 
longer political histories are associated with more pro-capital policy. The coefficients on 
absolute capital stock and population remain significant at the 5 percent level.
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Estimation method 
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) 
Ordered logit 
Labour regulation
(4)
Log of fixed capital -3.384 -3.384 -1.442 -1.442
(6.34)** (6.17)** (2.18)* (2.17)*
Log of population 37.224 37.221 63.776 64.888
(6.83)** (6.71)** (6.89)** (6.83)**
Log of net state domestic product -0.007 1.788
p/c (0.00) (0.75)
Janata majority -14.893 -12.908
(16.62)** (13.93)**
Hindu majority -15.707 -13.732
(17.37)** (14.67)**
Hard left majority -14.054 -12.076
(16.21)** (13.43)**
Regional majority -14.415 -12.455
(16.30)** (13.54)**
Congress majority -14.273 -12.301
(16.55)** (13.75)**
State dummies 
Year dummies 
Observations
Yes
Yes
600
Yes
Yes
600
Yes
Yes
600
Yes
Yes
600
Notes: Heteroskedastic-robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The 
estimation method is ordered logit. The dependent variable is a cumulative measure of amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act, coded as -1 if it is pro-capital, 0 if it is neutral, and +1 if it is pro-labour. Congress, 
hard left, Janata, Hindu and regional majority are counts of the number of years for which these political 
groupings held a majority of the seats in the state legislatures. See the Data Appendix for details on the 
sources and construction of the variables.
Table 4.4: Ordered logit results for labour regulation.
Finally, column (4) includes all the controls, which does not change the results 
from column (3). Overall, the results of the ordered logit regression serve to confirm the 
results of OLS and IV, which is that absolute stocks of fixed capital are related to more 
favourable policies toward capital.
4.3.6 Industrial specialisation in India, 1980-1997
To test the second main prediction of the model, we make use of more detailed data at 
the 3-digit-industry-state level, for which data is available for over 100 3-digit industries 
between 1980 and 1997. The prediction of the model which we want to test is the follow­
ing: the greater is the difference in policies across states, the greater will be the differ­
ence in their industrial structure. We can test this proposition using a simple formulation 
adapted from Bernard and Schott (2002) (see also Bernard, Redding, Schott and Simpson 
(2003)). In these papers, the following regression equation is used, in a different context, 
to test for the presence of multiple cones of specialisation in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
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We run the following regression:
Ira =  Ao +  Ai \T]ra \ +  A2 I r  +  A3 I s +  A4  | x r s | +  v rs (4.25)
The dependent variable Irs is the number of industries common to both states r  and s, 
and \rfra\ are the absolute differences in the measure of labour regulation between states 
r  and s. Ir and I s are the number of industries in states r and s; states with more 
industries are, other things equal, likely to have more industries in common. Therefore, 
while industrial structure is measured using industry-state-time data, the regression is run 
using state-time data.
There is, as in the case of our first estimated equation (4.23), a potential concern 
about reverse causality in equation (4.25). It may be the case that different industrial 
structures across states drives state governments to have different policy stances towards 
labour and capital. As a robustness check, we also run the regression with a 1-period- 
lagged labour regulation instead of current labour regulation. Because we include state 
and time fixed effects, identification of the parameters comes from the relationship be­
tween changes in labour regulation and changes in industrial structure within states. The 
state fixed effects control for time invariant considerations that affect both labour regula­
tion and industrial structure, while the time fixed effects control for common shocks over 
time.
|xrs | represents other variables which take the form of absolute differences across 
states. The controls we include are absolute differences in the land-labour ratio (which 
controls for exogenous, geographically immobile factor endowments which may have an 
impact on industrial structure), and per capita state domestic product (SGDP). Per capita 
SGDP captures possible differences in demand across states based on income levels; if 
preferences are non-homothetic, states with higher per capita SGDP may demand differ­
ent goods than states with lower per capita SGDP. If it is costly to ship goods between 
states, then we may expect states to specialise in industries with greater local demand.
The basic idea in equation (4.25) is that the larger is the value of |r/r5|, the more 
different are policies and hence factor endowments across states, and therefore the fewer 
industries the two states should have in common. Therefore we expect Ai to be negative. 
We include state and year dummies in each regression.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Number of industries common to states r and s
Absolute difference in current labour regulation -0.501
(3.08)**
-0.452
(2.84)**
Absolute difference in lagged labour regulation -0.475
(2.89)**
-0.424
(2.64)**
Total number of industries, reporting state 0.512 0.514 0.526 0.526
(10.66)** (10.73)** (10.04)** (10.08)**
Total number of industries, partner state 0.661 0.661 0.674 0.673
(19.93)** (19.73)** (19.22)** 00 VO * *
Absolute difference in land labour ratio 0.37
(0.25)
0.442
(0.29)
Absolute difference in real per capita net state -0.217 -0.227
domestic product (5.42)** (5.72)**
Constant -39.991 -63.227 -43.676 -46.72
(5.24)** (32.65)** (5.30)** (9.47)**
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2160 2145 2040 2025
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Notes: Heteroskedastic-robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
The number of observations is smaller in column (2) as data for state domestic product is missing for 
Jammu and Kashmir in 1997, and smaller still for columns (3) and (4) due to the lagged labour regulation 
used. Using the same number of observations for all specifications does not change the results. The 
dependent variable is the number of 3-digit industries common to any two states r and s. See the Data 
Appendix for details on the sources and construction of the variables.
Table 4.5: Industry overlap and labour regulation.
Table 4.5 which presents the results with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors, 
shows that our expectations are confirmed. Column (1) is the basic specification follow­
ing equation (4.25). All coefficients are highly significant and their signs are consistent 
with our priors. The absolute difference in labour regulation has a strong negative im­
pact on the number of common industries in the two states, while the total number of 
industries in each state have very strong positive effects.
In column (2), we control for the absolute difference in the relatively immobile 
land-labour ratio across states, and the absolute difference in per capita net state domes­
tic product between states. The difference in the land-labour ratio has no significant im­
pact on the number of industries in common, but larger differences in per capita incomes 
are associated with more different industrial structures. The coefficient on our variable 
of interest, differences in labour regulation, remains almost unchanged and highly signif­
icant; the greater the difference in labour regulation across states, the fewer the industries 
they have in common.
Columns (3) and (4) report the results of the regression when we use the lagged 
value of labour regulation instead of present labour regulation, to overcome simultaneity
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issues. The results are almost identical to those in columns (1) and (2); differences in 
labour regulation are still negatively and significantly related to similarity in industrial 
structure. This lends support to our claim that differences in labour regulation lead to 
differences in industrial structure.
4.4 Conclusions
The main contribution of this chapter is to develop and test empirically a model of elec­
toral competition and campaign contributions that has implications for the structure of 
economic activity. The model makes two main theoretical predictions. First, locations 
that have large absolute levels of capital stock tend to implement policies which are more 
favourable to capital. This prediction is found to hold true across states in India in the 
period 1959-1997, even after controlling for various other factors that could influence 
the policy stance. To overcome possible endogeneity issues, in addition to OLS, we use 
two-stage-least-squares as an alternative method of estimation. A second prediction of 
the model is that capital tends to flow into locations that already have more absolute lev­
els of capital than their trading partners, and so locations with less similar policies toward 
capital (due to initial differences in absolute capital endowments) tend to have more dif­
ferent relative factor endowments and therefore specialise in different bundles of goods. 
This second prediction is also confirmed in the data.
While the predictions of the theoretical model are in accord with the empirical 
evidence, there are several extensions that can be pursued to enhance our understanding 
of the key issues. One possible starting point would be to take the tax interpretation of the 
model, and consider further the role of informed and uninformed voters, the effectiveness 
of campaign spending and the range of voters’ ideological views (corresponding to the 
parameters 1 — a, a, h and /  in the model). For example, as noted in the introduction, 
evidence across OECD countries has been that capital tax rates have declined over the 
last 30 years, at the same time as capital mobility across countries has increased. To what 
extent this is simply the outcome of tax competition between countries for internationally 
mobile capital, and to what extent it reflects trends in domestic politics, is a topic worth 
pursuing in future research.
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Our results have broader implications for the process of policy formation. Most 
importantly, the financing of election campaigns through contributions from special in­
terest groups means that policymakers are effectively captured by the special interest 
group, and the larger is the interest group, the more favourable will policy be towards 
it. Locations with initially lower capital stock may therefore have difficulties in attract­
ing inward capital flows. However, it is not necessarily the case that small locations are 
worse off in the presence of capital mobility. The welfare implications for the different 
locations depends on the extent of repatriation of income from capital abroad.
4.A Conditions for which lobbying enhances the welfare of 
the SIG
In this appendix, we show the conditions for which the SIG prefers to lobby than not 
lobby.
If the SIG does not give any contribution to either political party, then its welfare 
is obtained by substituting equation the equilibrium policy without lobbying (4.15) into 
the SIG’s objective function (4.14):
lobbies party A) is obtained by substituting equations (4.15), (4.16), (4.21) and (4.6) into 
(4.14):
V l =  (r — tK')  K  — r K  — G
Welfare of the SIG if it lobbies a single party (assume without loss of generality that it
( H  rK - G+12 ^ ( ( T ^ f )
2
r *  —G + ( 1 +6) 1 „ (0)( _ J L _ )
2
Welfare of the SIG if it lobbies both parties is similarly obtained as:
Now, lobbying a single party is preferred to not lobbying at all (VjJ > VjP) if (substituting 
from (4.22)):
150
Similarly, we can show that lobbying both parties is preferred to lobbying a single party 
^  > VI )  if:
h
2 V ( l - a ) /
which simplifies to
- - 6  +  2iV (0)
|  +  b)  | ^ (°) V ( i - « ) /
- i ± Z ^ [ ( t LA L ? + (t LBL ? ] 
2 r(l - ) f Y {tLALy
>
h
b < ^ ( 0)
Finally, we can show that lobbying both parties is always preferred to not lobbying at all 
(VI  > VI)  if:
1 h
- - b  + 2btp(0) > (1 - < * ) f2
—6 +  (1 +  26) (f (0) — [y? (0)]2 >  0
[(tLAL ) 2 +  (tLBL ) 2
What do these expressions imply? Suppose that y? (0) =  that is, the probability of 
each party winning the election is one-half. Then, the above three conditions simplify to:
VI > Vt
v l  > v l
V i  >  V>
if
if
since
6 > - i
I > 0
Therefore in this case, lobbying both parties is always superior to not lobbying at all, and 
is also superior to lobbying only one party if neither party is too popular (6 sufficiently 
small; b e  ( - 3 , 3)).
4.B Capital mobility when the FPE set is not the entire 
Edgeworth Box
In this Appendix, we discuss the implications for capital mobility, of using a more general 
functional form for the production functions of the two industries. Suppose that the 
production functions take the following form:
X i  = x i ( K , L )  X 2 = x 2 ( K , L )
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Figure 4.4: The Edgeworth Box and capital mobility when the FPE set is not the entire 
Edgeworth Box.
K 0 F
L0H
That is, production of each good requires both capital and labour, and good 1 is capital- 
intensive relative to good 2. In this case, the FPE set is a parallelogram which is a subset 
o f the Edgeworth Box (see Helpman and Krugman (1985)). In Figure 4.4, the FPE set is 
the area O h A O f B .
Now, in addition to the decision of whether to move between countries, capital in 
each country also has to decide how much capital will be moved. This poses no additional 
difficulty to the game; we assume that both decisions of whether and how much to move, 
are simultaneously decided in the third stage of the game. In equilibrium, it must be the 
case that, given standard assumptions on the production functions, some capital stock 
will remain in each country.
Suppose that world endowment is given at point C .  Since Home has more capital 
at point C  than does Foreign, Home will implement more pro-capital policies than For­
eign. This will encourage capital to flow from Foreign to Home. Once outside the FPE 
set, however, the relative capital abundance in Home will drive down the rental rate of 
capital in Home, whilst the relative scarcity of capital in Foreign will drive up the rental
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rate of capital in Foreign. This higher rental rate in Foreign acts as a force against fur­
ther flows of capital from Foreign to Home; capital flows will stop once the net return to 
capital is equalised across countries.
4.C Data Appendix to Chapter 4
The data comes from many sources. Our dataset builds on Ozler, Datt and Ravallion 
(1996) and Besley and Burgess (2004).
The labor regulation variable comes from state specific text amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 as reported in Malik (1997). Besley and Burgess (2004) 
code each change in the following way: a +1 denotes a change that is pro-worker or 
anti-employer, a 0 denotes a change that was judged not to affect the bargaining power 
of either workers or employers and a -1 denotes a change which they regard to be anti­
worker or pro-employer. There were 113 state specific amendments coded in this manner. 
Where there was more than one amendment in a year they collapsed this information 
into a single directional measure. Thus reforms in the regulatory climate are restricted 
to taking a value of 1, 0, -1 in any given state and year. To use these data, they then 
construct cumulated variables which map the entire history of each state beginning from 
1947 — the date of enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act.
State population data used to express magnitudes in per capita terms and as a 
control comes from the 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001 censuses (Census of 
India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Government of India) and has been 
interpolated between census years.
State domestic product comes from Estimates of State Domestic Product published 
by Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India, and is expressed 
in log per capita terms.
Fixed capital comes from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries, Central Statisti­
cal Office, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government o f India. It repre­
sents the depreciated value of fixed assets owned by the factory on the closing date of the 
accounting year. Fixed assets are those which have a normal productive life of more than
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one year. Fixed capital covers all type's of assets new or used or own constructed, de­
ployed for production, transportation, living or recreational activities, hospitals, schools 
etc. for factory personnel.
Variables expressed in real terms are deflated using the Consumer Price Index 
for Industrial Workers, obtained from several publications including the Indian Labour 
Handbook, the Indian Labour Journal, the Indian Labour Gazette, the Reserve Bank of 
India Report on Currency and Finance, and the Monthly Abstract of Statistics of India.
Total installed electrical capacity of electrical generation plants is measured in 
thousand kilowatts and come from various issues of the Statistical Abstracts of India, 
Central Statistical Office, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of 
India. It is expressed in logs.
The data on political histories comes from Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1991), updated 
from the website of the Election Commission of India (http://www.eci.gov.in/). Political 
history is measured by the number if years during our data period that particular political 
groupings have held a majority of the seats in the legislature. State political configu­
rations are held constant between elections. In our data period, the relevant groupings 
are: the Congress party, the Janata parties, hard left parties, the Hindu parties, and re­
gional parties. These groupings contain the following parties (i) Congress Party (Indian 
National Congress + Indian Congress Socialist + Indian National Congress Urs + Indian 
National Congress Organization), (ii) Janata parties (Lok Dal+Janata+Janata Dal), (iii) 
a hard left grouping (Communist Party of India + Communist Party of India Marxist), 
(iv) Hindu parties (Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)), and (v) a grouping made up of regional 
parties.
Banking data refers to scheduled commercial banks: State Bank of India and its 
associates, Nationalized banks, Regional rural banks, Private sector banks, and Foreign 
banks. Data on bank credit is from the Reserve Bank of India publication Statistical 
Tables Relating to Banks in India.
Industry data is from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries. Data is available at 
the 3-digit level, following the National Industrial Classification (NIC). There is a change 
in industrial classification in 1987 and, in order to match the 1970 and 1987 NICs, we
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aggregate a small number of 3-digit industries. We exclude miscellaneous manufacturing 
industries, as these are likely to be heterogeneous across states. The industries ‘Minting 
of Currency Coins’ and ‘Processing of Nuclear Fuels’ are also excluded, as outcomes in 
these industries are likely to be determined by special considerations. This leaves a total 
of 138 industries.
Chapter 5 
Conclusion
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When an engineer is asked to design a car, his first question is: what type of 
car am I being asked to design? Is it a sports car, or a luxury car, or a family car, 
or a car for the urban commuter? Each type of car has its own special characteristics, 
whilst retaining several common characteristics such as four wheels, a steering wheel, an 
accelerator and brake pedals. Likewise, economists, when attempting to address some 
economic question, ask first what type of model is required. This has resulted in the 
proliferation of economic models. Each type of model has its own special characteristics, 
while retaining certain elements in common with other economic models. Each model 
explains well certain features of the world, and may be used as a basic framework of 
analysis in other applications, but without any pretence to unversal generality (just as 
no car engineer would claim that his car is suitable for all purposes). It is precisely this 
implementation of different models to address different issues that is at the heart of this 
dissertation. This concluding chapter will first highlight once again the key findings of 
the previous chapters, then widen the discussion to address possible extensions to the 
work presented here.
The motivation for this dissertation has been to shed some light on two closely 
related questions: How is economic activity distributed across space, and how can we 
explain this distribution? A series of three chapters focussed on three different aspects 
of these questions: the size distribution of cities, the relationship between factor endow­
ments and industrial structure, and the role of absolute factor endowments and politics 
in determining the structure of production. In each chapter, these aspects are analysed 
at different levels of analysis, namely empirical description, empirical explanation, and 
theoretical explanation.
In chapter 2 , 1 reconsider the empirical evidence regarding Zipf’s Law: the idea 
that city sizes follow a Pareto distribution with shape parameter equal to 1. Using a new 
dataset, the oft-claimed universality of Zipf’s Law is rejected. Zipf’s Law is rejected for 
53 out of 73 countries using OLS, and for 30 out of 73 countries using the alternative 
Hill estimator.
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Chapter 3 considers the role of factor endowments and technology in determin­
ing the pattern of industrial activity in India. Using a panel dataset across 16 states, 
18 industries and 18 years, these factors are found to play important roles. This find­
ing is robust to the inclusion of additional controls for political history and government 
policies. There is also evidence of structural breaks in the relationship between factor 
endowments, technology, and industrial structure corresponding to the liberalisation of 
the Indian economy beginning in 1985 and 1991; however, the impact of these reforms 
varies across industries.
In chapter 4, I investigate how initial conditions in terms of absolute factor en­
dowments can impact on economic policy and the structure of production. A theoretical 
model based on political economy is developed whose main prediction is that the more 
capital there is in a given jurisdiction, the more favourable towards capital will be poli­
cies, because of lobbying activity by the capital owners. This then has implications for 
incentives for capital mobility and hence the structure of production. These outcomes of 
the model are found to be consistent with evidence from India using a panel of 16 states 
over 39 years.
There are a number of interesting directions for future research. First, for city size 
distributions, now that there is a newer and more comprehensive description of what the 
actual size distribution of cities looks like, new theoretical models that capture more of 
these features may be developed. One possible difficulty with this line of research is that 
the pervasive presence of power laws in the natural world (e.g. rivers, earthquakes, vol­
canic activity, solar flares, forest fires, the extinction rate of biological species) appears 
to suggest that this is really some "natural'' outcome that may be difficult to model with 
models based on the tradeoffs faced by maximising agents. On the empirical side, recent 
work by Black and Henderson (2003), Dobkins and Ioannides (2000, 2001), Ioannides 
and Overman (2003, 2004), Overman and Ioannides (2001) for example shows what is 
perhaps the most promising direction of research: focussing on the evolution over time 
and space of a system of cities.
Next, for the relationship between factor endowments, technology, and industrial 
structure, at least two empirical extensions can be considered. The first is mainly descrip­
tive: if we go into greater detail, down to the 3- or 4-digit levels, what is the distribution
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of these industries across states and over time? Second, the impact of the 1991 liber­
alisation in India can be examined in greater detail. Recent work by Aghion, Burgess, 
Redding and Zilibotti (2004) suggests that industries close to the world technology fron­
tier benefited more from the liberalisation than industries further from the frontier. A 
related question would be to explore the determinants of economic growth in India, the 
contributions of factor accumulation, TFP growth, and liberalisation to this growth. It 
may also be possible to estimate more formally the impact of economic geography mod­
els following the framework used in Redding and Venables (2004).
Finally, the relationship between politics, policy, and industrial structure offers 
great scope for extensions. One implication of the theoretical model in Chapter 4 was 
that how favourable to capital is policy depends on the parameters of the model, including 
the effectiveness of lobbying activity. Given data on government policies and the dissem­
ination of communications technologies over time and across countries, it should be pos­
sible to estimate the impact of these additional implications of the theoretical model. We 
can also ask the question of whether improved communications technology strengthens 
the influence of special interest groups, by making political campaigning more effective, 
or weakens their influence, by providing voters with more information on the true poli­
cies of the political parties (see for example the discussion on the relationship between 
the media and politics in Besley, Burgess and Prat (2002)).
From a theoretical viewpoint, the political economy model in Chapter 4 may also 
be used as the basis of a model to shed light on the asymmetric liberalisation of capital 
and worker flows with the enlargement of the EU. While the long run goal of the EU is 
to achieve free mobility of both capital and people across member countries, in the short 
run more restrictions have been imposed on the movement of workers than capital across 
borders. It may be the case that capital lobbies have played a role in making capital flows 
easier, to enable them to benefit from low-cost labour in new member countries, while 
restricting labour flows for an initial period of up to seven years. We could also consider 
a dynamic setting where we consider capital accumulation rather than capital movement 
across locations. Although the basic outcome of the model would not be changed, a 
dynamic framework might yield additional insights.
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In the introduction I asked the question of what determines the spatial distribution 
of economic activity. This research project has investigated these determinants by study­
ing the size distribution of cities, industrial location in India, and the interplay between 
politics and economic activity. The main finding has been that, in all of these cases, 
the location of economic activity is determined by a combination of factor endowments, 
market access, and politics and government policy. Only by investigating the joint in­
fluence of these considerations can we understand the distribution of economic activity 
across space.
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